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The story of A1 Ghasail's life is riot directly relevant
to the theme of the present work. Indeed it has already been the
subject of exhaustive study# The history of his spiritual
development however, is relevant, since some knowledge of tills
is necessary for the understanding of his thoughts on
education# The scholars who have written on his theology, his
mysticism or his life story have not been given the chance to
differ on the subject of his spiritual development, since A1
Ghazali did not leave them to guess but wrote his spiritual
history in Ills book Al-Munqidh# in which he gives a clear
picture of the intellectual stages through which he passed.
Tliis account shows how his philosophy of education has grown
out of an earnest and unremitting search for the truth, and
how the truth he eventually found came to shape his thought
on every subject#
(2)
A1 Ghasali tells us that in his earliest youth he ceased
to accept the religious belief which came from authority. That
liis masters so taught him was no longer a sufficient reason
for belief. Mien he was still under twenty he began to
(1) ■P-JL Ghasali wr.s born in A.D. 1053 at Tus and died in 1111.
(2) Aj-Munqidh pp. 65 - 67#
examine theological questions and disputes, and the effect
upon him was very similar to that vdiieh such disputes had upon
Gibbon. So he drifted on,probably restrained only by the
influence of Ms great teacher, the Imam A1 Haramayn, a man of
the most profoundly religious character. But at the camp of
Nizam 41 Mulk the strain became too great and for two months
he touched the nadir of absolute scepticism- He doubted even
the evidence of the senses^the eye could not perceive the
movement of a shadow, but nevertheless the shadow moved; a
gold piece would cover any star, but nevertheless the star was
(1)
larger than the earth. His senses had deceived him, why not
his mind? May there not be something behind the mind, transcen¬
ding it, viiich would show the falsity of its convictions even as
the mind showed the falsity of the information given by the
senses? May not the dreams of the Sufis be true and their
revelations in ecstasy the only real guide? Mien vie awake in
(2)
death, may it not be into real existence? He was troubled
for two months by such speculations. He saw clearly that no
reasoning could help him, for he had no ideas on which he could
depend as a starting point. But the mercy of God is great. Ai
(3)
Ghazali went on to say "He sends his light to whom He wills, a
(1) Al-Hunqidh p. 71.
(2) Al-Munqidh p. 72.
(3) Al-Munqidh p. 75.
light that is produced by no reasoning but flows into the
soul." By tiiis light A1 Ghazali was saved; he regained the
powr to think, and the task which now lay before him was to
use this power to guide hira to truth. He decided to examine
all the current schools of thought in the effort to discover
where truth lay. There were the scholastic theologians,
those who were engaged in discussing religious truth on
logical or philosophical grounds. There were the Ta^llnilyah
who held that to reach a truth one oust have an infallible
living teacher and that such a teacher existed. There were
the followers of philosophy, discussing all problems by logic
and rational argument. There were the Sufis who held that
they were the chosen of God, and could reach knowledge of Him
directly in ecstasy. With all these schools he had been
earlier acquainted to a greater or less degree, but now he
settled down to examine them one by one and find which would
lead him to a certain/ty by which he could hold. He felt
that he could not go back to the unconscious faith of his
childhood. He began with scholastic theology, but there he
found no help. If the premisses of the theologians are
granted, they can draw conclusions. Their science had been
founded by A1 AshlarI to defend the truth against Mu 'tazilites
it had succeeded in that, but had no further value, for it
could hold the faith against the heretics, and expose their
(1)
inconsistencies; but against the sceptics it could do nothing.
It is true that the theologians had attempted to go further
back and meet the adherents of philosophy on their own ground,
to deal vd.th substances and attributes and first principles
generally, but these attemps were ineffective. The
theologians lacked the necessary knowledge of the subject, had
no scientific training and were constrained eventually to fall
back on authority. After the study of them and their methods
it became clear to A1 Ghazali that the remedy for his ailment
h
was not to be found in scholastic theology.
_ (3)Then he turned to philosophy. He had seen already that
the ¥Jeakness of the theologians lay in their not having made
a sufficient study of the laws of thought. He gave three
years to this study. He devoted two years to the study of the
writings of the different schools of philosophers and the
third to reflecting upon and working over his results. He felt
that he was the first Muslim thinker to do this with proper
thoroughness. He divided the followers of philosophy in his
time into three groups: Materialists, Deists and Thaists. The
diet
first group altogether reject the notion of a creator; the
world exists from all eternity, the animal comes from the egg
(1) Al-Munqidh p. 79.
(2) MacDonald (Duncan Black), The Life of A1 Ghazali. p. 83.
(3) Al-Munqldh p. 83#
and the egg from the animal. The second group admitted a
creator, but the creator was a machine which lias a certain
balance (^itidal) in itself which kept it running, its thought
was a part of its nature and ended with death. They thus
rejected a future life, though admitting God and His
attributes# He regards Aristotle as the principal exponent of
this doctrine and the Greek schools. His doctrines were best
represented for Arabic readers in the books of Avicenna and
A1 Farabi - the works of their predecessors on this subject
were a mass of confusion. Parts of these doctrines had to be
stamped as unbelief, part as heresy and part as theologically
unimportant •
The branches of philosophy recognised in A1 Ghazali*s
time were six; Mathematics, logic, physics, metaphysics,
political economy and ethics. These he examined in details
showing what elements in each are useful, which are innocuous,
which must be excluded from education; and vihat dangers are
incurred by those who rejectees what is useful or study what
is harmful. His disposition is to admit those truths of
-Pu.tr
mathematics, logic and physics, vliich are logically irre#«efe-
ablej but he gives warning against intellectuals and the
belief that mathematicians, on the ground of their success in
their own field, can be allowed to carry their methods into
other fields and against the belief that every subject must
be susceptible to the precision of syllogistic logic. In
physics he accepted the constitution of the world as developed
and expounded by the students of physics. But all should be
regarded as entirely subject to God. The system of current
ethics he considered to be entirely derived from the teaching
of the Sufis; nothing in it was independent of their
teaching.
(1)
Thus in philosophy he found little light. He turned
then to the Ta1limlyah whose doctrine is based on the
principle of authority in religion, reliance upon an
infallible teacher through whom alone could truth be found,
Ltd
and/that this teacher existed somewhere if he could only be
discovered. For himself A1 Ghazali found the Ta;limlyah and
their teaching profoundly unsatisfactory. They had learnt a
lesson which they repeated parrot fashion, and their
shallowness of thought vzas clear to all. He wrote several
attacks on this school*
He was left with the school of Sufisth 5 and this he
(2)
went on to explore. He tells us in the Munqidh how after
he had seen the emptiness of the Ta4limlyah, he began to
study the books of the Sufis. He read the works of their
chief vjriters, like A1 Muhasibi, Al Jurayu, A1 Siiibli and ^
(1) Al-Munqidh p. 107
(2) Ibid p. 121
7
Abu Yazid A1 BIstami and also sought oral teaching. Soon it
became plain to him that the understanding of Sufism could
not be reached by reading, but must come through ecstasy and
religious experiences. To achieve this he thought it
necessary to be initiated as a Sufi himself, live their life
and practice their practices. This he did for two years.
During this period he went through many hardships, and
finally found the light he had been seeking. He learnt that
the Sufis were on the true and only path to the knowledge of
God, that neither intelligence, wisdom nor science could
change or improve their ethical doctrine. The light in which
they walked was essentially the same as the light of prophecy.
There was no other light to Illuminate any man in this
(1)
world, and in tills light A1 Ghazali found the truth.
s
After his return from Ms travel', and his mystical
discovery A1 Ghazali, as MacDonald tells us, 'came back to
his home but did not resume Ms public duties as a teacher.'
Later that was forced upon him. "The century was drawing to
a close, everywhere there was evident a slackening of fervour
and faith. A mere external compliance with the rules of
Islam was observed. The students of pMlosophy went their
way, false Sufism abounded, the lives of many theologians
(1) Al-IIunqidh P*153«
8
excited scandal. The Ta<limiyah were still spreading. A
(1)
religious leader was needed," and Al Ghazali was the man.
This, then is the truth which Al Ghazali eventually
adopted, and which came to shape the general pattern of
his thought. Tliis truth lias come to form his theory of man,
the nature of mind, the nature of knowledge, and the human
character. It so permeates his thought and is reflected
clearly in his views about the child right from birth, his
early nurture, his food, clothing and every aspect of his
life.
This truth, moreover, dominates his thinking even in
those fields of thought which are essentially scientific or
purely religious. His views on the matter of the physical
world, and his views on the world to come are dominated by
liis profound conviction of the Sufi truth in which he had
eventually found rest and certainty.
Thus A1 Ghazal^s theory of education in its main pre¬
suppositions is the product of inter-mingled elements, some
of them from diverse traditions of human thought, some of
them original contributions made by Al Ghazali in his attempt
to reconcile what seems to him true in these different
traditions. In particular pcie attempts to reconcile religion
(1) JJ.B .Maedonaid, Development of Muslim Theology.p. 2<£8.
in its true original form as given in the Quran, Sufism, as
he understands it, and philosophy, mainly that derived from
Greek origins, in so far as he finds it complementary to
the concepts of religious and Sufi ideas. His thought is
strongly intellectual but, it can often be understood if we
realize that its direction is governed by a deeper mystical
current, and this is sometimes so powerful as to ove^ielm the
straight course of intellectual argument. Then 41 Ghazali's
thought appears restless and inconsistent. Sometimes it is
as if he were carried on along the philosophical traditions
of Greek thought, with scientific method as the dominant
force. Suddenly, and this happens frequently, the course of
this current turns and the whole scene is transformed. To
alter the metaphor, the man's appearance changes: The Sufi
fever is spreading and he goes into a trance. He says tilings
that can hardly have any intellectual grounds. He himself
feels this but he is unable to escape from the difficulty.
Sometimes he attempts to provide a logical justification for
such ideas but quite often fails. Where faced with this
intractability of reason, that same reason which he constantly
eulogises, he takes refuge in appeal to the 'hidden knowledge',
the knowledge which is not amenable to logical justification,
but is communicated only to those who possess it. Thus the
inconsistencies of thought that are found in A.1 Ghazali's
10
philosophy are attributable on the one hand to Ms unshak¬
able respect for human reason and on the other to his deep
fidelity to the form of truth in which he had found
certainty, the Sufi way.
Some commentators on Al Ghazali's work are apt too
readily to accept as the final verdict Al Ghazali's own
account that after he had examined the different schools of
thought, he came to the discovery of the light, and resting
in this discovery abandoned that which he had found in the
philosopMcal schools. They are apt to neglect to examine
how far Al Ghazali did in truth confine himself to the
contemplation of this light. It is true that the downing of
the 'Light* was the critical point in Ms turning to Sufi
truth, in banisMng the malady of scepticism which for some
time held him in darkness. But I am inclined to think we are
in error if we too unquestionably accept the account that A1
Ghazali completely surrendered to tMs light. In reading Ms
books Ihya,rulum al din (The Revival of religious sciences),
wMch is generally accepted as the most authentic of the
works of religious and Sufi ethics attributed to him, I could
not avoid the feeling that Al Ghazali was still tied with the
bonds of intellectual reason' ig from which he Mmself thought
he had been so far liberate< that he was free in the
contemplation of the light. He often seems to struggle to
• 11
never
loosen these bonds, but was / altogether free of them. In
the following expositions and discussions of his doctrines
of human nature, his theories of learning, a great part of
his theory of moral education, we cannot help being struck by
the way they are pervaded with scientific method and
philosophical ideas, both tho e which he received from his
Greek masters, and those which appear to be his own findings.
This gives support to my view that he could not altogether
liberate himself from the logical mode of thinking. This
tendency towards intellectualisra, even after he found the
light, encourages me to accept with reserve the traditional
statement that A1 Ghazali, after he had found light in the
Sufi truth, turned his back upon the philosophical modes of
thought, and escaped altogether from scepticism. Indeed his
scepticism had certainly abated its stormy character, but I
think there is great naivety in believing that It had
completely disappeared. This mild scepticism,, as it seems to
me, found expression to a greater or less degree in what
appear to be serious inconsistencies even in his authentic
writings. But A1 Ghazali, nevertheless, stands firm in his
Sufi convictions. There is almost always a mystical or Sufi
conclusion to many discussions, on ^latever topic, in his
book Iliva'. He often tries to justify his Sufi conclusions by
quotation from the Quran and the Traditions, but these
- 12 -
justifications are frequently unconvincing.
Now when A1 Ghazali spoke of his sceptical development,
he made no reference to religious belief. Did he doubt the
religious truths, as he doubted the information of senses and
the inferences of reason? Did he doubt tlie oneness of God,
the belief in the world to come, iieaven and HeU? A1 Ghazali
says nothing, May be lie did, but he did not venture to admit
it in the face of a strictly Muslim community where his
rivals and enemies could exploit the admission even to the
extent of creating a danger to his life. This in my opinion
has a special significance in relation to his theory of
education. It explains why his scheme of fundamental
religious education did not essentially differ from the views
currently accepted by all Muslims, If it was impossible for
him to suggest in Ms writings that his scepticism had
extended to religious belief, it was impossible for the same
reason to suggest any modification of the current practice in
religious education. Hence we find A1 Ghazali*s account of
religious education in no way original. It is both in full
concord with the accepted views, and free from the kind of
inconsistencies that we may find elsewhere in A1 Ghazali*s
thought#
At the same time Ms emphasis on good actions and the
purification of the heart brings him into close accord with
- 13
other religions that exalt those same ideas, and mapfe him in
particular more sympathetic than others. Sufi influence is
clearly the source of this element, but this must not lead to
any impression that A1 Ghazali ever deviated from the most
strict muslira orthodoxy in what he writes of religion.
What means of access hi Ghazali had to Greek thought is
a-
a question bound up withAwider and more fundamental problem,
one which is still partly a matter of conjecture, the question
of the channels tlirough viiich these ideas reached the Arabic
World♦ A1 Ghazali certainly had no knowledge of Greek nor is
there any evidence for thinking that he was a student of
languages# There are writings of his which show that lie had
sufficient kncwledge of Persian to express himself in that
language but tlxis knowledge did not lead to any sign,of great
influence upon his work.
Neither is there any evidence to show that he read
translations of the actual writings of Plato, Aristotle or
Plot inns, nevertheless the ideas of these philosophers are
deeply embedded even in his religious writings. There is no
serious problem as to how A1 Ghazali became familiar with
these ideas. He most probably read the -works of Al Far/abi
in which Platonic influence is most marked, he certainly
read the works of Aviccnna whose writings offered the
clearest reflection of^Aristotelian and Keop la tonic schools of
14
thought. When A1 Ghazali tells us that he devoted three
years to the study of philosophy Ms text-books must have
been almost entirely confined to the works of those
distinguished Muslim philosophers whose ideas he combated.
The crucial problem, to which there is as yet no certain
answer, is tliat of the access which Arabic thinkers had to
Greek thought. A full exploration of this problem lies
beyond the scope of the present work, but a brief outline is
necessary to explain the context of Ai Ghazali's thought and
writing. In giving such an outline we can profit by the
recent illuminating work of Dr. ¥&lzer^
Dr. Walzer maintains that we are not in a position to
give a definite account of the genesis of Islamic philosophy.
There are too many gaps in our knowledge of the history of
the descent to them of earlier philosophical traditions. Many
works which might illuminate this history have remained
neglected and the work of rediscovering them must be gradual.
He is able, however, to give a broad picture of the points as
they are so far known.
(1) Richard Walzer Islamic Philosophy (Chapter XXXII),
The History of PMlosouhv-Eastern and Western. Vol.11.
Also see chapter I, The Syriac Version of Hellenism,
fffrpttKht JLtg ptoQg, Ultitorg, by De Lacy
0*leary.
- 15 -
When in the seventh century the Arabs conquered Egypt
and Syria, Greek philosophy load been familiar in these
countries for more than a thousand years as a continuing
tradition of studies, handed dom in schools that were well
established throughout the Greek-speaking world* The great
creative period of Greek philosophy, however, was long since
*
past, and its light had become dim by the time it came to be
handed on to the Arabs. It is important, however, to realise
what Greek philosophy was like in the fifth and sixth centuries
A.D. It was in the form in which Greek ideas had been
incorporated into Christian thought that the Arabic thinkers
made acquaintance with these ideas. Dr. Walzer points out
that it is not always easy to be sure how Plato and Aristotle
were expounded in the Greek Schools, since on some topics our
only evidence is the account given in Arabic sources of the
teaching of the later exponents of these schools.
Moreover, Greek thought, in being reflected through the
minds of Christian thinkers, had been transformed by the
influence of Judaic religious thought. Philo^the Alexandrian
Jew was the first to try to express the essence of Judaism
in terms of contemporary Greek philosophy, this was Greek
philosophy before the influence of Neoplatonism. His thought
had a major influence upon two Christian theologians through
whom his combination of Greek philosophy with Judaic thought
• 16 -
came to affect Christian philosophy. These first Christian
philosophers were Clement of Alexandria and Grigen, and the
first Christian philosophy was thus uninfluenced by
Neoplatonism. This influence came upon Christianity late,
from the fourth century onwards. The Greek philosophy which
influenced the first Christian philosophers was non-religious.
Neoplatonism however, was not non-religious but pagan. There¬
fore the impact of Neoplatonism gave urgency for Cliristian
philosophers to the problem of reconomising the theories of
Greek piiilosophy with the tradition of Hebraic religious
thought, that is, to the conflict between religion and
philosophy, between the natural and the supernatural modes of
thought.
The conflict is epitomised by John Philcpouus and it is
this conflict viiich pervades the historical background of
Arabic philosophy, which raised, as Dr. Walzer says: "The
("1)
principal problem of faith and reason.
These currents of thought reached the Arabic world
direct from the late Greek Schools through translation into
Arabic from Greek and through Syriac. Of the Greek thinkers
it was Aristotle, with the works themselves and the
(1) Islamic Philosophy (Chapter XXXII p.123). The History
of Philosophy Eastern and vol. ii
- 17
commentaries of scholars, *ho was best knov/n to the Arabic
u> t-r<L
thinkers. The logic? in particular fws^snich used by the
Muslim tlieologieal schools. His treatises and the
commentaries upon them gradually became known.?with the
exception of the Polities. The absence of any influence of
the argument of the Politics is noticeable in A1 Ghazali's
writing, particularly his writing on Moral Education, and
this absence is in marked contrast to the strong influence
of Aristotle's Ethics.
Plato's Timaeus. Republic and Laws were available and
were studied. The two latter became text-books of political
theory in the school of A1 Parabi. His "Ideal City" is an
approximation to the city of the Republic, and from tliis A1
Gliazali, I believe, drew much of those of his ideas that
have a Platonic colour. This Platonic element is indeed
strong in A1 Ghazali as will be seen.
The Arabic translations of Greek philosophy began in
early Abbasid times, about 800 A.D. and can be follovred
with
until about 1000 A.D. The translator;: were./hew exceptions,
Christians, some of them followers of the orthodox church,
the majority Hestorians or Jacobites. They usually
translated from a Syriac version, less frequently from the
Greek original. Thus Christian translators play a part in
the general development of thought in the first two centuries
of* the Abba sid empire.
All the Arabic philosophers were influenced by a
written philosophic tradition neither exclusively Platonic,
(1)
nor exclusively Aristotelian, but a mingling of the two.
We shall find an example of this double influence in Al
Ghazali.
The only source that lias been drawn upon in the present
study of Al Ghazoli's educational ideas has been Ms book
- -(2)
Ihya ulum al-Diw 'The Revival of Religious Sciences'. This
restriction is imposed for two reasons: first, the commonly
accepted view of the authenticity of the book; and, secondly,
its comprehensiveness, for it embraces the whole province of
his educational thought. It will not be necessary, however,
for the purpose of the present study, to examine all the
detailed arguments and educational recommendations which Al
Ghazali includes in this important book. Moreover, I have
had to ignore a number of the philosophical issues raised in
it, which seem to me deserving of close investigation, but
which have not so direct a bearing on the philosophy of
education as to justify attention to them in the present
context, I have consulted also other v/orks of Al Ghazali,
listed in the bibliography, which have direct or indirect
(1) Ibid, p. 123 - 126.
(2) Referred to,throughout the present work es ih
- 19
significance for his philosophy of education, but have not
dram upon these as sources for his ideas for the reasons
given above. The exception to this is the support here
invoked from his book Al-Uunaidfa. for the history of Ms
spiritual development. This ms necessary for the reason that
it is Ms only autobiographical work and is certainly
authentic.
In presenting A1 Ghazali's argument I have found
considerable rearrangement necessary in order to present Ms
thought in systematic form. Tliis should not be taken to
imply that Ms thought does not form a coherent system; but
merely that Ms concern -co emphasise an idea often leads to
needless repetition. This is strikingly noticeable whenever
he approaches his Sufi doctrines, which he introduces
throughout his work. There are many ideas, too, vMeh Al
Ghasali introduces casually as subordinate to a major topic,
which seem to me to deserve separate treatment, and in such
cases I have not hesitated to present such an idea as a
separate topic. Examples are the theory of innate ideas,
the theory of reminiscence, the stages of/child development,
theories of the learning processes, the nature of child, and
other major topics which Al Ghazali discussed incidentally.
Thus I hope to make my account of Al Ghazali's theory more
easily comprehensible by arranging it in a systematic form
- 20 -
that may facilitate further study.
Al Ghazali's style is in my judgment highly effective in
imw«in," his thought/-°nhis reader by expressing an idea
in more than one form. This often proves helpful in
elucidating his thought- Sometimes it fails, but one cannot
be sure whether the failure is due to the wealth of ideas
crov/ding his mind or to a real shortcoming in the argument.
Examples of such a failure are to be found in his attempt
to prove that*301 as 9intelligence*, is peculiar to man,
(Part I p. 27 ) his discussion of the order of existences in
relation to the theory of forms (Part II p.76 ). There are
numerous other such examples. The expression seems to be
unclear because the thought is not fully worked out} the
obscurity is not merely a matter of use of language.
All the translations and summaries of Al Ghazali's
work which I have given are made direct from the original.
The only exception is that the quotations in the introduction
are from HaeDonald's account of Al-Munaidh. His interpretation
of Al Ghazali's meaning, however, differs slightly from my
own in some cases, and in such cases I have modified his
account to accord with my om interpretation ...
There is some difficulty in deciding upon the
appropriate English words to represent Arabic terms,
particularly in those cases when Al Ghazali is creating a new
- 21 -
terminology. In all such cases I have endeavoured to make as
clear as possible the sense in which the term is used. An
outstanding example Is to be found in the meanings of caal and
nafs.
In the matter of philosophical terminology, A1 Ghazali
was certainly an innovator in simplifying the language of his
predecessors such as Avicenna, vihose 3tylo was highly abstract,
and in briging philosophical language nearer to the level of
normal cultivated expression. This indeed was one ground for
the attacks launched against him by one of his successors,
Ibn Rushd. His writing is, however, not free from
technicality, but this consists in something other than the
previous philosophical terminology; partly It consists in
the adoption of existing Sufi terms, partly in the
appropriation of certain terms for his original concepts;
hence the creation of a new terminology.
A1 Ghazali*s innovation in terminology is but a slight
reflection of his wider originality as a thinker. I shall be
speaking in the Conclusion of A1 Ghazali*s outstanding
position in the history of thought; here it is sufficient to
say that he stands quite alone in his philosophy. The under¬
lying principle in his whole philosophy is his unwearying
attempt to reconcile his Sufi experiences with the philosophical
ideas which he accepted, and to reconcile both with the
22 -
tenets of orthodox religion* No other thinker had attempted
such a reconciliation, and A.1 Ghazali had no fellow-seekers
in the attempt. In the following pages I shall show from an
examination of Al Ghazali's theories how far he was success¬
ful in this reconciliation. The attempt has earned him an
outstanding position in Arabic thought as an original and
daring thinker.
-23-
P A R T I
DOCTRINE OF HUMAN NATURE.
24
Like most educationalists Al Ghazali puts the Doctrine
of Human Nature in the forefront of his theory. Man is the
object to be educated, therefore in order to know hov; he
acquires knowledge or gains experience, we must understand
what he is and how his natural forces and passions can be
regulated. Human nature is the question at issue, so let us
see how Al Ghazali examines it.
First comes Mind, (aa1). the noblest of human elements.
Mind, says Al Ghazali, is the tree whose fruit is knowledge.
As iiis theory proceeds, in highly figurative language, the
influence of Plato is clearly discernible. In investigating
the casual relations of the "Things in the mind", he varies
Plato*s similes, using in fact the same figures with
different analogies. Closer scrutiny suggests, however, that
these discrepancies may be more apparent than real.
Extracting from the Sixth Book of the Republic only what
lias direct bearing on the present inquiry we find that Plato,
things
using physical analogies to symbolize intellectual!, presents
the soul as the eye, "The organ of sense, which is the most
like the sun." But the eye, in order that it may have sight,
needs the addition of "A third nature", Light, whose source
is the sun. Hence the sun is the author of sight. That
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which according to Plato corresponds to the sun as the giver
of light to the soul, making it radiant with intelligence ,
is the "Idea of Good*.
To A1 Ghazali, on the other hand, the sun symbolizes
(1)
Mind, and the light that streams from the mind is knowledge.
Thus the sun is equated by A1 Ghazall with Mind, by Plato
with the Idea of Good - an apparently wide divergence. It
Is, however, to be noted that Plato's "Idea of Good" does
not occur as such in the writings of A1 Ghazall. To both
philosophers, however , the sun symbolizes the "author" and
"cause" of science, truth or knowledge. If we assume that
A1 Ghazali Is postulating mind in its' highest state, his
conception becomes identifiable with Plato's "Idea of Good".
Then the correspondence is close both in the pattern of
thought and the symbolism of the sun. This I believe to be
the correct interpretation of A1 Ghazall's conception of
mind as reason, despite inconsistencies of thought, to be
examined in due course.
A1 Ghazali further asserts that the mind is the means
of happiness both here and hereafter. Since knowledge is
commonly recognized as excellent, it follows that mind,
being the cause of knowledge, must be the noblest of all.
(1) Ihya' Vol.1 p»73.4<8.
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"How could tHat be doubted", he observes, "seeing that,
though the beasts are on a lower level than men in respect
.(1)
of their tamviz they yet have reverence for men?" This
reverence is expressed in the psychological state of the
beasts when they recognise man, the fear and apprehension
shorn by the strongest animal at the sight of what appears
like the human form is a remarkable sign of this reverence.
It is obvious that this reverence is because of the mental
power he possesses.
The Defining of Keywords
At the outset of his enquiry A1 Ghazali finds that
error lias arisen through faulty interpretation of scientific
terminology. Accordingly he prefaces his account of human
(2)
nature with a set of definitions of "Keywords". Thus
guided by a penetrating insight into meanings, his study of
these keywords is thorough/analytic. This is shown in the
(1) 1 'amy!z is an ambiguous word in A1 Ghazali 's terminology. It is
variously used in different contexts; here it apparently means
the quality -ef- distinguishing man from animals. He also uses it
to denote "sensus communis" (see p.^75). -"-t other times he speaks
of "the age of Tamyiz", i.e. when reason becomes fully developed
(see p.l82). I have given each time what I believe t o be the
meaning At Ghazali has in mind; but it is unfortunate that he did
not include Tamyxz in his defining of "keywords".
- P
(2) Ihya Vol. Ill p.3.
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way he concerns liimself v/ith the relation of knowledge and
experience^ and in his distinguishing between cAql as an
inborn power ( Gharizah ) and '&□! as the items of knowledge
actually attained (cUlun). Here A1 Ghazali finds in the
pedagogy of his own day a problem still persistent in ours.
CA Q L
A1 Ghazali's approach to the study of mind or
intelligence is by my of a fourfold definition of the
Arabic word cAcl which had been a stublingkLock and cause
(1)
of dispute among scholars. Certainly both in importance
and complexity it holds a first place among the words
singled out by A1 Ghazali for definition. His fourfold
division of the connotation of is not exhaustive, nor
does he entirely escape the ambiguities he is concerned to
combat.
The extreme difficulty of equating some of 41 Ghazali's
findings to the accepted English equivalent of the word in
question makes it frequently advisable to retain the Arabic




This suggests that cAal is the distinctive quality of
human beings. "It is a quality ( V&sf) by Milch man is
distinguished from all other animals". Through it man is
capable of comprehending or building up speculative sciences*
( Al c Uluri AX Ilazariy.vah) and becoming conscious of the
mental operations t.lthin himself ( Tadbir As sinacit 41
• »
Kfelffryyah A3, Pifoffryyah) Al Ghazali supports 41 Huhasibi
in Ills definition of as an inborn power (Giiarizah). The
definition reads, "It is a Gharizah through which ^'le
perception of speculative science is possible." "It is
like a light which is shed into the lieart, and by which it
is prepared to perceive things". Al Ghazali egresses his
support of this definition, which implies that cAal is a
Giiarizah or a quality inborn in man Miich enables him to
achieve self-knowledge and knowledge of others. He
comments "He is not right vho denies this and confines the
meanings of cAal to actual knowledge, for men Mien negligent
or sleeping are considered to possess fAal because of the
presence of this Gharizah in them, although they lack tlie
(21
actual knowledge."
Tlius through cAal man is fitted for speculative
(1) Ihya? Vol.1 p.75dA
(2) - Ibid,
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sciences or abstract thought#
A1 Ghazali is at pains to expand his theory that fAal
in this sense is a Gharizah - an inborn pov/er. He eoments...
"It maybe objected that man and the donkey are equal in
possessing sensual perceptions and the Gharizah which is
the inborn power, and further that there is no difference
between them except that God, according to His usual custom,
created In man the actual knowledge, that is to say, the
•
fruit of this power, which He did not create in the donkey.
If this argument is sound, then it would also be possible
to maintain that the donkey and the inanimate object are
equal in possessing life, on the ground that there is no
difference between them except that God according to His
usual custom created in the donkey actual life which He did
not create hi the Inanimate object." This would be absurd,
however, A1 Gliazall saysi "Supposing that the donkey were
dead or inanimate, then we must say that in the same way God
is capable of creating in it, being thus dead, movements
observed in it alive. This is absurd; therefore we must
say that the difference between the donkey and the inanimate
tiling is an internal principle which is peculiar to it,
namely life." Similarly the difference between man and
other animals with regard to reasoning is the inborn power
r (1)
(Gharizah) which is called A£l*
(l) ifryaJ Vol.1 p.75.^.
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(1)
Second Meaning; 'Emergence of Innate Ideas'.
Here Al Ghazali is influenced by Plato's theory that
some ideas are innate, though not fully developed at birth#
They emerge at the time of adolescence, and consist, says
Al Ghazali quoting one of the theologians, in the awareness
of the possibility of the possibles and the impossibility
of the impossibles, such as the judgment that Km is more
than one, and that a person cannot be in two places at the
same time. Al Ghazali comments ... "This definition is
sound in itself. For such ideas (fUlum) exist and calling
them 'Aai is reasonable, but the error lies in the denial
of the Gharizah and the claim that fAal is nothing but that
knowledge, "
Thus Al Ghasali's only objection to this "theologian's
definition" of cAal to connote "Innate Ideas" is the implied
(2)
absence of the inborn power or Gharizah.
Ti#yd 'Experience* CV}W afr-Tajarp))
Another meaning of cAal. is the power which is gained
through the interrelation of man with his environment. The
education instilled by practical experience is the main
source of cAal in this sense.
'V
' . A ■ i t 1, It *,,. ? * +
(1) c01um darurivvah 'necessary knowledge* is the phrase Al
Ghazali uses for "innate ideas".
(2) lhya' Vol.1 p.76.^.
A1 Ghazali in explaining this says: "It is the pother
gained through experiences and changing circumstances since
he who Is taught by experience and versed in traditions Is
usually described as 'Aail Experienced* and he who lacks
(1)
these experiences is known as Jahil * Inexperienced*.
The Fourth Meaning: *Wisdom*
©lis meaning has in Al Ghazali*s thought a spiritual
bearing. It is the power which results from the control
over desire. It corresponds to some extent to the
philosophic form of the soul in Plato*s terminology. It is
the higher element In the constitution of human nature. It
is, as Al Ghazali puts it, that power (Quwraah) which leads
to foresight of consequences and to the control of the
appetites which seek momentary pleasure, "lien this power is
developed, then its possessor is called loll •Wise * in the
sense that his conduct 13 shaped by a reasoned regard for
consequences and not by passing desires^*
Having completed his fourfold analysis of fAal Al
Ghazali makes a careful comparison of Ms findings and
endeavours to synthesize them. "The first two", he says,
"i.e. the inborn power of intelligence and the innate ideas,
(1) Ih.va Vol.1 p.76.^. (3) Ihva' Vol.1 p.76
(2) ©10 context here suggests that lie means by caal
'wisdom* though he does not use the equivalent Arabic
word hiking.
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are inherited properties, the other two, wisdom and
experience, are acquired*" That Is, tley must be achieved
through ''nurture"* In an interesting passage he anticipates
objections to the assigning of so long a span to a single
word, from the concept of Innate Ssnowledge, < cB1im
toM of "experience", ( . and ventures
•
into linguistic theory for his answers - "It is probable",
he says, "that the tern faal originally denoted the 1 lorn
p « 4 V Hjf.
power of intelligence, but, by a process of development,
$■ ■
case to denote the fruits of that power." "A thing", he
CD
eoments, "is sometimes defined by its fruit." lie explains
hot? the innate ideas in Ills second definition make fcjielr
~(2)
appearance at the time of tanviaf and tshy they are inborn.
We shall discuss this point fully then tie speak of his
theories of learning*
SJkJkM an& a S
These two terms, translatable respectively as "Heart"
ami "Spirit", have each at least two meanings for k% Ghasali,
since each symbolises a physical as well as a non-physical
entity.
A1 Gilasail dismisses in few words the physical entitles
CD Vgg Vol*I p*76*^"-
(2) The time when reason becomes fully developed.
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as "natter for the physician"♦ The physical heart, whose
form, composition and position in the body are briefly
described, is, he observes, visible to man and beast alike
and present even in the dead# It is, however, the fountain-
head and source of ruh (see below), and forms the link
between the spiritual aalb and all other parts of the body.
He guardedly compares this relationship to that of
"Accidents to substances, qualities to what they qualify,
the thing placed to its position". Then he ?arns against
trying to explain the mystery since (a) It belongs to the
h
realm of contemplative knowledge, and £iis concern is with
practical knowledge, (b) the investigation demands the
disclosure of the secret of the spirit, of which the prophet
a)
himself did not speak.
Physical ruh.a subtle substance springing from the
cavities of aalb.embodies the life force and is carried in
the veins to all parts of the body, imparting life, and the
senses of feeling, sight, hearing etc,, just as a lighted
lamjo,^carried through the house brings light wherever it
goes.
On the transcendental plane aalb and ruh are
(1) Ihya' Vol. Ill p.3 0.0,
—*—r
(2) Ihya* Vol.Ill p.3.M-.
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synonymous ^ symbolizing the essence of man, human nature, man
in reality. Thus he uses them in contrast to the body,
all of whose members and organs are the servants of aalb.
They are its "outward faculties"} both inward and outward
faculties he terms iunud al aalb (the heart*s forces). It
Is evident that this whole conception of aalb with Its
inward servants, corresponds to Plato's "soul", viz, the
forces of appetite, anger and reason, contrasted with the
"body",
further symbolizes the knowing and comprehending
element in man, tha| which is addressed, punished, censured,
and held responsible - in fact the rational element.
Al Ghazali, probably discerning the wide discrepancy in
meaning between oneuma. together with its accepted Arabic
equivalent ruh. and tlmmos. the spiritual element, generally
translated the latter by ghadab - anger. He generally
prefers aalb to ruh In contexts where either term would be
suitable in Arabic,
N A F S




Quaranic equivalent is "self", but in the use made of it by
A1 Ghazali, under the influence of Greek thought, the
translation should frequently be "soul".
Like aalb and ruh.but in different contexts, nafs
symbolizes the essence of man. Ai Ghazali detaches his
conception of it from Sufi usage, according to which it
signifies, not the apprehending element, but the baser
(1)
tendencies in man, which "command to evil" and which,
according to Sufi ethics, must therefore be combated and
broken. Tims the Prophet ... "Thy greatest enemy is nafs.
(2)
which is between thy ribs." To Al Ghazali, on the other
hand, nafs stands primarily for the soul in its higher
state, which again has two manifestations, the "upbraiding"
(3)
# nafs (lawwamah) and the tranquil nafs (Aj Muffia
"0, thou Tranquil Nafs return unto thy Lord well pleased
and accepted", he argues, "The nafs as a combination of
blameworthy qualities, cannot be pictured as returning to
God ... for it belongs to the party of Satan." The
difference between the "upbraiding" and the "tranquil"
nafs is one of degreej the former is still struggling with
(1) Qtuv'an. 12.53
(2) Ifa'c? Vol.Ill pp. 3-4.
(3) Qtuf an, 75*2; 89.27.
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the lustful "nafs" and upbraiding Its possessor for his
shortcomings in worshipping his Lord, and has therefore not
achieved complete tranquillity• If it ceases to oppose, and
obeys the enticements of lust and the invitations of Satan,
CD
it is called the nafs commanding to evil".
(1) Ihya* Vol.III p.4.?>.
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THE ELEMENTS OF THE SOUL
A1 Ghazali's theory of education is a product of two
main formative factors, (1) The influence of Plato, which
shapes the general pattern of his thought, and determines
his scale of human values; (2) Ms own intellectual
independence, especially Ms clear judgment of the relation
of words to tiie tilings they symbolize. It is this second
factor that enables hint to steer clear of the errors common
to most followers of his two masters, Plato and Aristotle,
and sets him far above and in advance of Ms contemporaries.
The play and interplay of these two factors is
discernible in Ms analysis of the elements of aalb tiiich he
equates with Plato's "Soul",
aPT??W,S
Both A1 Ghazali's fourfold and Plato's threefold
division of human nature begins, at the lower end, with
Appetite, Both distinguish two main kinds of appetite, the
necessary, which is the means of preserving the body, and
vhich it does us good to satisfy, and the unnecessary, vhich
includes of urges, all superfluous and in varying degrees
harmful.
- 38 -
According to A1 Ghazali the maintenance of the body in
health and vigour, for vfiiich the appetite is the natural
agent, has a lofty purpose, Man's business here on earth
is the Journey of his soul towards God, It is the purpose
of education to equip the soul for the Journey, and, in this
process of equipping, the body plays the role of tlie
riding animal. Hence good maintenance for the body is
(1)
important, and provision for the Journey is necessary,
Are hpvcy (<?T iMiege g S3 ry; 3ppe tIt£ s . Various
factors render the presentation of the lower appetites,
whether according to Plato or A1 Ghazali, a more complex
matter, Plato recognizes a subdivision of lower appetites
into: a) - those that are unnecessary, wasteful and
unproductive, but can yet be regulated, and b) - those that
are inherently wild and lawless, affect the best of men when
reason is in abeyance, and, unless held severely in check,
bring life to ruin, This whole conception is symbolized by
Plato1s Beast, the Hydraheaded monster with a natural
capacity for growth and reproduction, some of whose offspring
can be tamed and rendered serviceable, while others are
(2)
radically untamable, inhuman and generally destructive.
(1) Ihya3 Vol, III p,5,<*.
(2) The Theory of Education in I-lato's Republic.no. 10-1] .
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To Al Ghazali the corresponding appetites are the
lowest of human elements, "Man" he says, "for the reason
that lie is influenced by appetites, shares the cravings of
beasts, such as gluttony, covetousness, lust, etc," Al
Ghazali also uses allegorical figures, picturing man as a
being having the outward form of man but combining within
his skin four creatures, the pig, the dog, the demon, and
the philosopher (Hakim).
In Al Ghazali*s allegorical figures the pig is appetite
and corresponds to Plato*s beast. To explain why the pig
represents appetite he says "The pig is not held in contempt
because of its colour, nor because of its form, but because
(2)
of its gluttony and greed." Al Ghazali maintains that
"Most people are subject to concupiscence, and indulge
desire for food and sexj for instance, we may see how such
men condemn others for worshipping deities and stones, but,
if the truth were clear to them, they would find themselves
worshipping a pig and obeying its commands. From among many
evil qualities resulting from submission to this pig





Diva0 Vol. Ill p.9
Ibid.
Ibid p.9 - 10.
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C GHADAB ) - "Anger"
With the element of "Appetite" wo are on firm
terminological ground in both A1 Ghazali and Plato, The
second element introduces a problem of meaning which Al
Ghazali himself lias not left entirely clear. The term
used by Plato for his second element in human nature is
thumps translatable in English by "spirit", but in a
different sense from that in which Spirit* is equivalent
to nneuma or ruh. Tlierefore the word chosen by Al Ghazali
to designate his second component element in human nature
is gliadab - ♦anger*. It covers virtually the same ground
as Plato*s *spirit*, but there are certain ambiguities.
Like appetite, ghadab lias its good and bad sides. Of the
former he writes: "Since God lias created the animal
perishable and liable to ruin through internal and external
causes, He has provided it with that which protects it from
corruption and defends it against destruction." He refers
again to the body's need for food and proceeds: "As to the
external means of destruction to which man is subject, these
are the sword, the spear and all other death-dealing
instruments. Thus it requires strength and passion which
rise from within man to repel the destructive attacks. To
this end God has created the force of anger out of fire and
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fixed it in man's disposition, kneading it into the clay of
his inborn nature (tinah)• Whenever he is prevented from
fulfilling his aim, anger breaks out and expresses itself
in the form of explosion to the extent that the blood of the
heart boils with it, spreads in the veins and rises to the
higher parts of the body, in the manner of fire or boiling
•water. This blood expands ?#ien a person is angry with some¬
one who is inferior to him and on whom he can take revengej
but if the anger is directed against a superior where he has
no hope of revenge, then the result is that the blood
shrinks from the surface of the body down to the inside of
the heart and the anger turns into grief, huzn. If anger
is directed to an equal where the chance of revenge is
doubtful, then the blood sways between expansion and
shrinking. In general the place of this faculty is the
heart# It brings about the boiling of the blood in seeking
revenge# This impulse when provoked is directed to either
the repelling of impending wrongs before they occur or the
avenging of wrongs after they are inflicted, revenge is -the-
which (1)
natural food and by its satisfaction is secured."
DEGREES OF ANGER: A1 Ghazali makes a threefold division of
•anger* according to degree, distinguishing the individual
(1) Ihya* Vol.Ill p.144/5.
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by (I) "Deficiency of the power ( tafrlt). (II) Excess
• #
( ifrat) and the mean ( ictidal). Aristotle's doctrine is
here discernible.
DEFICIENCY:
This is a blameworthy state. Those subject to it are
described as having no sense of honour (haiixvah). for he
who lacks anger entirely is indeed incomplete. Hardness and
sense of honour are regarded as virtues in the Quran, In
praising the companions of the Prophet God said: "They are
hard on the unbelievers but merciful amongst themselves."
Such hardness is the result of the power of indignation,
EXCESSi
The person who is influenced by excess of anger lacks
insight, consideration, reason and control} he becomes its
slave. This domination is due either to instinctive factors
or acquired habits• For there is a person who is by nature
easily provoked to the extent that Ms nature is like that
of ail'angry man, TMs natural tendency is caused by the hot
temperament of the heart. There is also the person who
attains such a condition through mixing with others who pride
themselves on their subservience to anger, and regard it as
courage and manliness. For instance such people boast "we
do not bear with injustice2 Then the person who hears comes




A mean degree of anger, or praiseworthy anger, is that
v/hieh hears the voice of reason and religion. It rises viien
- y
the sense of honour (haalyah) is touched, and it abates when
self-control (hllm) is appropriate. Keeping within the
bounds of the mean in anger is righteousness (istigamah)
which God enjoined upon His people. The Prophet also said:
(2)
"The best of tilings Is the mean ( al wasat)" Concluding
the analysis of the degrees of anger Al Ghazall says that if
a man's anger is inclined to tepidity to the extent that he
feels in himself a slackness of zeal and a lowliness of the
self that Inclines him to submit to wrongs and unjust
humility, he should amend himself so that his anger becomes
strong) and if his anger is Inclined to excess, he should
also amend himself by reducing his excess of anger. One
(3)
should try to keep to the mean between the two extremes.
These, then, are the three forms of Al Ghazali's anger. In
(1) Ihya3 Vol.Ill p.145.10,
(2) Ikya' Vol.Ill p.146.>7.
(3) Ihya' Vol,III p.146
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other passages he pictures anger as representing the wild dog
in the composition of human nature. He apparently here refers
to anger in its second form.
THE SPIRIT or SPIRITED ELEIiENT (THUMPS) III PLATO
As stated, A1 Ghazali's Ghadab covers the same ground, in
most respects, as Plato's Thumos. but there are differences in
approach and in the working out of the idea due to differences
in the spiritual backgrounds of the two writers. Plato's term
is akin to English "Spirit" in such contexts as "A spirited
reply", "The good news restored the spirit of the troops". At
the same time it is represented as the source of pu.gnacity
and aggressiveness with their possible development into
ferocity and cruelty. It is the hard element in human nature
which if rightly nurtured becomes bravery, but if excessively
encouraged degenerates into blind brutality, \tien a man
thinks that he is the sufferer of wrong, he boils with anger
and is on the side of that xihich he believes to be justice.
His noble spirit will not be quelled, until he either slays
or is slain, or until he hears the voice of the shepherd,(that
(1)
is, reason) bidding his dog bark no more.
This well-trained, well-bred dog, obedient to the voice of
the shepherd, is not to be confused with A1 Ghazali's "wild
dog". It occurs again in Plato's conception of the State, as
(1) The Republic Tr. Jowett p.133
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(1)
"the auxiliary that hears the voice of the rulor".
So far A3. Gha&aH follow Plato, '•Anger1', says the latter,
'at times goes to mr with desire". "Anger", says 13 Gkasall,
"is used by the rational part of the soul to break the
(2)
intensity of the appetite." "We observe", says Plato, "that,
vlieu a man's desires violently prevail over his reason, he
reviles himself and is angry at the violence within hlra, and
that the straggle is like the struggle of the factions in a
state} his spirit is on the side of his reason. Similarly 41
Ghasali states: "He sbo lacks anger is not cabbie of disciplin¬
ing himself, for self-discipline cannot be secured except vhere
a man uses anger against desire, and Is angry vlth himself when
(4)
desire craves for low pleasures."
To A1 Ghazall, on the other hand, the natural affinities of
anger are vdth ax>petitej the tv/o are almost allied powers,
which reason must subjugate and employ in order to bring
harmony into the inner life of the individual. True, "God
created anger out of fire... kneading it into the clay of man's
inborn nature"} (see P.40 }, but, mee lodged there, it becomes,
• The Republic Tr. Jowett p.133.
(2) Xhya* Vol.Ill p.9^.
0) The Hepublic Tr. Jowett p.132
(4) Ihya3 Vol.III p. 146. ■
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with appetite, the instrument of Satan, unless subdued by
reasonj and reason, as already shorn, can be disarmed by its
roar. Thus courage, righteous indignation, and the manly
virtues, which are natural attributes of Plato's spirit, must
be won in battle for A1 tihazali's anger by the victories of
reason,
Sufi influence colours all this part of A1 Ghazali's
psychological doctrine. Introducing the Demon, the third
allegorical creature, which has no counterpart in Plato., he
thus graphically describes the spiritual position; "The
Demon does not cease exciting the appetite of the pig and the
anger of the dog. He tempts each of them through the other,
and glorifies in their eyes that to which they are disposed...
It devolves upon the philosophic part, hich represents Reason,
to obstruct the machinations of the Demon and, through its own
piercing insight and shining light, to reveal his perversion
of the heart.
A1 Ghazali's brief statenant that Reason can use the pig
(2)
(appetite) against the dog (anger), is obscure, and he makes
no attempt to clarify it. The following explanations, none
of which is satisfactory, may be offered.
(1) Ihya' Vol.Ill p. 9/17.
(2) Ihya3 Vol.III p.9.1V
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1) - If reason limits the functions of appetite to the
minimum, it follows that Anger, vihose natural food is revenge,
can be more easily controlled by reason. This seems to make
illicit play with the metaphor "food".
2) - Since it is the Demon's method to set the pig and the dog
N
to emulate each other, the strategy of his opponent, Reason,
should aim at making them subdue each other.
THE DEMQMIC EL5HBHT
The introduction of the demon adds a further difficulty.
A1 Ghazali, believing that an enquiry Into its nature will
serve no useful purpose, discusses It according to its
function. But he seems in two mind# whether this element is
an internal force which develops within man or an external
power which enters the human heart. His first exposition of
how human nature is constituted suggests the first view. Here
he suggests through his allegorical figures that man combines
within his frame a mixture of four elements, so that there
are contained in him four qualities. The demonic
(shavtanlvvah) then Is shorn as an evil power exercising its
activities in the role of agitator. In explanation of this
he says "since he (man) is distinguished from other animals
by 'intelligence', tamvlz, but still shares with them anger
and appetite, he contains within him a demonic quality whereby
-• 48
he has become evil, and employs his Intelligence in devising
various types of evil and fulfilling his ends through cunning
trickery and deceit, presenting evil in the form of good, and
(1)
these are the characteristics of the demon."
This is illustrated by his picture of the demon's setting
the pig and the dog to pervert each other by mutual emulation.
Obedience to the irrational part of the soul is in fact
obedience to this demon, for it is he who entices the pig
(appetite), provokes the dog (anger) and employs them for his
(2)
service. This is, then, a conception of the demonic element
as a natural faculty, though it exercises itself through the
activity of the other three faculties.
Now let us see how he represents this evil spirit in other
parts of Al Ihya'.
Speaking of the conflict within the human heart, A1 Ghazali
holds the opinion that there are two types of opposing
thoughts, evil suggestions (waswas)f and good inspirations
(illiam). The cause of the former is the Demon or Satan and
the cause of the latter the Angel. He believes that the
function of the Angel is the spreading of good, the imparting
of knowledge and the unveiling of truth, and the function of
(1) IhyaJ Vol.Ill p.9,11
(2) Ihya' Vol.Ill p.9
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Satan is the reverse. Hence bad suggestions are the opposite
of good inspirations, Satan is the opposite of the Angel, and
hence there arises a conflict between these two powers. "The
heart by nature (fitrah)". he says, "is equally liable to the
reception of the impacts of the Angel and that of Satan.
Neither of the two powers prevails against the other until a
man either follows desires or opposes them. If man follows
the dictates of anger and desire, then Satan influences him
and the heart becomes a nest of the devil, for desires are
the pasture and the hot-bed of the devil; but, if he resists
desires and does not allow them to rule him, and imitates the
qualities of the Angels, then his heart becomes the residence
of the Angel." He also maintains that so long as no heart
is free from desire, anger, covetousness, greediness and so
forth, the devil must have a foothold in every heart. That
is why the Prophet said, "There is no one of you but has a
devil." And when they (The Companions) said to him, "And
also you, 0 Messenger of God", he replied, "I, also! but God
<2)
helps me against him."
Yfoat, then, is this power? Is it an outside power that
invades the heart of man and occupies It, the result of
(1) Ihya' Vol.Ill p. 24
(2) Ihya° Vol.Ill p. 24
♦
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environmental development? Or is it present as an inborn
pov?er in the child at birth - the result, that is, of
heredity? If the latter, then the conception is in accord
with A.1 Ghazall's first introduction of the demonic element.
But if it is the former (outside power), then the question
arises, how could this be reconciled with his first
introduction of the demonic element? In another passage of
the Ihya' he says the conflict between the forces of the
angels and Satan continues endlessly outside the heart, until
the heart is opened to one of them, and then the victor enters
the heart and settles there. In this case the incursions of
the other occur occasionally. Most hearts, he thinks, are
liable to the entry of evil forces and consequently subject
to evil suggestions which incite to momentary pleasures. How
are we to explain this Inconsistency? He also says that just
as appetites are embodied in the flesh and blood of man, so
too Satan circulates in the flesh and blood and surrounds
the heart, and this is why the Prophet said: "Satan
circulates within man as the blood circulates In his veins.
Therefore close its channels by hunger, because hunger breaks
(2)
the appetite which Is the channel of Satan."
Here again A1 Ghazali leaves his problem unresolved and
(1) Ihya* Vol.Ill p. 24
(2) Ihya* Vol.111 p. 25.G.
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this seems to me the source of the inconsistency in his view
of the demonic element; he has confused what we may call the
•influence1 of Satan with Satan himself. He evidently speaks of
Satan as 'circulating• within the human heart just as the blood
circulates, and it is obvious that the Satan which is an outside
power cannot enter the heart and be part of it. He certainly
means here the "influence" of Satan, whose function is to "Pmin-
ate the heart through apoetite and anger, this influence becoming
so dominant that it becomes part of the heart. I am inclined to
think therefore that he conceives this evil power as being the
external force of evil, (i.e. Satan) which enters into the heart
in the form of an influence. This view is supported by his
words "Until the heart is/open to one of them". We must therefore
accept that this force is external, but that its influence becomes
an internal force. This, in my view, resolves the apparent
inconsistency in these passages; nevertheless there seems an
irreconcilable contradiction between his introduction of this
power as external force and his division of human nature into
four elements including the demonic.
In Plato's 'Republic' this is called the philosophic
element. It ranks highest in the constitution of the human
soul. As it is variously handled in different parts of The
THE RATIONAL ELEMENT,
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Republic it would be of service to review the account of it
given by Kettleship in Ms work 'The Theory of Education in
Plan's .Republic?'? we shall see later how much A1 Ghazall
diverges from or follows the line of Plato.
Nettleship says: "Vfe find the philosophic element at
first characterised in a way far removed from what the
English word -would lead us to expect.
It is Introduced as a necessary pliilosophic complement to
the element of spirit. Unmitigated or unbalanced the latter
element would be a source of mere indiscriminate pugnacity,
and would result in a destructive war of all against all.
Clearly, if human nature is to be adapted to the higher
function of civic society, it must contain some counter¬
balancing factor, some quality of gentleness to soften
ferocity. The germs of such an element Plato finds in some
of the lower animals, the well-bred dog which had been
chosen to typify the quality of spirit is found to exhibit
along vd.th the greatest fierceness toTards strangers, the
greatest gentleness to those wham he knows5 and this
suggests that is found to be the fact vzhen we look at human
nature that this combination of qualities, so opposite, is
not only possible but natural. But why call this softening
element philosophic?" Nettleship continues 5 "Plato helps
himself with the analogy of the dog. The dog judges of
friends and enemies by the test of knowledge, those whom he
knows he treats as friends, with hi to know' is in t- worn
to be fond, and it is the feeling of knowing those whom ne
knows vihich excites his fondness. He may be said in a sense
to be fond of knowing much as a person who likes the society
of his inferior might be said to be fond of superiority.
"In so far then as the quality of gentleness attaches to
the consciousness of knowledge and the pleasure which that
consciousness excites, it may be said to arise from fondness
of knowledge and this is almost equivalent to philosophy in
its literal sense of love of knowledge or wisdom."
There is another form of the rational element of the soul
which is described in The RepublicT of which Nettleshlp says:
"it is still indeed the gentle or tame part in contradiction
to the wildness and hardness of the spirited part, and it is
still intimately associated with knowledge but the gentleness
of which it is now said to be the source is the result of
culture Instead of dog-like attachment, and the knowledge
in which it takes delight is the sense of something under¬
stood rather than of something familiar."
Nettleship concludes "vihen again we meet with the higher
form of the soul it is no longer under the name of
(1) The Theory of Education in Plato's Republic, p. 15.
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philosophic. The intellectual character in it now
predominates over the emotional, it is the calculative,
deliberative reasoning element in the soul, that in virtue
of which it guides and rules, that which hen fully developed
becomes not love of wisdom but wisdom ...
"its relation to the spirited element is also changed from
being a merely complementary factor to it, it lias come to be
its natural master from whom issue the dogmas and principles
which in the well trained soul appetite carefully obeys and
(1)
spirit fearlessly carries out,"
It now remains to turn to Al Ghazali's account of the
rational element of the heart. He also gives it different
forms in his work, the Ihvak It is introduced as the third
faculty of the heart, and in its simple and primary form it
suggests to Al Ghazali the knowledge of or the familiarity
with what is good or harmful to the body. The means of this
familiarity is the faculty of 1 sense perception*, the
faculty whose function is to identify things, the tester
(al mufarrif) which distinguishe| between good and bad in
(2)
order to satisfy bodily needs*
Nov; let us see how closely Al Ghazali follows Plato*s
(1) IpglJbldH: p. 16
(2) IhyV Vol.Ill p.
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train of thought in the notion of the simple form of his
philosophic element.
He does not lead up to his conclusion through the same
argument as Plato but he agrees with Plato's conclusion when
he says that the function of the rational element is to
provide the heart with the familiarity with, or as he puts it
the knowledge of, that which satisfies the appetite "for that
he who needs nourishment would not benefit from the desire for
food unless he were familiar with the food required; therefore
in order to secure this familiarity he requires two kinds of
faculties, the first being inward, and the second being outward
a)
as it lias already been said. Sensation her© has a function,
making possible this fondness which grows through familiarity,
-which is like Plato's conception of the quality in animals that
gives rise to gentleness, the testing of knowledge, and
consequently the fondness grounded in familiarity which in its
developed form becomes in man the philosophic element. A1
Ghazali, however, does not say what plays the role of Plato's
spirit in creating this kind of 'rationality'.
A1 Ghazali's next presentation of the rational element
may also correspond to Plato's, though the correspondence is
not easily recognised. He says: "the heart has another
(1) Ihya7 Vol.Ill p.5
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faculty namely the faculty of knowledge or wisdom", In
another passage he speaks of the characteristics of rational
element by virtue of which man becomes superior. He says "His
superiority is due to knowledge and volition. Hie former is
the knowledge of secular and religious affairs, and of logical
(1)«
truths. (See part II p.74) This conception of the intellect
may fairly be equated with Plato's fully developed Philosophic
element whose object Is knowledge., whose gentleness is the
result of culture rather than mere devotion and whose delight
is in things understood rather than things familiar. We may
safely maintain that the knowledge of secular and religious .
matters etc. in A1 Ghazali's language is equivalent to the
culture which Plato's conception contributes to the shaping of
the rational element.
A1 Ghazali's final conception of the rational form which
is introduced by him in his allegorical figure is almost
identical with that of Plato. It represents the God-like or
the Divine quality (rabbinivvah) in the composition of human
nature, it is the highest form of the soul. He says: "Since
man in himself is a Divine matter ... he claims for himself
Lordship and he loves domination, elevation, leadership and
freedom. He is fond of learning and acquaintance with all
(1) Ihyk' Vol.Ill p.7.«.
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sciences and ideas, and he claims for himself a comprehension
of the reality of all things. He is pleased if knowledge is
attributed to him and annoyed if he is accused of ignorance."
A1 Ghazali goes on to say: "Comprehension of all realities and
domination over all creatures are Divine qualities, but in
(1)
human nature there is a desire for that consummation".
A1 Ghazali says: "The function of the philosophic element
(Mkltt) is to keep off the cunning and the mischief of the
Demon by unmasking all his misdirection through its sharp
insight and shining light."
Influenced! by Plato1 s conception of the State A1 Ghazali
explains the relationship between this philosophic eleoient and
the other parts of the heart. To him, its function is to rule
and guide, the function of the other elements is like that of
the other classes In the State, therefore in performing each
their separate functions in the best way they are also in the
best way working for the good of the whole. Any serious
contradictions between these elements may lead the individual
to ruin and probably destruction! harmony and friendly co¬
operation lead to justice and consequently happiness. The
conception of the individual in such manner illustrates the
deeper understanding and wider outlook of the rational element
(1) Ihya' Vol.Ill p. 9.30
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in human nature. The formation of human character and the
regulation of human conduct cannot come but as the result of
the domination of this rational element#
To illustrate the functions of the various elements in
human nature A1 Ghazali uses several metaphors of vhich we
shall now give an account#
THE STATE METAPHOR
This, the most ambitious of A1 Ghazali's metaphors for
the better understanding of 3alb , is built on Plato's
"Republic", and clearly shows how Plato influenced his views
on the social structure and its divisions# But the "Republic"
here serves merely as the vehicle for the conveying of A1
Ghazali's theory of the position of the heart in relation to
the body. With the immense body of doctrine concerning justice,
statecraft, education, and all other components of the civic
community, which - whatever its ultimate theme and purpose -
are discussed and re-discussed on their ovai merits in the
"Republic"A1 Ghazali is not concerned. But Plato identifies his
state with his individual (Book IV)5 A1 Ghasali's psychology
of the heart is Platonic in design; accordingly ho takes the
skeleton outline of Plato's state as an analogy of the human
soul, supplementing the account, where necessary, with elements
from Sufi thought#
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So the heart in the body is the ruler in the state and
the body is the state which the heart rules. The rational
element is the Counse/lor, the v&se minister, who advises the
ruler; the organs and physical forces are labourers who
produce commodities for the community. Anger represents the
military and security forces, whose function is to defend the
state against external and internal attacks and disturbances.
Then a Sufi element appears: "The slaves", a class not
found in the "Republic". They are largely dominated by
Appetite, and the directing force behind them is, I think, the
demonic element. So the slave is cunning and treacherous; A1
Ghazali warns the ruler to beware of this class until it
becomes "Ruled and not ruler", commanded, and not commander,
so that justice may be established in the state; for the
slave will appear in the guise of an adviser but behind this
advice is "terrifying evil and fatal poison", he never ceases
from his opposition.
So, too, human nature: if it seeks the assistance of
reason, is disciplined by anger, and uses both anger and
appetite to restrain each other's excesses - then its forces
(1)
become balanced and its character good.
(1) Ihya? Vol.111 p. 6.\<\
6o
The City Metaphor
In order to elaborate the relationship between these
facilities, A1 Ghazali gives another analogy* Here the body
is a city, and reason, the rational element in man, is the
King, vhile its powers of sensation, both visible and
invisible, are soldiers and keepers; its members are the
subjects, and those elements of the soul which command to evil,
namely appetite and anger, are the enemy that wars against the
kingdom and endeavours to destroy the subjects.
Thus the body is seen as a fortress and its rational
soul is the commander who is stationed there. If it fights
until it defeats the enemy its deeds mill be praised, but if it




Another example is given by A1 Ghazali to identify the
function of the rational soul. Reason is a horseman, appetite
is the horse, and anger is the hound. If the rider is skilled,
if Ms horse is well trained and Ms dog well bred, then he is
likely to be successful; but if the rider is unskilled, his
horse ungovernable, and his dog is intractable, then he is
likely to meet disaster rather than to acMeve what he seeks.
(1) IhyiT Vol. Ill p.6.^4--
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The inefficiency of the rider corresponds to the lack
of wisdom in man, the ungovernableness of the horse is like
the excess of appetite, especially appetite for food and
sex, and the wildness of the dog represents the passion of
(1)
anger*






Like Platoj A1 Ghazali considers how we attain know"
knowledge ; Is It a gift of God? Is it something that can be
developed through education?; Is the capacity for knowledge
innate, or does it come of instruction, or both? A1 Ghazali
asserts that knowledge is of different types. Some, he finds,
is innate (see Part I page^o second meaning of caal). Here
his argument follows Plato's in a famous passage of the lleno,
which it may therefore be helpful to recall: "A man who does
not know has within him true opinions about that which he does
not know. The opinions are called up within him as a dream
but on questioning him variously and repeatedly about the same
tiling he would at last come to know about them as correctly as
anyone. Without being 'taught1 but merely by being 'questioned1
he will come to know, tliat is to recall certain knowledge out
of himself,M
In order to reach this conclusion Socrates has,
during the discussion, called up a slave boy who knows nothing
whatever of geometry, and put a series of questions to him with
a figure of squares and triangles dravati In the sand. The boy,
after some overconfident blundering, followed by a state of
perplexity which reveals to him his present ignorance,
eventually discovers the correct answers to the questions,
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"uttering", says Socrates, "nothing but his own opinions".
The conclusion is that the boy has not been learning new
knowledge from Socrates, but remembering "true opinions, roused
up by questioning'^, ^v;hich "his soul must have been learning
through all time."
Such is Plato*s doctrine of •innate ideas* in its
simplest form,which seems to have guided Al Ghasali's theory
given in Al Ihya'. Here he writes ofculun daruriv.vah
(literally, "necessary items of knowledge"), vhich,he says, are
innate in the heart and emerge when there is a stimulus to
cause their appearance. They seem not to come to the mind from
outside, but to be hidden within it ready to emerge. This, he
Q
says, is analogy to the way in which, viien we dig a well,
water gathers beneath the .earth and appears in the wellj but
what thus becomes visible in the well is not new. The practice
of drawing analogies from the events of everyday life is a
favourite device of Al Ghazalij and it is reasonable to surmise
that his picture of water welling up when the earth is dug is a
parable of Plato*s doctrine of reminiscence in response to
questioning.
But if the form and structure of Al Ghazali*s theory of
innate ideas is Platonic, its inspiration derives from his ovffi
(1) The Meno. pp.179 - 191-
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religious training. He infers their existence in an argument
dependent on the meaning of the Arabic word "Fitrah". Else¬
where in this study (See Part page ) I have attempted to
interpret this nrucl^bisputed term. Here It Is sufficient to
say that A1 Ghasali implies with it his belief that man is
(1)
created with an innate faith in God.
The Process of Reminiscence
How then are we to explain the fact that some people
lack this faith or belief in God? To this A1 Ghazali replies:
"Belief in God is fixed in man by nature, but there are two
kinds of people: (1) those who have turned av/ay and forgotten
- the unbelivers; (2) those who have thought and recollected."
The former are like one who is asked to give evidence, but
(2)
forgets through negligence.
"To describe this process as 'remembering• is not
difficult, according to him, for remembering Is of two kinds:
the first is when one recalls something one has experienced but
which has now disappeared; the second is to recall something
which has not come to one by experience and must have been
(3)
implanted by nature."
(1) Ihya' Vol.1 p.77.7.
(2) Ihya* Vol.1 p .77
(3) Ihya' Vol.1 p.77
J
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These innate ideas are the image of the knowledge that
exists in the eternal realm (A1 Lawh Al-Mahfuz. ). They are
not clear enough however to mate 'their appearance before the
tine of adolescence because of the physical immaturity of the
child*s heart; he says "the heart is like the eye, and the
n
mind in it is lite sight. This mind directs its power towards
the knowable, as the eyesight directs its power towards
visible, objects. The power of sight is a subtle entity which
is absent in the state of blindness, and present in the state
of having sight. It is present even if the eyes are shut or
darkness is falling. Knowledge which occurs through mind in
the heart is lite the power of sight in the eye. The absence
of ideas from the eye of the heart during childhood until the
-(1)
age of tamviz resembles the absence of the vision in the eye
until the time when the sun rises.
The Pen with which God inscribes ideas on the pages of
the heart corresponds to the disc of the sun which gives light
to the universe. The reason why these ideas do not appear in
the heart of the child before tam.vis is that the heart is not
yet fit for the reception of the actual ideas. The Pen is the
instrument specially used by God to cause these ideas to emerge
(1) The age of tamviz nere is the time v/hen reason starts to
be fully developed as is clear from the analogy of the
sunrise.
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in the heart. In the Quran God said: "It is He who taught by
(1)
the Pen, taught man what he did not know."
A1 Ghazali's choice of the Pen as main cause of this
emergence reveals a profound belief in the divine pov/er.
According to him all ideas existed long before in the divine
realm; they were inscribed on the Preserved Tablet. To A1
Ghazali then, the cause of reminiscence is the Pen by which God
"taught man what he did not know." At first sight this view
is at variance Y/ith Plato^, according to which the chief aid
in reminiscence is the living voice. Nevertheless I do not
interpret A1 Ghazali's formula as denying oho importance of the
living voice. As already shorn he expressly states that innate
(2)
ideas emerge in response to a stimulus (sabab). 1 here venture
the suggestion that this stimuls, which is symbolized by the
process of digging the earth in order that water may well up,
is none other than the living voice. That being so, the Pen,
which A1 Ghazali propounds as "cause of emergence of ideas",
must be interpreted as a cause behind a cause, in other words,
the ultimate stimuls, v?hich is the divine pov/er.
The child passes through two states in respect of the
occurrence of ideas.
(1) Primary ideas, such as the knowledge of the impossibility
VI
Cl) Ihya' Vol.Ill p.14 Quran 96 - 4^.
(2) Ihya^ Vol.1 p.77h.
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of the impossible and the possibility of the possible,
actually exist in the heart of the child. But speculative
knowledge exists only potentially. The child has these
potential ideas, in the same way as a person who is learning
to write possesses the ink-pot, the pen and a knowledge of the
alphabet, although he does not know how to combine the lettersj
ho is nearing the stage of being able to write.
(2) Other ideas come to the child through experience and
speculation. They are stored within him as it were, and ready
for him to consult whenever he wishes. The learner may now be
compared to one who has mastered the art of penmanship, and
can be described as a penman because of Ms capacity to write
even if he is not actively engaged in writing. The state when
knofjledge is possessed in tMs way is thus described by A1
Ghazali: "this stage of human knowledge is the Mghest,
although within it there are countless degrees, since people
vary in proportion to the quantity and quality of their know¬
ledge, and also in the method of attainment. It occurs to
some hearts through revelation and to others through
instruction. They also vary in the rapidity or slowness of
their reception of ideas. This is what constitutes the
difference in degree of knowledge between the scholars,
philosophers, saints and prophets. Highest of these ranks the




These stages are an interesting though not quite
original feature; for we encounter them first in the
Psychology of Avicenna, which is mainly Aristotelian. A1
Ghasali has, however, put his own stamp on it by applying it
to Ills theory of "innate ideas", and the problem of their
emergence. This augments the educational significance that
he attaches to them.
As presented by A1 Ghazali the 'stages* form the frame¬
work of our mental development. In the first stago our hearts
contain all primary ideas. This excludes those obtained by a
process of logical reasoning; concerning these, he says, we
possess not the ideas themselves, but the capacity for
acquiring them. Our power of thinking is not yet mature but
is approaching that stage. In the second stage our under¬
standing advances; both 'experience* and 'speculation' have
begun to play a part. There is now a double source of ideas;
the forms upon which knowing depends may be innate within us,
but they can only become effective in constituting knowledge
when we experience things that live, in a sense, within us;
that includes of course the words of others from which we
learn. People vary in their capacity of attaining ideas: some
»«"■>«« »wn.in»wm»i I — ———mm
(1) Ihya' Vol.Ill p.7.^
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a,
have direct and un/ided intuition; others deoend upon the help
that those who know more than themselves can give - teachers
In fact.
Original Ideas.
The problem of original ideas - how and. whence they
anpear has puzzled thinkers on education In all periods. Even
Plato with his strong emphasis on reminiscence as the essential
element In the learning process does not ignore or deny the
part played byAxoerience, since hls"nuestionlng" is in fact
a form of exnerience, though operating through a process of
reminiscence.
Al G-hazali, as his exposition of the term caql makes clear
(see Part I p 30 ) » "hile allowingjfche existence of innnte
ideas, is at pains to limit his conception of their field of
action, since there are, too, acquired ideas, which enter the
mind through the senses; and perception through the senses is
the first step in the learning process. Here he speaks of al
mudrlk, 'the perceiver' - the medium through "hich ,:e obtain
all that we can speak of as sensory knowledge.
Al G-hazali's own words seem to confirm the foregoing
account of this theory of learning. In his analysis of the
elements of the heart he writes: "The third is the perceiver
( 1 niu^rlk) -.-hose function is to get to know (yatac arraf)
physical objects. It is like a spy. It is represented by the
70
senses of seeing, hearing, smelling, touching etc. (sense
perception). The 'perceiver* (mudrik) is of two kinds: -
that which resides in the outward dwellings (the senses):
that which resides in the inward dwellings, which are five
in number. A person, for example, seeing an object and then
closing his eyes perceives an image within himself. This takes
place in the imaginative part of the brain. Then the picture
remains within his mind through a special faculty which is the
retentive part. He reasons about what he retains by combining
some of these images with others. Then he recalls what he lias
forgotten and so remembers it. Then lie harmonises the sense
images in his imagination through the faculty of "common-
sense" - (A1 hiss Al mushtarak). Therefore faculties are the
internal, common-^sense, imagination, reasoning, memorisation
and retention."
This notion that the mind is divided into various
(2)
faculties is borrov^ed from Avicenna. A1 Ghazali has, however,
confused the issue with conflicting statements concerning the
position and function of "common-sense". At times he shows it
beginning to operate after the imagination, and he writes:
"The mind harmonizes (yaJoaT ) all the 'sensed ideas' in the
(1) Ihya* Vol.Ill p.
(2) Avicenrxe's Psychology, English Translation of Kiteb
Ai Najah by P. Eehman, pp. 30-31.
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imagination, by the faculty of "common-sense!but be
concludes his introduction of these faculties by listing
"common-sense" before imagination, thus: "There are within the
mind the faculties of "common-sense", imagination, reasoning,
memorization and retention". As, however, this division is
very similar to that of Avicenna, it may be assumed that he
assigns to ?common sense1 the function of receiving the
contents of the five senses, after which the function of
imagination begins. This, however, is not clearly expressed,
and A1 Ghazali is weak on what Avicenna speaks of as internal
aana&a*
These, then, are the faculties that A1 Ghasali groups
under the name (mudrlk) 'perceiver* and expounds according to
their function in the learning process. His chain of raental
operations leaves no doubt that in his view our ideas of the
outside world come from the senses. Here he anticipates the
English empirical school of Locke, whose principal tenet was
that "all ideas come from experience". The doctrine is
clearly expressed in the following passage from Locke's
"Essay concerning Human Understanding*Book II, Ch.I, Para.23:
"Since there appear not to be any ideas in the mind before
the senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that ideas in the
understanding are coeval with sensation: which is such an
impression or motion made in some part of the body, as
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produces some perception in the understanding. In time the
mind comes to reflect on its ovm operation about the ideas got
by sensation, and thereby stores itself with a new set of
ideas which I call ideas of reflection.
The impressions then that are made on our senses by ou£-
ward objects that are extrinsical to the mind, and its own
operations about these impressions, reflected on by itself, as
proper objects to be contemplated by it, are, I conceive, the
original of all knowledge."
Elsevihere in the IhvaJ a highly pictorial exposition of
the functions of the cognitive faculties reveals the close
resemblance of this part of his theory to Locke's. He writes:
"The inudrik (the perceiver)',' that is, the perceiving element
in man, "resides in the heart, which sits like a king in his
kingdom. It appoints the imaginative power which has its seat
in the cerebrum as its dpstrnaater-genera1 (sahib al barid)
because all the sense information is gathered in itj it
appoints the retentive power which resides in the back of tlia
brain as its treasurer (khazin). the speech organ as its
interprets (tuy.jupi%), the active members as its clerks
(kuttab) and the five senses as its spies (,1awas is). The heart
holds each of them (the five senses) responsible for the
information of a specific region. It appoints as agents, the
power of seeing for the world of colour, that of hearing for
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tins world of sound, of spelling for tto world of scent, etc.
Tiiose so.-ses ore they glean
Ideas froc the catsMo regions ana in turn deliver then to the
postoaster-general, namely imaginative power, and tills in turn
delivers them to the treasurer, which is the retentive poser;
the treasurer then exhibits then to the Icing and the king in
turn extracts from then tot lie requires for the management
(1)
of his kingdom,11
41 Ghaxall and Locke thus agree in assigning a
predominant role to sensation and experience in the cognitive
process. But here the resemblance ends; for whereas Locke*@
whole philosophy rests largely on a denial of the existence of
innate ideas, and arises out of a desire to prove this, 41
Ghasall not only finds s place for innate ideas in the
cognitive process (Boo p. 62 )sbut propounds yet onotor sot of
Ideas tot are neither Innate nor acquired through sensation.
He indicates this torn, lie speaks of 'acl as signifying the
qualities peculiar to to human heart, vis: cognition ( filxi)
and conation ( Irsdeh). cIlp, he says, "is the abstract knou*
ledge of things secular and spiritual; these things are
beyond the sao^e of the senses and other animals cannot take
part hi then." rXln is thus the quality of the nind that
(1) lays' Vol.Ill p.3.0-1).
(2) Jhya' Vol.Ill p.7.1.
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sees the self-evidence of universal statements.
The influence of Aristotle's theory of the Rational
Faculty is very marked in Al Ghazsli's discussion of abstract
tliought. This faculty laiows without a Physical organ and so
it follows that it knows itself, the organ and the act of know¬
ing. Hie mental operation here is purely abstract! all these
according to hie can not belong to the category of empirical
knowledge nor to the category of Innate ideas. They are rather
a distinct class having its own characteristic. Al Gustsail
conceives general ideas - or universale - as belonging to
this class. Here he lists categories that can be Interpreted
neither as empirical knowledge nor as innate ideas. These
include (1) under secular knowledge, mathematical truths, (2)
under metaphysical facts, which he describes as spiritual
(uMirawiwah). the conception of God, His deity and otiier
attributes! finally (3) our generalisations: these he terms
logical (caoliw«h).
Spiritual Process of besnilm
Al Ghazali speaks also of another process of learning. Tills
process is a purely spiritual one, it springs frco his mystical
leanings. Sow some iniowledge is neither innate, near readied by
reason through the rational faculties, nor acquired tlirough
sensation, as already explained* It is beyond the scope of the
senses. It enters through the 'internal door' (Al-iiab Al
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Dakhlli) which, as A1 Ghazali thinks, leads to the invisible
v?orld, the divine realm where the perfect ideas are found.
Here is A1 Ghazali speaking of his theory: "It should be
known that the venders of the heart are beyond sense perception,
because the heart itself is beyond the scope of senses, and
that which is not perceived through the senses is difficult
for the intellect to grasp, and can best be grasped through an
analogy dram from sense experience; therefore we give an
example in order to make this clear even to a simple mind.
"Let us suppose there is a pool. It is possible for water
to be directed into it from above through streams running into
it» It is possible also to deepen the bottom by removing the
soil until a spring of pure water is reached. Then water wells
up from within the pool. This water is purer and has a more
constant flow. It may also be deeper and more abundant. The
heart, then, is like a pool, knowledge is like the water, and
the five senses are like the streams (anhar): it is possible
for knowledge to be directed to the heart through the streams
of the senses until the heart is filled with it; it is also
possible for a man to block these streams by going into
seclusion (khalwah) or shutting his eyes, and then he makes
for the depth of the heart, purifying it by removing from it




At this point A1 Ghazali sees an objection, to which,
however, he fails to give a satisfactory answer. "How," he
asks, "could knowledge possibly overflow from within the.heart
seeing that the heart itself is devoid of knowledge? It is one
of the secret v/onders of the heart, ana it is improper to dis¬
close it in a discussion of practical knowledge ("Ilm A1 Mu-
ahialah)." None the less, some light has to be shed on the
question in view of its bearing on the present enquiry. Here
Al Shassali uses the theory of forms or ideas to explain how
knowledge could flow up from within the heart itself. He
believes that there are various forms of reality, or ideas
that.derive from the divine realm, that is to say, the world
where perfect knowledge is stored. The realities of things
are inscribed on the Preserved Tablets fAl lawh Al-Mahfuz'). in
the same way as an architect plans the structure of the house
i
on a blank sheet and then puts it into effect according to
that plan. So too did the Creator of heaven and earth. He
inscribed the plan of the Universe from beginning to end on
the Preserved Tablet and then put it into effect accordingly.
Now the universe has come into existence after the
fashion of that plan and there issues from it, (the
(1) Ihyg* Vol. Ill p. 17.*».
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Universe) an image to sense and imagination, A person who looks
at the sky and the earth and then closes his eyes perceives the
image of the sky and earth through his imagination as if he
d
were still looking at it; had the sky and the earth cease# to
exist, then he would still find their image within him as if
he were witnessing them. Then there proceeds an effect from
his imagination to the heart, and it is by virtue of this that
the images experienced by sense and imagination occur in the
heart. This eventual image of the universe in the heart is in
accord with that which occurs in the imagination, and that
which occurs in the imagination is in accord with the actual
universe (perceived by sense) and the actual universe is in
accord with what exists in the Divine realm (The Preserved
Tablet). Therefore reality has four forms or degrees of
existences I. Existence in the Preserved Tablet, which
precedes its actual existence; II. Its actual existence; III.
Its imaginary existence, that is to say, the existence of its
form in the imagination; IV. Its mental existence (wti.jud
^acili)« namely the existence of its image in the heart.
To return to the original question, how ideas flow up
within the heart, A1 Ghazali states: "it is possible that the
image of the universe can come into the heart either through
(1) H^yi" Vol.Ill pp. 17 - 18
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the senses or through the Preserved Tablet, as the image of
the Sun can occur in the eye either through looking at it
directly or through looking at the rater which reflects its
image. Whenever the curtain between the heart and the
Preserved Tablet is removed the heart sees the things inscribed
on the Tablet, and knowledge overflows from it. The heart no
longer needs any perception through the senses. This
resembles the flowing up of the water from the depth of the
earth. If, however, the heart pays attention to the images
that come from sensation, this becomes distraction, which acts
as a veil between it and the Preserved Tablet; similarly in
the analogy of the pool, when the -water collects from the
streams it prevents the flowing up of water from within the
earth. Thus the heart lias two doors, one of which leads to the
invisible world or the Divine realm (The Preserved Tablet), the
to
other pr the five senses which are in contact with the visible
worldj tliis being to some extent a copy of the invisible one.
As for the unclosing of the inner door of the invisible world
and the seeing of the Preserved Tablet, it is obvious how this
happens when one considers the wonders of dreams (rn' va). and
how the soul during sleep, and when senses are inactive, sees
what is going to happen in the future or what has happened in
the past. Thus the difference between the knowledge of the
prophets and saints and that of the philosophers is that ths
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former comes from within the heart through the door which
leads to the invisible world, fAlam A1 Malakut). the latter
comes through the doors of senses which lead to the visible
world CAlam A1 liulk)."
Now what A1 Ghazali means by his theory is that there are
some ideas which are acquired, yet are acquired not through
sensation or the rational faculties, but through prophetic
insight, which receives the ideas directly from the Divine
realm which is beyond the sphere of the senses. We notice
that in his application of the theory of forms A.1 Ghasali
adopts an approach different from that of Plato.
Plato ,s makes the comparison between "imperfect
ideas" - those that are copies of plans that derive from
actual objects existing in the visible world, and the perfect
"ideas", which exist in the Divine realm. Whether or not A1
Ghazali approves this comparison, he gives it little
prominence. This, I think, is due to his Sufi belief that the
perfect knowledge can be attained provided the screen which
veils the heart is raised, so that the heart faces the Preserved
Tablet, where it can look at the Divine reality; the removal
of the veil is a spiritual process which can be achieved only
through disciplining the heart and purifying it.
(1) Ihya' Vol.Ill pp. 18, 19.V
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Process of Reasoning
The introduction of a theory of the nature of reasoning
and its relation to different kinds of knowledge is a
courageous attempt made by A1 Ghazali to show that all know¬
ledge, including religious truths can be subjected to
tafakkur and is open to confirmation by reason.
In his treatment of this part of his theory A1 Ghazali
deals with two points of great importance to any discussion
of his general theory of learning * the nature of tafakkur
("reasonirig'J and its effect on our actions. As to its nature,
he defines tafakkur as: "The Presentation in the mind of two
propositions in order to deduce from them a third - the
conclusion (majrifah). A person inclined tov?ards the present
life who wants to know that the Hereafter is more deserving
of desire, has two ways of getting to know that it is so. The
s
first is to hear from another person that the Hereafter is
more deserving of desire and then accept that statement with¬
out awareness of why it is so. He who accepts will then
conduct Ms actions according to his belief that the Hereafter
is more deserving of desire# This, according to A1 Ghazali,
is not ifla rifah 'knowledge', but simple acceptance of belief
on authority (See p.).
, the
The second way (and this isApoint under review) is to know
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that that which lasts longer is more deserving of desire; then,
since a man knows that the Hereafter lasts longer than the
present life, he may deduce from these two premises a third
proposition - which is the conclusion - that the Hereafter
is more deserving of desire# This last judgement cannot be
secured except through the two premises Cmacrifatavn) that
precede it# This threefold mental operation - two premises
producing a conclusion - is tafakkur. and is variously called
1 *tibar. tadhakkur. nazar, and ta3 aminul # The last two are
synonymous with tafakkur - "syllogistic reasoning". But
icaibar and tadhakkur have special implications: the former
originally meant "traverse" and here refers to the presentation
of two premisses with the implication that the mind traverses
through them to a third judgement.
But if this traversing does not occur, and what happens is
only a halting (wuauf) at the two premisses, then the process is
called tadhakkur. a term whose literal meaning is "recollection",
but, as used here, embraces some such additional notion as
"deliberation".
Here, in brief, is this terminology as A1 Ghazali applies it:
tafakkur. taJ amrnul and nazar. all convey the notion of the mind
searching for a third judgement; cafakkur r being of rather wider
connotation than the other two# Their fruit (i.e. the fruit of
reasoning), first and foremost, is the growth of knowledge and
the acquisition of new ideas, while the fruit of tadhakkur
(deliberation) is the reiteration of ideas, which thus persist
in the mind. Whan ideas (or propositions) are arranged in the
mind in suitably combined premises, a fresh idea is produced.
Thus one idea is the result of others, and, if this new one is
again set in correct combination with another, then yet another
is produced, and knowledge advances progressively. But only he
who knows how to reason can acquire knowledge in this way; and
the majority of people are handicapped by "lack of capital",
namely the basic promises out of which knowledge and ideas are
generated.
Knowledge of tai'akkur comes, in very rare instances - as
to the Prophets - through an inborn divine light in the heart;
but normally through education. It works differently in different
minds: one man may reach a conclusion from valid premisses
unawares; another may be conscious of the process, but lack the
ability to express it in words. He may, for instance, be
convinced that the Hereafter is more deserving of desire than
the present; but, if called upon to prove it, may be unable to,
s
although his Judgement rests on the valid premisses already out¬
lined.
Further fruits of reasoning, in addition to the growth of
(1) Ihya3 Vol.IV pp. 363-4.
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knowledge, are a change (1) in ( ahwal) the "states" of the
heart, and consequently (2) in (acmal) "the actions" of the
individual. But these fruits are subordinate to cllra ("know¬
ledge"); for they are the result of its presence in the heart.
Prom this chain of cause and effect it follows that our
acts are directed by our emotions, and that these are the
result of the new knowledge that wo obtain through reasoning.
Hence reasoning is the starting-point and the key of all forms
(1)
of good.
It has been necessary to stress the syllogistic comparison
between the present life and the Hereafter, because it is A1
Ghazali's preferred illustration of the way in which thinking
affects the emotions and - through them - actions. Tafakkur
shows us the world to come as more desirable than this world;
once this knowledge is established in the heart, the attitude
of the latter changes; it becomes interested in the world to
come, and indifferent to this world.
This "attitude" is what is meant by hal: and it will be
seen that five stages are involved in the complete process of
change wrought by tafakkur: (1) Deliberation (tadhakkur). or
s *
the placing together of the two premises in the intellect; (2)
Reasoning (tafakkur). or the search for new knowledge to be
(1) Ihya* Vol. IV p.364
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produced from tlio premises; (3) Inference (nazar or ta' ammul).* *
or the occurrence of the desired knov/ledge and its enlightenment
of the heartj (4) The change in the attitude of the heart, due
to enlightenment: (5) the change in the behaviour of the
(1)
person, due to the changed attitude.
A1 Ghazali'3 theory of learning is thus aristotelian in the
importance it assigns to the syllogism as an aid in the
production of knowledge. What makes his theory original is his
attempt to reduce Sufi and religious truth to a system of
progressive syllogistic inference. The accord between
intellectualism and revelation which he sought was indeed not
attainable5 but the attempt throws interesting light on the
limitations he imposo-s on the status of revelation,
Stages of Child1s Development
In his theory of education A1 Ghazali goes into the child's
psychological development and the stages through which lie
progresses - not, indeed, very fully, but to an extent and in
a manner far ahead of his age. For this reason, and for the
light it throws on his view of the mental and emotional
activities, the subject will repay a brief examination.
His study of the forms and varieties of pleasure is strictly
(1) Hays' Vol. IV p. 364
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psychological. All forms of pleasure derive from our sensations
( idrakat). The individual is made up of many faculties (quaa)
and instincts (gharaf iz). each of which has its own variety of
pleasure - this being secured through the successful
performance of its peculiar function. These faculties and
instincts are fixed in man, each having a special purpose
according to its nature. For instance, the proper function of
the ''instinct" of anger is to avenge; therefore its pleasure
lies in accomplishing acts of vengeance. Or take the "instinct"
of appetite: its proper function is to provide the body with
the necessary satisfactions; its pleasure, therefore, is secured
through achieving this. 80 too with all the forms of pleasure
appertaining to the faculties of hearing, seeing, smelling, etc.
Each one of these faculties is always experiencing either pain
or pleasure arising from the things sensed. Intelligence is a
faculty, called bothfaQl ("reason") and Al-Hur Al- ilahl the
"Divine Light". The proper function of this power is to know
the true nature of things; therefore its pleasure lies in and
is secured by the exercise of this function. The forms of
appertaining to knowledge, vary greatly in proportion to the
nobility of the knowledge and this nobility in turn varies
according to the nature of the thing known. The highest form of
(1)
pleasure is therefore found in the knowledge of God.
(1) Ihys? V01. IV pp. 264-5
*
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From this brief summary of Al Ghazali's account of the
different forms of pleasure we proceed to our original question,
namely the different stages of psychological growth. Referring
to this he says that: (1) When the child beaIns to move about
there emerges in him a tendency through which he finds delight
in play to the degree that play becomes to Mm the most
interesting thing. (2) Next comes an interest in ornaments and
dress, which makes him indifferent to the pleasure of play. (3)
There follows an interest in sexual intercourse, expressed in
tiie desire for women, to indulge which he forsakes all previous
interests until (4) this takes second place to the craving for
leadorsMp' and superiority, the satisfaction of which is the
highest and most powerful of wordly pleasures. (5) Finally
this, too, is superseded by a loftier power: the individual
experiences the pleasure of the knowledge of God, of His
attributes and His acts; and, when tMs stage is reached, he
(1)
scorns all previous interests.
Al Ghazali gives no clear indications of the ages at which
the three earliest of these stages appear. He evades the
difficulty by assigning the interest in play to the time of
tarnyiz (apparently the "sonsus communis"), in ornament and
sexual intercourse to the times of adolescence and puberty
(1) IhyaJ Vol.IV p.267 .
(bulugh). As, however, he makes the fir3t stage coincide with
the child's first experiences of moving from one place to
another, it is safe to place it at about the age of three, when
the child is engrossed in the simplest forms of play.
It is more difficult to determine precise ages for A1
Ghazali's next two stages (the interests in sexual intercourse
and finery). Iio himself assigns both to the age of I;ulugh. This,
on the face of it, conflicts with his scheme of classifying
development by stages. I am therefore inclined to give the
ambiguity a terminological explanation and to suggest that A1
Ghazali has stretched the term bulugh to cover both puberty and
adolescence, perhaps not wishing to draw a rigid line of
demarcation between the two stages; but the effect is to make
bulugh the time for both the second and third stages. This being
the case I take bulugh as the starting age for the sexual interest
and adolescence (elsewhere referred to by A1 Ghazali as the time
taraviz) for the interest in ornament etc. The closing age of
this period is clearly stated as about twenty. From twenty to
forty the interest in leadership dominates, and from forty
(1)
onwards the interest in wisdom supersedes all.
Intelligence itself undergoes a course of gradual development,
we are told, though A1 Ghazali fails to give a clear picture as
(1) Ihya' Vol.IV p.26fA.
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to the nature of tills development, yet he holds the view that
intelligence continues its growth until a late age. It is not
only the items of knowledge attained (cu1ud) or experiences
(ta.iarib) that increase, but the intelligence itself as an
inborn power is subject to this gradual growth.
This inborn power is like a light; it rises in the soul,
its dawn comes at the ago of adolescence, and its growth
continues slowly until it is complete at the age of forty.
It is like the daylight: the beginning of it is so faint
that it can hardly be felt, but it (the light) gradually
increases until it is completely developed by the rise of the
sun-disc. It is indeed the natural order of God that all tilings
develop gradually, even the sex instinct is subject to this rule;
it does not appear at once at the time of puberty. Furthermore,




In the section of Part I dealing with A1 Ghazali's
"definition of keywords" prominence was given to the importance
and complexity of the term 'aql. Coming to the problem of
individual differences A1 Ghazali handles the phenomenon under
the heading: 'differences among people inragl." It will be
(1) Ihya? Vol.1 p. 78. G.
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remembered that lie assigned a wide field of concepts to this
word, and these, with one exception, are here elaborated into a
compact body of doctrine, -which suggests that A1 Ghazali's key-
vjords have exercised an influence over his thought# From the
group of entities symbolized by 'aal and exhibiting differences
of degrees and kind in different individuals the one exception
— — Y
is innate ideas (culum darui'^yah). which, he says, are the same
in all people. For the rest, the qualities symbolized by'agJL
are those which are variable as among different people, thus:
(1)raql as a power which exercises control over desires is
evidently subject to these differences, moreover, a person may
differ from time to time in degree of control, Tiiis is
attributed to one of the following causes: -
A) - Difference in the object of desire, for a person may
p
bo able to suprass one for:.: of desire more easily than another.
P
Desire for sex, for instance, can be more easily suprossed with
increasing maturity through old age. A younger man may be
unable to avoid adultery; but -when lie is of maturer age and
hiscaal is complete, he may bo able to abandon it, whereas trie
desire for leadership grows stronger with advancing years.
B) - A difference in the amount of knowledge, which leads
to awareness of the harm of a particular desire. This, for
instance, is why the doctor i3 able to avoid harmful food while
others equally intelligent fall victim to it. The latter may
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indeed have a general notion that the food is harmful; bifcthe
doctors knowledge is more perfect and his fear, consequently,
stronger- Touching the avoidance of harmful food, then, the
doctor has more Fear is in this case the agent by which
caal represses desire- Similarly the learned man (calim) is
better able to avoid wrong-doing - in other words, he has more
facsl - than the less learned or ignorant man.
C) - The difference in the ability to 'control* desire may
also 1x3 due to difference in the degree of intelligence} for
when intelligence is high the individual control of his desires
becomes more probable#
it
Here/is to be noted that differences in the ability to
control desires may be due merely to differences in the
intensity of the desire- In such cases the term'sol is not
applicable.
(2) cAol as •experiences* C culuoi at ta.iarib) is subject to
individual differences- For individuals differ in their insight
as a result of differences in their experiences.
(3) What caal stands for in its sense of intelligence is
undoubtedly subject to individual differences- It resembles a
light which shines in the soul and it differs in the same way as
the light of sight, for obviously there is difference between
the blear-eyed and the clear-sighted- Had not differences in
intelligence existed, people would not have differed in their
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understanding. But in this matter individuals are divided into
(1) the "stupid" or "dull", v/ho can be taught only by dint of a
great effort on the part of the teacher; (2) the intelligent
or bright, who understands at the slightest hint; (3) the
CD
genius (kamil) from whom truths emanate without any instruction,
(2)
as in the case of the prophets.
Differences in intelligence and the degree of understanding
are like the differences that exist in the nature of the land.
There is a kind of land on which water gathers until it becomes
so abundant that it overflows spontaneously into springs;
another kind needs digging in order that the water may be
diverted into channels; yet another kind is that which although
it is dug, will yield no results. This is due to the
differences in the nature of the land and consequently its
qualities. So, too, with the differences between individuals
spring from differences in their intelligence. Here A1 Ghazali
quotes the following Tradition describing the Throne: "The
Angels said, 0 Lord, hast Thou created anything that is greater
than the Throne, and He said, Yes, the intelligence. They said,
How great is it? and He said, Far from being described! The
knowledge of it is incomprehensible! Hast thou any knowledge
(1) Literally 'perfect1,
(2) Ihya' Vol.1 p.78M).
of the number of the sands? and they said No. Then said God,
I have created •intelligences* as numerous as the number of
the sands. Some people have been given a single grain, some
have been given two, some three ... and some have been given a
(1)
load and some more than a load."
It is noticeable here that A1 Ghaaali's main emphasis is
upon individual differences in 'acl in its various meanings
including 'intelligence*. As regards differences in the traits
of personality, lie says nothing in a direct manner though in
his moral teachings he gives an account of the different forms
of good character which go to make stable and healthy
personality. Individuals differ as much in moral as in physical
(2)
health. This will be discussed in its proper place.
The teacher should pay attention to these differences. He
should take into account the mental variations among the
individuals he teaches; he must deal with the pupil according
to his understanding, and must not teach him what lies beyond
Ms capacity. Such procedure will only stunt the growth of
the.pupil's intelligence, and confuse him. The teacher must
follow the example of the Prophet who said "all we prophets
are directed to set people in their proper places, and address
Cl) Ihya3 Vol.1 p,78.V).
(2) Ihya' Vol.Ill p.$2.12
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them according to the amount of their intelligence". He should
disclose the truth to his pupil only when he is certain that
(1)
he is capable of understanding it.
The backward pupil (al-muta callim al oasir) should be
taught only v&iat is Intelligible and appropriate to his
intelligence. The teacher should moreover avoid mentioning to
him that behind any teaching there are difficult questions of
which he will not speak, for to do so will damp the pupil's
interest in what is easy, and cause him to expect confusion of
mind.
In accordance with his theory of individual differences Al
Giiazali holds the vie?; that the 'common people" (al c awarn), v.'ho
are simple-hearted and whose intelligence is incapable of under¬
standing difficult questions, should abide by the bond of
religion and adhere to the traditional beliefs of the early
Muslims without anthropomorphism (tashblh i.e. private or
metaphorical interpretation of the text of the Quran and the
Traditions); they should not be driven to any point of
confusion but left quietly to pursue their trades. If a person
of this kind is plunged into difficult questions and taught the
-
- ■&.
different interpretations of the text <Ta"J wilat al zahir)/will
be freed from the bond of the common people, but it will not be
(1) Ihya' Vol.1 p. 51/X,
(2) Ihya3 Vol.1 p. 51 -
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easy for him to belong to the company of the intellectuals
(al khawass). Thus the barrier which keeps him from disobedience
will be removed and he will turn into a rebellious devil and
cause destruction no less to himself than others.
Such a person should not be plunged into the advanced
studies, but his education should be limited to teaching him
the fundamental acts of worship and a code of honesty in the
trade which he pursues. His heart must be filled with the
hope of Heaven and the fear of Hell as taught in the Quran and
doubtful questions should be completely avoided. In general
the door of intellectual discussion should not be opened to the
common people, for that would hinder them from practising their
trades on which the structure of society and consequently the
\15
life of the intellectuals depend,
*
It must be admitted that Al Ghazali here advocates a
cultural policy calculated to deny all opportunity of higher
education to the greater part of the community. However truly
it may be urged that his motive is to temper education to the
intellectual capacity of the individual, two factors, both
essential to the practical application of the policy must be
deplored: (1) Al Ghazali's division of the community would
operate on a basis of social discrimination; (2) The education
(1) Ihya3 Vol.1 p.51
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allowed to the excluded categories would amount to no more than
the minimum of religious education together with such moral
precepts as conduce to professional integrity - honesty in
trade, loyalty to society, and so forth. Their sole share in
the cultural life of the community is to provide the labour on
which the structure of society and the welfare of their
intellectual superiors depend.
This part of A1 Ghazali's theory is at variance with the
generally accepted Muslim vie?/, which recognizes no distinctions
among people other than by the measure of their piety. Certain
theological schools do, Indeed, withpld the study of logic and
philosophy from students who, through lack of intelligence,
might thereby be led to views in conflict with the faith, which
they would not have the intellectual ability to refute. But to
-extend the restriction to the whole field of higher education and
apply it to categories determined by sp^sial considerations is
peculiar to Al Ghazali.
The origin of an idea so alien to Suslik tradition and
practice must lie outside the boundaries of Muslim thought. The
influence of Plato's "Republic" as the model for the
presentation of Al Ghazali's theory of human nature has already
been shown (see Part. 1 p. 58) we shall probably not be wrong
in tracing the source of this repressive element in Al Ghazali's
educational theory to the social divisions in Plato's State -
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A1 Ghazali's "Intellectuals" corresponding vaguely to Plato*s
"Philosophers"# BBre again A1 Ghazali#s tendency towards





HIKD IH RELATION TO REALITY
The relation of mind to reality is likened by A1 Ghazali
to the relation of a mirror to that which it reflects. The
reflected object has a form, and it is this form or image
ithieh is reflected in the mirror. So too every object of
knowledge has a form or image, and this is reflected in the
mind.
On this view there are evidently three elements in the
process of knowing: - I) - Mind? II) - Reality? Ill) -
the occurrence of the image of reality in the mind. To
describe this triple process in terms of function A1 Ghazali
identified the mind as the 'knower' in which the image of
reality is reflected, reality as the 'known1, and the occurr-
(1)
ence of the iuage of reality in the mind as the 'knowing*.
We are to understand that both reality and mind were in
existence before 'knovdng*. A1 Ghazali illustrates the pre¬
existence of mind arid reality by the example of the 'laying
hold' of a sword. Here the sword lias existed independently?
so, too, has the hand whose functions is to grasp? but the
act of 'grasping' did not exist before this process took




Thus A1 Ghazali holds an idealist theory which carries
with it belief in both the antecedence of reality and the
autonomy of the mind; the knowing process, which is a
process of reflection, belongs to the natural order of human
activities, whereas mind itself, and likewise reality,
transcend this order.
The mind, which has the function of 1reflecting1 in this
process, is according to Al Ghazali an immaterial entity
(latlfah) whose function is to rule and direct. Reality it¬
self, that which is 'reflected1 in the knowing process, has
existed long before the actual universe, for the actual
universe is a copy of this eternal reality, which exists in
the divine realm.
Hence reality is not the invention of human experience,
nor is it - as the pragmatist believes - the product of
environmental changes. Rather the images of reality form our
ideas of the universe and to reflect these images is the
natural function of our intellect. The process of reflecting
these images is in fact the operation of copying the truth,
and this is the process of 'learning* or 'getting to know'.
The 'Kftpwifig' Cpnditicffl?
(1) Stfi' Vol.Ill p.11
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From the previous section it is evident that Al Ghazali
in his epistemology inclines towards •idealism1, the theory
that reality is eternal, and the function of mind is to
reflect its images* The human mind however, does not always
succeed in reporting accurately or, as 41 Ghazali puts it,
•reflecting the truth*, though the mind is by nature formed
to perceive the truth; yet there are some defects both in
the mind and outside it, which make the reflecting of the
truth difficult or even impossible; the absence of these
defects is a condition of knowing* Al Ghazali here uses the
mirror analogy; the mirror, also, cannot always reflect the
images of objects, for there may be flaws or obstacles which
prevent its reflecting* There are five possible reasons why
an image may not be reflected: I* A material defect In the
mirror; if, for instance, it is not properly fashioned or
polished; II* A soiling and dimming of the mirror, which
may be fautless in itself; III* A wrong position; if the
object to be reflected is behind the mirror; IV. The presence
of a veil between mirror and object; V. Ignorance of the
beholder where to seek the desired object (In this case, how¬
ever, the defect attaches to the beholder, not to the mirror).
Human intellects are sometimes devoid of knowledge for
one or more of five causes corresponding to those that bar the
image from the mirror. These constitute A1 Ghazali*s
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"conditions of knowledge". To avoid confusion in considering
these, we need to be clear about A1 Ghazali's terminology. In
his theory of knowledge the three Y/ords. macr-ifah. hasiaah
and iman. here respectively translated "knowledge", "truth"
and "belief", are virtually synonymous terras. In propounding
the conditions of knowledge (through the analogy of the mirror)
A1 Ghazali uses the first two ?»rds indiscriminately, and to
cover a wide field of intellectual attainment and spiritual
condition. I have attempted to use the terms In such a way as
to distinguish what A1 Ghazali appears to Ixave in mind in each
context. Here, then, are the five causes of the mind's
inability to reflect Truth: I. Immaturity. A child's mind,
says A1 Ghazali, is not yet sufficiently formed to receive
"knowledge", - lie apparently means that know/ledge vhich it
is the function of education to impart.
(In the next three cases A1 Ghazali seems to identify "know¬
ledge" with the mystical states attained In successive stages
of Sufi experience).
II. Mists and stains of vice, which gather on the intellect
because of the multiplicity of desires. This mars the purity
of the intellect and, consequently, its reflection of the
"Truth"•
Deviation (evidently at a higher stage, since the man Is
already regarded as pious). The pure mind may fail to catch
f
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the reflection of the truth because it is facing the wrong
direction; it may, he says, be concentrated upon the external
details of worship, or on securing the means of livelihood,
rather than upon meditating on the realities of Truth; only
that on which it is refelcting can manifest itself to it.
IV. The presence of a veil, Here, evidently, the dangers at
the lower stages have been passed, and a yet higher stage
reached. Al Ghazali instances the obedient person who controls
his desires and devotes his thoughts to a given truth, which,
however, cannot manifest itself to him because some belief,
due to his acceptance of authority (taglid), has veiled it
from him.
V. Ignorance of the direction in which the seeker should
expect to find the desired "Truth". Here Al Ghazali has
evidently shifted to a different plane of knowledge, implying
a totally different intellectual performance. The seeker, he
now says, cannot attain knowledge of the unknown except
through the recollection of previous knowledge, which must be
cognate with the fresh knowledge he desires. This,
constituting a third "knowledge", can only be secured through
the harmonising and combining of two premises already known
in such a manner that they yield a third "knowledge",
previously unknown. This method of arranging knowledge in
- 102 -
(1)
the mind is known as Meditation* (tafakkur). and the
intellectual operation it requires is evidently Logic, Al
Ghazali gives the analogy of a man vho wishes to behold his
back in a mirror. He can only do this by placing a second
mirror in the right position. Here we have the three parts
of the syllogism: the two mirrors symbolize the major and
minor terms, the man*s back is the conclusion; the careful




We have seen that the terms'knowledge' (ma frifah),
•truth* (haqjqah) and 'belief * ( ?iman) are almost synonymous
in Al Ghazali*s epist^mology. He does however distinguish
three grades of 'belief* or 'knowledge's
X. The belief of the common people (cawamm)i that is,
belief through acceptance of authority.
(1) The free use of tafakkur to denote what is obviously
intended as the syllogism is noticeable here. It
reflects Al Ghazali1s constant endeavour to harmonize
religious and Sufi contemplation and logical thinking
as it was explained in Part II.
*»
(2) Ihya3 Vol.Ill p.li%~ 12.
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II. The belief of the theologans (nutakalllnin). namely that
which is supported by proofs) this kind of belief ranks very
close to the first.
, - (1)
III. The belief of the (carlfin) 'gnostics1 namely the know-
ledge experienced through the light of certitudi? ^
An illustration is given here to make the distinction
clear. Our knowledge of 'X1 being in the house has three
degrees: -
The first is that we are informed of this by a person
whose truthfulness is known to us and in whom we have
confidence, and so we believe vlhat he says by merely being
informed.
The acceptance of authority is here the basis of our
knowledge, and this corresponds to the belief of the common
people. $hen they reach the age of maturity they have
already learned the dogmatic beliefs from their parents and
accepted them on authority (tealid). They adhere to these
beliefs without question and entertain no doubts about vihat
is told them by their parents and teachers. As to the
certainty, and hence the value of such knowledge, A1 Ghazali
(1) Tills term - not to be confused with the Christian
heretical sect - is here used to express the Sufi
conception of "those Who truly know God."
(2) Ihya' Vol.Ill p.13W.
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maintains that knowledge in this sense has little clearness,
embodies no revelation, and so does not cause the delight of
the heart which is attained through the illumination of
certitude. The possibility of error in this kind of knowledge
is even greater especially in so far as it relates to
religious beliefs.
The second degree is when our knowledge that 'X* is in
the house is based on our hearing his voice inside the house
although m cannot see hlraj thus we deduce from his voice
that he is in the house. Our knowledge here is stronger than
our knowledge through mere information. If we are informed
that he is in the house and afterwards hear his voice, then
our certainty is strengthened. The explanation in this case
is that voices are usually associated with particular persons
especially when there is a previous familiarity with the
persons concerned. For instance, if one knows a person and
then hears his voice one will deduce that this voice is the
voice of that particular person. In this case, belief is
based on inference but still the possibility of error exists,
for the one voice may resemble another and may also be
imitated, though tills possibility does not usually occur to
the wind of the hearer. Al Ghazali is concerned here with
the kind of belief in which inference is the characteristic
element, and it is important to notice that he considered
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that the beliefs of theologians belong to this category.
The third degree is when our knowledge that 'X* is in
the house is based on seeing him when we enter the house;
this A1 Ghazali believes is the true knowledge and complete
revelation. It corresponds to the 1aiowledge or belief of
the rauaarrabii and the ;iddiair,r 'the saints', because
their belief is the result of vision. Hence, their knowledge
embraces the characteristic of the first two categories, that
of the common people and that of the theologians; but in
addition it lias its own characteristic in being a revelation
in which there is no place for any possibility of error.
People who have knowledge of this third kind raay differ
I11 the amount of their knowledge and the degree of its
clarity. The difference in clarity is easily seen in the
example given. If we see 'Xf in the house when he is near to
us or in the courtyard when the sun is brilliant, our know¬
ledge is complete; if we see him from a distance or in the
dusk we become certain from his outline that it is he but we
cannot perceive the details of his figure; and our knowledge
is therefore incomplete. This difference is also to be found
In men's visions of divine truths.
That the amount of knowledge which Is gained through
revelation varies can be illustrated by a similar example. If
there are several persons in a house, you may see more than
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one person; another may happen to see only one. Thus the
amount of knowledge increases in proportion to the amount of
the objects of knowledge (ma cluraat).
True knowledge and Vision
In his theory of knowledge A1 Ghazali classified the
"perceived" tilings into two kinds: X* Those which belong to
the sphere cf imagination; these are sensible things such as
concrete or material forms, animate and inanimate objects.
II. Those which belong to the sphere of the "abstract" or
immaterial, such as the Deity of God, and all el3e that has
no material existence, such as His knowledge, omnipotence and
will. Ihen a man sees a body and afterwards closes his eyes
he will find the image of that body present to his Imagination
as if he were looking at it, but if he opens his eyes he will
perceive the difference between the real and the imaginary
form.
This difference Is not a difference in the substance of
the two forms, for the imaginary form is in agreement with
the real, but the difference which exists Is due only to the
degree of clarity or revelation. The image of the concrete
form is clearer than that of the imaginary form; an example
of tills is the person who is seen at the time of twilight and
(1) Ihya® Vol.Ill, p.13 - 14
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before the spread of daylight, and then is seen again in full
daylight; the difference between the two states lies only in
the additional clarity. Hence imagination is the preliminary
stage of perception; vision is more perfect than imagination,
it is the highest form of revelation. The vision of the eye
is called in Arabic vah, and it is so called in virtue
of its certainty. If God had created this power of perfect
perception in the forehead, in the chest, or in any other part
of the body, it would still deserve the same designation,
rut yah. If such certainty is found in another kind of
revelation, a revelation other than the revealing of visible
tilings to the eye, than this also can be given the name rupvah
- (vision). Thus we may speak of to3vah as vision in relation
to immaterial objects, the objects of knowledge. The
apprehension of the objects of knowledge also has two degrees*
the first is a preliminary, incomplete one, where the
apprehension is not yet fully clarified. The second is that
in which apprehension is complete and perfectly clear. More¬
over between these two there is a gradation of clarity, as
there is also in perceiving visible forms. It is only the
final, complete form which is properly called ru* vah - the
highest form of revelation.
The impossibility of such vision in this world is due to
the bodily handicaps which stand as a veil between this
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capacity for the highest revelation and the Deity of God.
It is part of the divine order that the shutting of the
eye-lid bars the eye from the revelation of visible objects and
stands as a veil between the eye and the object to be seen. If
vision is to take place, the veil must be removed. If the veil
is not removed the result is not vision, but mere imagination.
Similarly the human soul, so long as it is handicapped by
bodily obstacles, will not arrive at the stage of complete
vision of the immaterial objects of knowledge. These lie out¬
side the scope of the imagination which has to do only -with
material things. A1 Ghazali believes that even after death the
veil is not completely removed, for the soul is still dimmed by
the impact of this world; people differ, however, in the
amount of this 1dimness1 in proportion to their previous
domination by bodily desires. There are some souls which are
overloaded with lust and these are similar to the mirror on
which so much stain lias accumulated that there is no hope of
polishing it. Some souls, however, have not been so corrupted,
but these also differ one from another.
After the fulfj^nent of what God lias promised, the
Resurrection, the Judgment, and the measures and procedure of
punishment and reward, and after the soul has become completely
polished, the Divine Reality manifests itself. This is a
revelation and illumination of things which were previously
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knom. It is like the clarification to the eye of that which
ms previously •imagined1. This form of revelation is what is
called ru? yah. The Vision of God is possible in the world to
come provided that we do not understand it in the sense of
•perfection of imagination1 in relation to a special visible
object which has association with a location, for vision in this
sense is quite out of place m relation to God. Al Ghazali is
or
of the opinion that this highest knowledge/'vision1 after death
is a development of the "true knowledge" of God that was secured
before death. He asserts that as the perfect knowledge of God
in this world can be attained without any support from the
imagination or any association of place, so too is the Vision in
tiie next tvorld. To emphasize this view Al Giiazali states: -
"Indeed I assert that knowledge which is secured in this world
is the same knowledge which becomes perfect or rather reaches
the highest form of perfection and turns into Vision in the
?</orld to come. There would not be any difference between the
Vision in the next world and true knowledge in this world
except in the increase of clarity or 11luminationfin the same
way as we have pointed out in the instance of the imagined
object becoming clearer in the natural vision of the eye. If
our knowledge of God in this world has not been supported by
images (surah) or special concepts, then it necessarily
follows that there would be no such concepts in the perfection
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of that very knowledge when it is elevated to the highest form
of revelation. For this Vision is in substance the same as the
previous "knowledge" and the only difference is the increase of
the amount of clarity. God said (referring to the pious): -
"Their light shines in front of them (bavna avdihim) and on
their right hand. They say "Oh Lord complete for us our
'light*"5 Al Ghazali comments "the completion of light causes
only an increase in clarity, and for this reason only the
gnostics in this world can gain the stage of Vision in the
world to come; for knowledge (in this v;orld) is the seed which
develops into Vision in the world to come, as a seed becomes a
CD
tree and a grain becomes corn." A1 Ghazali goes on to say
that"he who does not plant the seed on his land cannot expect
a palm to grow, and he who does not son the grain cannot
expect to reap a harvest! So, too, he #10 does not know God in
this world cannot see Him in the world to come."
Division of Knowledge
The heart or soul, as is repeatedly asserted by Al Ghazali,
is capable of apprehending the true nature of knowables, and
hence knowledge that occurs in it is of two main kinds, natural
and supernatural.
(1) Ihya* Vol.IV p.267^9
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Natural Knovfledge
A1 Ghazali calls natural knowledge •rational1 (caallvvah)
in the sense that it comes within the sphere of human reason
and in relation to such knowledge he regards the approval of
the rational element in man as final. He sub-divides this
type of knowledge into two groups: -
fold
I. Inborn, and II. Acquired, with, again, a two^classifieation
of the latter: a) Temporal or secular (dunvav/ivvah). and b)
Spiritual (. uldiraulvvah). Here is a brief account of the
nature of each of them.
A1 Ghasaii means by rational knowledge the knowledge which
is gained with the help of reason; it cannot be secured through
acceptance of authority nor through mere •hearsay* (sanar).
This is divided into: I. Inborn, that is to say the knowledge
which exists in man from birth, such as the knowledge that a
thing cannot be both originated and /terna1 or existent and non¬
existent at the same time# Man finds this kind of knowledge
inherent in his heart, but none knows its source nor how it
occurs in the heart; though we know that God is the ultimate
cause of this as of all things. II. Acquired, that is to say,
knowledge gained by cultivation of the mental faculties; it
is sub-divided as we have already stated into: -
a) - Temporal Knowledge, that is to say, the knowledge which is
concerned with secular affairs such as medicine, arithmetic,
geometry, astronomy, and so forth.
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b) - Spiritual knowledge,which A1 Ghasali conceives as the
knowledge of the •states1 or feelings (oh :al) of the heart,
til© knowledge of its defects and also the knowledge of God,
His attributes and acts.
iiit.
A1 Ghazali is of/opinion that temporal and spiritual know¬
ledge are often opposed to each other in the sense that if a
man devotes himself to one of them to its uttermost depths, Ms
insight would fall short in respect of the other. Hence we
notice that people who are discriminating in the affairs of
tMs world are lacking in the knowledge of the world to come,
and on the other hand those who are discriminating in Spiritual
knowledge are deficient in a great deal of secular knowledge.
The reason is that since the capacity of human intelligence is
limited, It is normally not equal to the mastery of both, and
great attainment in the one kind of knowledge stands in the way
of attainment in the other.
Thus mastery of knowledge both of this world and the world
to come is not possible for ordinary people. The prophets,
however, are exempt from this limitation, and must be so if
they are to fulfil their mission; It requires them to be able
to guide and direct people both in the affairs of this \?orld
and the "world to come, and they are accordingly enabled to
attain perfection in both kinds of knowledge through the
special support they have from Providence and the strength that
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A1 Ghazali gives the title of "Religious Knowledge" (Al-
* ilium A1 Dinivvah). to the knowledge which derives from the
supernatural, and is achieved only through the acceptance of
the authority of the prophets. The study of the Quran and the
Traditions is the main channel through which it flows. By
this knowledge the character of the heart is perfected and its
freedom from disease is secured, for A1 Ghazali is of opinion
that, although the soul has need of natural knowledge, this
alone is not sufficient to secure the health of the soul.
Furthermore, even the health of the body cannot be maintained
by reasoning alone, but requires also the authoritative
instruction of the doctor as to the qualities and functions of
the various medicines. These cannot be discovered by reason,
though the medical instructions cannot be understood without
the aid of reason. Thus reason cannot dispense with
Revelation nor, on the other hand, can Revelation dispense with
reason. He who claims that taalid (the mere acceptance of
religious authority) is sufficient, and lias no regard for
reason, is ignorant; equally he who over-emphasizes the
(1) Ihya3 Vol. Ill p.15*- 16
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significance of reason, claiming that it suffices for
Revelation, is deluded. A1 Ghazali believes that there is
danger in either vlewj the safe way is to have regard for
both reason and revelation, for each of them lias its own
indispensable function. He likens rational knowledge to
normal food, whereas religious knowledge performs the function
of medicine. His point here is that the sick person can be
harmed by food in the absence of the necessary medicine. So,
too, the diseases of the heart cannot be cured except through
the 'prescribed medicines', which have been laid down by
religion. Therefore he who does not cure his sick heart by
observance of religious rules and practices, but contents him¬
self vdth rational knowledge, may be harmed, just as the sick
(1)
man may be harmed by food.
It is thus clear that although A1 Ghazali sees a certain
possibility of opposition between the attainment of natural
and supernatural knowledge, Revelation and Reason, he is also
at great pains to reconcile the functions of the two. To him
the two principles must collaborate in securing the well-being
of man. Any attempt to isolate the one from the other would
be to ignore the fundamental functions of the two principles,
and to this effect Al Ghazali concludes "the claim that
rational knowledge Is contradictory to religious, and that
(1) Ihya' Vol.Ill p.15
- 115
the reconciliation between them is not possible, is a result
of blindness in the eye of insight. Indeed, the man who makes
such a claim is one of those who would be ready to see
contradiction even between religious truths and, for the mere
reason that he is unable to reconcile them, think that there
is a contradiction in religion itself, Al Ghazali proceeds
to liken this attitude to the position of the blind person who,
on entering a house, stumbles against utensils and blames
others for putting the articles in the wrong place, whereas
the objects were indeed in the right place but he could not
find the way because of Ms blindness. It is strange, Al
Ghazali thinks, that such a blind man does not attribute his
fault to Ms blindness^instead of attributing it to the
shortcomings of others.
SpirHua^ Knowledge
In his theory of knowledge Al Ghazali uses various terms
for spiritual knowledge. The most common term however is the
'knowledge of the way to the world to come' (<rllm taria al
S
akhirah). This phrase is used to cover the Sufi teaching which
is the major influence in forming Ms views on the aims and
methods of education. He classifies this type of knowledge
into groups: I. Contemplative? II. Practical.
(1) Ihya7 Vol. Ill p.15
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Contemplative Knowledge
+ ' ' • > .
fILn al mukashafah. which we translate 'contemplative
knowledge*, represents the theoretical aspect of spiritual
experience# Al Ghazall sometimes refers to such knowledge as
'tiie knowledge of the inner Self*, ( fllm al-baipin), It is the
highest form of knov/ledge that can be attained in this world.
Knowledge in this form is characteristic of the saints,
'sincere believers* (slddlqin) and 'those close to God*
•
| _ L
(mucarrabin) and Al Ghazali describes it as "a light that
shines in the heart when the heart is sanctified and purified
from its blameworthy qualities j through this light many tilings
which the heart previously knei? as names, to which it attached
obscure or vague meanings, come to be so revealed that the true
ma"rife(knowledge) is secured. This light illuminates such
truths as the knowledge of the Deity of God, His eternal and
perfect attributes, His acts, Hits purpose in the creation of
this world and the world to come, also the knowledge of the
meaning of prophecy, revelation, Satan, the Angels, the
conflict betxveen Satan and Man, the appearance of the Angels
to the Prophet and the Delivery of the revelation to the
Prophet, the knowledge of the realms of heaven and earth, the
soul, the conflict between the forces of the Angels and
of the Demons within the soul, the knowledge of the world to
come, Heaven, the Fire, the meeting with God, the Vision, the
meaning of nearness to God, the presence of God, the meaning
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(1)
of the happiness of belonging to the heavenly company."
A1 Ghazali points out that there are great numbers of
people who believe in the principles of these things without
any clear understanding of them and that they can be ranked
in various degrees of unclearness of understanding? but
contemplative knowledge results in such a lifting of the veil
as permits the reality of these tilings to shine out as clearly
as io the objects of the material world to the vision of the
eye. This knowledge could be attained by human nature were
the mirror of the heart not covered over by stains as a result
of the lusts of tills world.
Tills illuminating function of spiritual knowledge is thus
described by A1 Ghazali: "le mean by knowledge of the way of
the v/orld to come the knowledge of how to 'polish' this mirror,
to remove the 'lust' that acts as a 'veil' from God-Ifost-Highj
this purification of the heart is secured by abandoning desires
and following completely the example of the Prophet. That part
of the heart which has been purified, that part which is clear
without any obscurity veiling it from reality, reflects the
true nature of things. There is no means to this state except
(2)
through self-discipline (rlvadah)."
(1) IhyaJ Vol.1 p.l8.a7.
(2) Ifcya3 Vol.1 pp. 18 - 19.
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This to A1 Ghacall's mind is tlie form of knowledge which
is incommunicable by books nor can it be disclosed by him to
whom it has been granted except to those who are already
familiar with it; and then only in the form of a 'reminder'
and ill secret# This kind of knowledge is what has been
referred to by the Prophet as the 'hidden knowledge' when he
said: "Some knowledge is hidden and/cfese who know it are
(1)
uhe people of the knowledge of God."
It is obvious from the foregoing account of contemplative
knowledge that A1 Ghazali conceives of it as the 'true know¬
ledge* which is revealed under the shining light of reality,
the knowledge ?/hich is characterised by clear apprehension and
certainty, the Divine light which illuminates all those things
that have vague and obscure meanings in our minds, the
metaphysical problems which we usually fail to understand or
give a true picture of, the idea behind religious principles
that we do not fully grasp. All these things and others
become clear and plain under this Divine light# A1 Ghazali
claims, as we have already seen, that this kno?/ledge is not
only the highest possible in this world but is also the basis
of the highest knowledge in the world to come, namely the
'Vision' of God, which is in fact the final development and
(1) Ihya3 Vo.I p.19
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the ultimate clarification of the contemplative knowledge
attained in this world.
Practical Knowledge
A1 Ghazali presents practical knowledge ( rilm al-mucamalah)
as the knowledge of the qualities of the heart in both their
positive and negative aspects, that is to say, the praiseworthy
qualities which 'ought* to be present and on the other hand
the blameworthy ones that are to be eliminated. SpeaIcing of
the former, A1 Ghazali gives instances of some of them as
patience, thankfulness, fear of God, hope, contentment, piety,
generosity, gratitude, charity, truthfulness and sincerity.
He points out that the practical knowledge is achieved through
(1) the knowledge of the nature of these qualities, clear
understanding of their causes and effects, a knowledge of
their symptoms, and (2) of the methods of curing their defects.
As to the blameworthy qualities, which are the source of all
disobedience, A1 Ghazali gives as examples: fear of poverty,
spite, envy, deceit, pride, hypocrisy, anger, selfconceit,
enmity, hatred, avarice, parsimony, discontent, vanity,
dishonesty and brutality. Again the knowledge of the nature
of these qualities, their causes and effects, and the means
of combating them is an integral part of the knowledge of the
world to come. Moreover A1 Ghazali maintains that although
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the attainment of such knowledge does not form a part of the
orthodox scheme of religious obligations it has been shorn by
"the learned"j (his Sufi masters), to constitute a truly
U)
obligatory duty. The emphasis in Al Ghazali's view of this
practical 'science* is upon its function in the 'cultivation*
of the soul. The contrast between the 'practical* and
'contemplative* which is characteristic of Sufi thought, makes
plain the special function of practical knowledge. Its direct
aim is the improvement of character. To educate the soul, in
Al Ghazali's view, is not a mere exercise of external worship;
the latter is important, but less important than the educative
process which must go deeper into the inner self, examine the
roots of human character, good or bad, and discover the causes
and the effects which directly affect human behaviour. Any
defect or lack in the praiseworthy qualities, or any
inclination to bad qualities or domination by them would
present a task for this science. Its goal must be the cure of
an unhealthy character or the restoration of a good character
that lias been lost; in other words purification of the soul.
This is the reason why Al Ghazall definitely includes this
'science' in Ms spiritual discipline. In emphasising the
significance of this form of knowledge Al Ghazali points out
(1) Ihya" Vol.1 p.19
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that the "qualities" of the heart are the source or power from
which all human behaviour springs. To him this causal
relation between qualities and actions follows the obvious
connection between body and soul, and for this reason also the
science of jurisprudence, vhieh is concerned with our external
activities, is inferior to the science of the world to come,
a)
which is concerned with the purity of the soul.
Prophetic scholastic Enpv/igdge
Knowledge is also classified by A1 Ghazali according to
the means of its attainments I. That vhich flashes into the
heart without the knower being aware how it has occurred. This
is called 'revelation'• II. That which is gained through
normal channels of learnings this is called Scholastic know¬
ledge; since it is attained by the kind of study characteristic
of scholars. Revelation, A1 Ghazali maintains, is itself of
two formss - a) That in which a person is not aware of the
way it happens nor of its source. To this A1 Ghazali gives
the name 'inspiration' ( ilham). b) That in which the person
is conscious of the source of the knowledge, as when he sees
the angel who delivers it. This he names true 'Revelation'
(wahv). The first kind of revelation is characteristic of the
(1) Xhyi* Vol.1 P.l8
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Saints and the second coses only to the prophets#
The distinction betuoon 'revelation1 and •scholastic' know¬
ledge is here presented as a difference in the means of
attaining knowledge# A1 Ghazeli firmly emphasises that the
nature of the truth to be attained through either means is one
and tlx© same# H© reiterates that the heart is by nature
capable of apprehending all forms of truth, and its failure to
do so is due only to the obstacles and defects he has
described. Her is there any distinction between revelation
and scholastic knowledge in respect of the source or the cause
of the knowledge they attain; for the source in both cases is
derived from the "Preserved Tablets", arid the cause is in both
eases the removal of the veil which cedes between the soul and
the truth# The difference between the two lies in the 'method*
or the 'means' of removing tiie veil. In scholastic learning
the veil Is removed tlirough natural methods, and knowledge is
attained by human effort alone; In revelation the means to
attainment is supernatural and human effort to gain knowledge
Is by itself of litfclo avail# In revelation tiie moans to the
removal of the veil is the Providence which causes the 'wind
of Grace* to blow; as 41 Ghasali describes its - "The veil
between the two mirrors (the heart and the Preserved Tablets)
is sometimes removed by 'hand* and sometimes ceases to exist
through the blowing of the wind of Grace, and thus some
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of that which is inscribed on the Preserved Tablets is
(1)
reflected in the heart."
How and when this process of learning by revelation occurs
is explained by A1 Ghacall thus: - "this happens sometimes in
sleep and so the person can foretell vihat is going to happen
in the future: though complete removal of the veil which hangs
before the truth comes only in death." He further explains
that this veil can be removed, even when the person is awake,
through a hidden Grace ana then "there shines in the heart
from the invisible world something of the wonders of knowledge."
Sometimes it comes like a sheet of lightning, sometimes in a
(2)
succession of flashes but seldom is the illumination prolonged.
Mystical or Sufi learning
A1 Ghazali asserts that the Sufi way of approaching reality
is to invoke Divine inspiration rather than to practice
scholastic reasoning. The Sufis are not advocates of book-
learning nor of the examination of logical proofs. They
consider rather that the means of discovering the truth, the
means of self-education, is discipline, the elimination of
blameworthy qualities, detachment from earthly interests, and
(1) Ihya3 Vol. Ill p.l6.*L
(2) Ihya J Vol.Ill p.17
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setting forth with eagerness towards God. then these
disciplines are practised then God will take charge of the
servant's heart by enlightening it with the light of knowledge
so that His Grace is flooded upon it; when the light shines
the secrets of the invisible world are manifested and the
Divine realities beam upon the heart. Hence the duty of the
servant is to be prepared by complete purity, devotion,
sincere will and continuous expectation of the Grace of God.
In support of this Sufi theory A1 Ghazali points out that the
prophets and saints did not arrive at reality through
scholastic reasoning but through indifference to this world,
detachment from its relationships, freeing the heart from its
interests, and diverting attention from family, home, power
and position, so that the heart arrives at a state of complete
indifference towards temporal and material things. Therefore
the learner must confine himself in a private mosque (zawvah)
and limit hi3 physical worship to the duties and the fixed
supererogatory services (rawatib). He must sit with Ms heart
present and concentrated; he should not distract Ms thoughts
by reciting the Qu ran, enquiring into its explanation, nor by
studying the books of the Traditions. He must strive not to
allow anything to enter Ms thoughts save God. During tMs
period of solitude the learner must not cease to utter the
word God, God, Allah. Allah. He must perform this
continuously with the concentration of the heart until he
arrives at a state in which he ceases to utter the word, since
he feels that the word is present in his tongue; then he will
find Ms heart continuing the repetition of the word until its
form and letters cease to exist and its meaning only persists
in the heart as if it were inherent in it.
Then the learner, or •seeker1, arrives at this state he
has the option of concluding the course of his discipline
further pursuing this course by completely repelling the
disturbing evil thoughts (v&swas). He should not beseech the
Grace of God, for indeed through what he is doing he is
deserving of the Grace of God. He must merely wait for that
which God may bestow on him as He has done on His prophets and
saints. If the learner is sincere in his will, persistent in
his devotion, not pulled down by his earthly desires, nor
disturbed by any wordly thought vzhatever, then the light of
a)
truth will shine in lii3 heart.
Defects of the Sufi Method
After giving an account of the mystical way of learning A1
Ghazali thinks it fair to present the argument which can be
brought against it. The scholars who criticise it do not deny
(1) Hiya* Vol.Ill pp.16 - 17.
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the possibility of carrying out the Sufi practices, nor that
they may lead to the desired end} this, they think, is rare
but it has happened in the case of most of the prophets and
saints* It is objected, however, first that It is not easy
to secure the conditions for learning in this way, for the
cutting off of all wordly relations to the extent recommended
is almost impossible and even if it can be secured at all it
is most likely to prove ephemeral^for the heart is easily
disturbed by the slightest thought;moreover mperament may
deteriorate and consequently the mental balance of the learner
may be affected and through this the body itself may become
sick. Furthermore this self-discipline and cultivation may
fail to carry the student up to the desired truth, but instead
some delusive imaginations may take possession of Ms heart for
a long time and even for his life-time. The scholars in their
arguments indicate that there were many so-called Sufis who
were subject to such delusions, whereas If they had adopted
and mastered the method of rational study they would have been
able to unmask and banish these delusions* Therefore,
continues the scholars' argument, the scholastic method of
learning is safer and arrives more quickly at the goal. k
further such argument is that the Sufi method encourages the
abandonment of study, witness the man .ho declines to learn
Jurisprudence on the grounds that the Prophets did not learn
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it, though he became jurisprudent through Revelation or
Divine Inspiration. Such a person thinks that self-discipline
alone raay lead him to a knowledge of Jurisprudence. This, the
scholars say, would be like a person who refuses to earn a
living through husbandry, hoping that he may find a treasure;
to find a treasure in such a way is possible but highly
improbable and so is It with the student who hopes to attain
knowledge without the labour of methodical study. Finally
the opponents of the Sufi method maintain that there is no
objection to adopting the mystical methods of self-discipline
for further revelation of that which lias not been attained by
the scholars, but this is no substitute for the effort of
scholastic study. Application to that study is an essential
preliminary to the other.
Here we see that A1 Ghazali states very fairly the
scholastic stand-point and shows a considerable understanding
of the objections r^-aised by the scholars. He allows their
arguments some subsuance, and in this context he does not
engage in refuting them. But does this mean that he is less
confident in the Sufi method he himself adopts? The answer is
definitely not. He repeatedly asserts that the Sufi method of
approaching reality, namely the method of self-discipline is
best; moreover he maintains that according to the verdict of
the spiritually learned it is an obligatory duty and it Is one
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which he has followed himself* Certainly it is not easy but
this does not affect its validity and its eventual leading
to the true knowledge* A1 Ghazali on many occasions states
that the way to the knowledge of God is not a smooth one and
hence the term * effort' or 'striving' (mu.lahadah) has been
used by him to describe it* God said: "Those who strive for
us we shall guide to our ways", and here A1 Ghazali
interprets this 'striving' as the struggle against the self
or the self-discipline Tdiich God lias made the condition of
(1)
His guidance.
A1 Ghazali's failure to refute the other scholastic
objections which he quotes requires some explanation. I think
that he is not unmindful of the fact that there have been some
people who have adopted the Sufi way but have gone astray, and
so have undergone mental and physical troubles* For this
reason he strongly recommends that the student must have a
Sufi teacher (shavkli). in whom he may find guidance, and who
will lead him in the straight way; "for the road to God is
not an easy one, and the ways to Satan are pleasant and
numerous*" He also states that "the seeker who has no teacher
to guide him will be guided by Satan, just as the man who
goes into the wilderness without a guide is courting serious
XI) Ihya* Vol.1 p.21.S.
(1)
danger."
The danger that arises from abandoning the scholastic
method of learning and adopting the Sufi method is
recognised by A1 Ghazali to some extent; for this reason he
insists, as we shall see later, that obligatory religious
instruction must receive priority; he gives spiritual know¬
ledge, or the science of the world to come, superiority to
all other types of sciences such as theology, law, medicine
and other secular subjects, and fervently claims its
predominance over them. Therefore the adoption of the Sufi
method of learning is in Ms view inevitable for those who
seek true knowledge.
Tire Difference ladaaaa Prpphetlc god
Scholastic Experience '
To differentiate between the two forms of knowledge in
terms of the method of learning and the experience of the
learner, A1 Ghazali points out that the prophetic experience,
or intuitive knowledge, springs from within the heart through
the inner door which leads to the invisible world, vdiereas
scholastic or rational knowledge enters the heart through the
natural channels of learning, -that is to say the 'senses*,
(1) Ihya® Vol. Ill p.65.W
the faculties which disclose the visible world. This is the
difference, according to A1 Ghazali, hi the ways in which
the two forms of knowledge occur in the heart (see Part II),
but there is also another difference, namely the difference
in the methods whereby the scholars on the one hand and the
Sufis on the other direct their efforts towards knowledge,
Tiie scholars direct their efforts to the attainment of know¬
ledge itself whereas the Sufis apply theirs to the task of
purifying and polishing the heart, in certainty that when
the heart is purified knowledge will flow from it
spontaneously. In illustration of this A1 Ghazali narrates
the following story: -
Sane of the Romans and Chinese challenged each other in
front of a king to a contest of skill in the art of painting.
(1)
The king decided to give them a "panel" (suffah) and
required each party to paint on one side of it. A curtain
was placed between them so that neither party could see the
(1) This is the word A1 Ghazali lias used in the text. It is
impossible to determine exactly what he had in mind;
but "panel" seems the safest equivalent as expressing
what would have served his purpose. The dictionary
equivalents of "suffah" are "shelf" and "ledge", which
are clearly unsuitable. A possible alternative would be
"portico", but this, too, hardly fits the picture Al
Ghazali is trying to convey.
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work of the other. Now the Romans came and brought with them
a good collection of marvellous colours, but the Chinese
brought with them not a single colour, but set to work merely
polishing their side.
Ihen the Romans finished the Chinese announced that they
also had finished. The king was surprised to hear that the
Chinese had finished seeing that they had come without any
colours. Mien they were asked about this, they said: "Pay no
heed to colours, remove the curtain." Mien the curtain was
removed their side was shining with the beauty of the Roman
painting. It was even more beautiful because of its purity,
just like a polished mirror. In like manner A1 Ghazali
maintains that the concern of the Sufis is to purify and
polish the heart until the light of reality shines in itj
just like the act of the Chinese in directing their effort to
the polishing of the suffah. C&i the other hand the effort of
the scholars and philosophers is directed to the attainment
of knowledge itself through its natural means just as the
(1)
Roman effort was directed to painting by means of colours.





Al Ghazali criticises the usual accounts of what is meant
by the phrase iiusn al 1-ihulg "goodness of character", on the
ground that tliey tend to define "goodness of cliaracter" in
terms of its main consequences, and fail to examine what
character is. Each scholar defines goodness of character in
relation to the presuppositions of his own branch of study,
neglecting to ask what is the nature of character itself. The
legal thinker relates goodness of character to legal conceptions;
the theologian to theological conceptions. Thus such thinkers
in Al Ghazali*s view are one-sided in their conceptions of
character, Al Ghazali then sets out to say -what he himself
means by character starting with a distinction between khula
(the inner qualities) and khala (the outward appearance), when
people speak of a man being of good khula. they mean Ms inward
form (al gupah al bq-fcinah); when they speak of khalo tMs
« •
refers to Ms outward form (al surah al zahirah). TMs is the
popular distinction between the two terms.
Wow Al Ghazali regards klmla as that "inward" hay"ah
which is firmly established in the soul, and from wMch actions
arise spontaneously and without deliberation (rawivvah). The
state in which actions springing from kliula are determined by
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reason and religion is called "good character"; but for good
character there must be a stable disposition to perform such
aetions. Hie state in which such actions are not approved by
%
reason and religion is called "bad character". If the internal
form is such as only sometimes yields good actions, we do not
speak of "good character". A person who performs the acts of
generosity only infrequently and from ulterior motives cannot
be described as having the trait of generosity; the internal
form of generosity is not firmly established in him. The same
is true of a man in viiom good action does not arise
spontaneously, but with a deliberate effort. The man who makes
a deliberate effort to be generous has not the trait of
generosity. A1 Ghazali here Introduces an argument similar to
that of Aristotle, in order to prove that character is a
disposition, or an established state (frj>y3qt 33, h^g).
Aristotle puts his argument as follows: Since the things that
come to be in the mind are of three kinds, emotions, faculties,
and disposition^ virtue must necessarily belong to one of the
three classes. By emotions, Aristotle means feelings such as
anger, fear, envy; by faculties, he means that in virtue of
which we are said to be capable of these feelings; and by a
disposition, that in virtue of which we are in a certain
relation, good or bad, to the feeling. If, for instance, on an
occasion of being angry, we are either too violent or too slack
i}4
in our anger, m are in a bad relation to the emotion; if our
anger proceeds in a happy medium, our relation to the emotion
is a good one,
1) - Emotioiisara in themselves neither virtues nor vices,
for by reason of the emotions we are not denominated either
good or bad; but by reason of virtues and vices we are. By
reason «f emotions \jq are neither/ pruiseo. ,s but :>y
reason of virtues and, vices we are. In both anger and fear we
feel without choice, whereas the virtues are acts of choice,
or at least certainly not independent of it,
2) - For the same reason, emotions are not faculties, for
we are not called good or bad, nor are we praised or blamed,
merely because we are able to feel. Moreover, we have
faculties by nature, but we do not cose to be good or bad by
nature,
3) - Since then the virtues are neither emotions nor
(1)
faculties, it remains that they must be dispositions.
nwuxos, j.-i ,-+l> - wo J.
In A1 Ghazali, the term "character" represents what
Aristotle deals with under what he calls "virtues and vices".
(1) The Ethics pp, 45 - 46
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Aristotle proceeds "by considering the three states that
have some connection with virtues and vices, and by eliminatio
reaches his conclusion that they are dispositions of the soul.
A1 Ghazall proceeds siuiilarly to consider four possible
alternatives for what could be held to constitute character.
These are (l) the actual practice of good or evil; (2) the
capacity (qudrah) to perform a good or evil act; (3) the
knowledge (tiarifah) of what is good and what is bads (4) the
disposition (hay* at al nai's) through which (man becomes incline
to perform either good or evil acts and through which the act
of either good or.evil becomes more pleasant than the other.
(1) How character is not the actual performance of good
or evil, for a man may possess the character of generosity, bu
for same reason or other may not be able to practice it, as
when a man who has nothing to give, but would give if he had.
Similarly a man who has the character of meaness and who is
unwilling to give, may sometimes give because of an ulterior
motive.
(2) Character is not the capacity to perform good or evil
acts, for such capacity is related equally to both good and bat
Moreover, all men possess by nature the capacity to do either
good or evil; hence this capacity cannot form the distinction
between good and bad cluiracter.
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(5) Character is not ju3t having knowledge of what is
good or bad, for ouch knowledge is related equally to good and
bad. Men rosy know what is good without doing it.
(4) It remains, therefore, that character is the
disposition of the soul, whereby man performs good or bad
acts.
Aristotle and Al Ghazali thus agree that character does
not consist in n faculty or capacity for doing good or bad;
also that character is a dlsx>osItlon of the soul. Al Ghazali
however, does not discuss "emotions" nor does Aristotle
discuss character either as the knowledge of good md bad or
as the actual performance of what is good or evil.
Intellectual and moral Virtues.
Absolute beauty of the outward form is secured only when
there is goodness in all its parts in relation to one another.
The same is true of the inward form. There are four principal
parts (arkan) in the soul. For character to be good, there
must be a proper balance among these parts. Good character,
therefore, is the harmony that this proper balance brings about
These parts or elements, according to Al Ghazali, are the
faculties of anger, appetite, knowledge, and justice. This
last he calls ciuwwat al cuul and introduces as a faculty along
with
(1) Ihya Vol.Ill p. 4G*- 47
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the other three. In Al Ghazali's thought, there is a faculty
of justice, and it is the domination of justice over the
CD
elements of the human soul that produces goodness of character.
Intellectual Virtues.
The distinction between intellectual and moral virtues in
A1 Ghasali does not take explicit form. He speaks of a faculty
of knowledge (uuwwat alcilm). whereby man can judge and
distinguish between true and false beliefs and statements, and
between good and bad acts. It is only as this power of know¬
ledge exercises itself, that man achieves wisdom, and this is
the foundation of all good qualities of character. It is
through the power of knowledge, when it exists in the souls that
many Intellectual virtues such as practical ?;isdom (al sivasah).
intelligence, quickness of perception, shrewdness of opinion,
are generated. Excess in the faculty of knowledge generates
the qualities of cunning, deceit and so forth; while a defect
in it generates qualities such as idiocy, stupidity and
insanity. The mean between these tv?o extremes is wisdom, which
(2)
is praised in the Quran.
The foregoing outline is all that Al Ghasali says about
what Aristotle conceives as "intellectual virtues". Al Ghazali,
CD IhyT Vol.Ill p.4-7
(2) Ihya' Vol. Ill p.4-7
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however, in Ms analysis, includes wisdom in the list of his
Cardinal Virtues without any implication of its being
"intellectual" in the sense in which Aristotle contrasts
(1)
"intellectual" with "moral". On this point, A1 Ghasali seems
to be more influenced by the Platonic notion of the Cardinal
Virtues, But his mode of dividing the human soul and Ms
attempt to include what he calls the "power of Justice" as a
fourth faculty that results from Reason exercising itself seems,
however, to be an Innovation; though it is one wMch apparently
involves some inconsistency, as we shall see.
Moral Virtues.
Moral Virtues are conceived by Aristotle to be the outcome
of Reason controlling the irrational parts of the soul, for in
the man who controls appetites and in him who resolves to do so
but fails, we praise the Reason or rational part of the soul,
because it exhorts aright and to the best course. Clearly
there is, beside Reason, some other Irrational principle which
opposes and withstands Reason. In the man of self-control it
obeys Reason and perhaps in the man of perfected self-mastery
it is yet more obedient, for then it agrees entirely with
Reason. The irrational is twofold; the one part, (the vegetable)
has no share in reason, but the second part, desire or
(1) The Ethics p. 35
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appetition, generally does partake of it in a sense, insofar
as it is obedient to reason and capable of submitting to its
(1)
rule.
In accordance with the division of the soul into the
rational and irrational, Aristotle considers the excellence of
man to be of two kinds. We recognise two classes of excellence,
calling the one Intellectual and the other Moral: pure science,
intelligence and practical wisdom are intellectual; liberality
and self-mastery are moral. In speaking of a man's moral
character, we do not say he Is scientific or intelligent, but a
good man. We praise the man of science by reason of I lis
intellectual qualities and these, as far as they are proise-
(2)
worthy, we call excellences.
In A1 Ghasali, however, we do not find this classification.
His thought goes only so far as to define the four Faculties,
out of which the four Cardinal Virtues arise. A1 Ghazali's
account of intellectual virtues lias already been discussed; it
remains to consider his analysis of what Aristotle ealls moral
virtues. The analysis of the human soul viiich A1 Ghasali
adopts in Ms scheme of moral education differs considerably
from the conception manifested in his more general theory of
(1) The Ethics pp. 32 - 35-
(2) The Ethics p. 35*
human nature. In Ms scheme of moral education what he calls
the "faculty of justice" (ouuwat alfadl) appears as a new element
in the soul, TMs conception, however, does not appear in his
general analysis of human nature; there, he does not distinguish
between the function of this power and that of the power of
knowledge (Reason), The function of Reason there is to keep in
balance the irrational faculties of appetite and anger. The
the
absence of this balance is due to the part played by/demonic
element. It manifests itself in the failure of Reason to
control anger and appetite. Contrasted with this is a fourth
faculty auvjwat al fadl. which comes into play when tliere is
balance among the parts of the soul, when, that is, Reason
successfully exercises control over the passions and desires.
An analogy is given here to distinguish between the power of
i lm (Reason) and the pov/er of cadl. The former is pictured as
a Msg cp'T,:a^dqy (M wwhiir a J, hasj^),the commander who gives
reasonable orders^ while the latter as that which carries out
the commands of Reason. Anger and appetite are pictured as the
subjects upon which these commands are Imposed. The moral
virtues^ therefore, are the outcome of the power of cadl
exercising Itself in carrying out the commands of Reason. Thus
the good state of anger and tile good state of appetite are
the outcome of the control demanded by Reason and carried out
by the power of cadl. It Is right to note that Al Ghasali seems
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not to distinguish between Plato's concept of Justice and
Aristotlefs. He sometimes speaks of it in terms of the mean,
the happy medium that produces our virtues? and here he
clearly deviates from the meaning that Aristotle attaches to
the word .justice. Again he speaks of it as "Justice" in the
soul, which is a sign of the soul's health. This seems
Platonic rather than Aristotelian, though Plato's social
interpretation of Justice gives place to A1 Ghazali's more
individualistic tendency.
Like Aristotle, A1 Ghazall speaks of the good state of the
power of anger and appetite, that is, the mean, as constituting
our moral virtues. Hence the idea of the AristotjLian mean
plays an important role in shaping A! Ghazali's thought regard¬
ing the education of character. The good state of the power of
anger, Al Ghazali says, is called courage, the good state of
the power of appetite is called temperance ( "iffah). Hence
courage is a mean state between excess and defect in the
faculty of anger. Y*hen the faculty of anger deviates from this
mean, and rises to excess, it is called rashness; when it
diminishes to the point of defect, it is called cowardice. If
control over appetite is lost and it rises to excess, this is
called gluttony (intemperance); if it falls to the degree of
deficiency, it is called apathy. The virtue of the faculty
lies in the mean, which is praiseworthy, and the vice of it lies
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in the two extremes, #i±ch are blameworthy. The power of
justice, according to A1 Ghazali, lias neither excess nor defect,
(1)
for a man must be either just or unjust. In this connection,
A1 Ghazali conceives of justice ( cadl) as the mean in other
faculties. At other times he speaks of it as a separ,te virtue;
and here he differs from the wider conception of Aristotle. It
is, however, safe to assume that the political and the social
conception of justice which played a great part in directing
the thought of Aristotle did not strongly influence A1 Ghazali,
and this explains vAiy he says so little about v.hat he sometimes
calls the "power of justice" (auv/wat alcadl> and sometimes
"justice" ( radl) . A1 Ghazali is undoubtedly inconsistent in
his definitions of this virtue. He first considers the
faculty of justice as one of the principal parts Carkin) of
the soul. His context here suggests that it is not an
independent faculty, since it operates only through the
(2)
operation of Reason in controlling passions and desires. He
identifies its function as being the carrying out of the
commands (isharah) of Reason. This is all that he says about
the faculty of justice ( u-./.nh al'u^l), On the other hand,
when he speaks of the Cardinal Virtues which are produced
(1) HiyaJ Vol.Ill p. 47 - 48
(2) Ihya1 Vol.Ill p. 47.
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through achieving the mean in the faculties of knowledge,
anger, and appetite, he lists cadl (Justice) as one of the
virtues. One would suppose that this virtue of Justice would
be conceived as springing from the faculty of Justice, but Al
Ghazali is not precise on this point. In an attempt to define
cadl "justice", which he conceives as one of the four Cardinal
y __
Virtues, he says: "We mean by cadl a state (foil) of the soul,
a power (ciuwwah) through which man controls anger and appetite,
and rules them according to the requirements of vd-sdom". Thus
the definition, as it reads, tends to identify cadl so conceived
with auwwat alrilm or Reason, which yields the virtue of wisdom,
and of which he gave a similar definition in his discussion on
the elements of human nature.( .
But Reason here has a different sense from that given it
in the general analysis of human nature. It is a state of the
soul through which man is capable of judging what is right and
what is wrong, How, does the making of distinction between
right and wrong, which is the function of Reason, differ from
the controlling of passions and desires according to the
requirements of wisdom, which is the function of justice (radl)?
Al Ghazali is not clear about this, I would think that the
distinction he implies is that the function of reason is to
shed light and give a sound judgment, while the function of
gadl (the power of justice) is to act accordingly. His
144
analogy of the "wis© commander", (Reason), and the "executive
body", (auwwat alfadl). may support tills argument.
It still remains to be considered whether the faculty of
justice is held by Al Ghasali to be an element of the human
soul. Clearly Ms words: "there are four arkan (main ^arts)
In the inner self" supports the impression that it is. But
again his explanation of the function of the power of justice
among these faculties suggests that this power is merely a
phase of balance, and one which constitutes a mean state in
human nature. This interpretation may be supported by Ms
leaving this power out of account in Ms discussion of the
elements in the human soul (see part 1), Moreover, he
repeatedly uses tiio expression fadl "justice", as equivalent
(2)
to the lctidal "mean state".
Thus it becomes increasingly clear that Al Ghazali's
conception of justice in human nature is confused, Inasmuch as
he identifies Justice in the PlatoMc sense with the
Aristotelian "mean", which constitutes goodness of character.
Cquffeg pf Gqxxjfleg.g p£ Cliarap^y.
Al Ghazali propounds two ways in which goodness of
character comes aboutj but the first of these is a complex of
(1) Ihya' Vol.Ill p. 4?
(2) Ihya Vol.Ill p. 50.*7.
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two distinct conceptions, probably due to the close similarity
of the two Arabic words, fitrah and tabr. The usual meaning
of the former is "natural disposition"; of the latter,
"acquired disposition"; in certain contexts, the two are
interchangeable; but in studying the first of Al Ghazali * s two
causes of good character, the distinction must be borne in
mind. In the case of fitrah goodness of character can come
through the Divine Grace. Then the person is born with a
perfect reason, balanced appetite, and moderate anger. He is
virtuous without external aid ancl educated without instruction.
The prophets are examples of this. Linked with this in Al
Ghazali's first cause is the case of tabr . Here, again without
effort on his own part, the child's character may become good
either by up-bringing or by the "customs" in which he grows up.
Al Ghasail's second cause of goodness of character is
self-discipline. Here, like Aristotle, he propounds the
doctrine that goodness of character can be achieved by
training and practice. Thus if a man wishes to acquire the
virtue of liberality, his way lies in practising the art of
giving lavishly of his wealth and exerting himself in this
until it becomes part of Ms nature. So with other virtues,
it is similarly by training that vice can be cured, or even
a)
turned into good habits. All qualities of character that
(1) Ihya Vol.Ill p. 50
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are approved by Religion conic about by means of habit
formation.
Formation of Habits and the Doctrine of Pleasure and Pain.
The pleasure we experience when we perform moral or
religious acts is the test whereby we judge the strength of
our virtues of character. Hence the liberal man is he who
finds pleasure in the acts of giving, the humble is he who
finds pleasure in humility. Here Al Ghazali speaks of what he
calls al-*idilaa al dln^ivvah which may be translated "the
characteristics of a religious man". These according to hira
cannot be firmly rooted in a roan, unless he becomes so
accustomed to good actions as to find pleasure in them, and
becomes so habituated as to find it painful to do the opposite.
We must interpret the pleasure and pain that supervene upon
our actions as symptoms of our condition. The man who abstains
from bodily pleasures, and actually enjoys doing so, is
virtuous, while the man who does so but dislikes it, is not.
It is pleasure that makes us do vhat is bad and pain that
makes us decline what is good or right. For this reason, we
have to discipline ourselves to feel pleasure at doing
right and pain at doing wrong. To emphasize this, Al Ghazali
quotes the Quranic verse, where God, referring to prayer,
(1)
says: "it is difficult except to those who are pious."
(1) Iliva' Vol.Ill p. Jo
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It Is a sign of our being vicious If m feel pain in doing
good actions, or in emitting bad ones, A person In audi a
state cannot attain aoral happiness* lie should however,
continue doing the right and emitting the ureng, ©von If lie
fools pain in doing so. Such a person Is bettor than the
r;crson vtio omits doing the good acts completely® or one sb»
feels pleasure in doing bad actions* Bo is, however, less
virtuous then the person ftio does good actions vdllingly and
(1)
with pleasure. Tho latter is ti^e man enjoys moral happiness.
To attain happiness through virtue it is not sufficient that a
man occasionally feels pleasure at doing goodj he must feel
such pleasure continually thrmighsufc his life* A aaa »ho
performs the acts of liberality sssst unfa ilingly fiat pleasure
in such acts ® if he la to happy through his virtu©♦ The
longer a laaa practises virtuous acts the ..ore firmly
established the virtue becomes. This is the view that the
prophet expressed in replying to a qua3ti|n about happiness!
"It is length of life In obedience to Cod,"
11 Okasail her© introduces an explanation of the dislike
for death shovti by the Prophets and the Saints* His argument
runs as follows: "the longer the life spent in practising good
(1) flgg. Vol. Ill p.
(2) Ibva Vol.Hl p. 51
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actions> the more perfect and firmly established becomes
virtue, and the more firmly established is virtue, the happier
man is". The purpose of religious acts, A1 Ghassali continues,
is to leave a good effect on the heart# This can be assured
only through prolonged practice in the good acts. Moral and
religious education must be directed to eliminating love of
tills v/orld from the soul and implanting in it the love of God.
Meeting Him should be its greatest delight.
It is quite usiial for virtuous acts to become pleasant
through habit formation, for habits have great influence upon
our souls, even greater than that required in the formation of
virtues. Here are sorae examples given by A1 Giiasali to prove
the far-reaching influence of habit on our lives.
I) - The gambler rejoices and finds much pleasure in his
gambling. He even disparages all sorts of pleasures other than
Ms onn. Though gambling deprives him of his money and brings
his life into ruin, yet he adheres to it because of the
influence of habit upon Mm.
II) - Some people have the habit of vatelling birds and
observing their flight and behaviour. We see such persons
standing under the heat of the sun, probably all day long,
paying no attention except to the birds In wMch they are
interested. This is because of the habit Uhieh they have




III) • The criminal may pride himself on the punishment
which is inflicted on him. He endures all sorts of suffering,
even to the sentence of death, rather than admit his guilt.
This is because of the pleasure he finds in what, as he thinks,
is an act of courage and manliness. Though his acts are wicked
and contemptible, yet he finds pleasure in them, because of the
habit of vicious action that persists in hi: .
These illustrations explain, according to A1 Ghazali, how
greatly our actions are governed by the habits w© form. He
concludes that since, through the formation of bad habits, the
soul can be led into the my of enjoying vice, it can similarly
be trained to delight in virtue by >eing disciplined in the
constant performance of what is right. Moreover, the
inclination of the soul to vice is unnatural. It resembles
the inclination of appetite to unnatural food. The inclination
to wisdom, to the love and worship of God, is natural to the
soul. It resembles the inclination of appetite for good food,
which is natural to the body. But the tendency of the soul to
(1)
bodily pleasures is unnatural and unbecoming.
Tfo? ?ost Pf Fo^t^on.
Both A1 Ghazali and Aristotle emphasize the fact that the
pleasures which follow from our actions must be taken as a
(1) Ihya' Vol.Ill p. 51
sign of our moral state. He who is truly brave is he who
stands up against danger either with pleasure, or at least
without pain, while he who does it with pain is not truly
(1)
brave, The liberal man, according to Al Ghazali, is he who
finds pleasure in giving, whereas he who gives with reluctance
cannot be described as liberal. The humble man is he who finds
(2)
pleasure in humility, Al Ghazali, however, does not, like
Aristotle, give a systematic account of pleasure and pain as
being the criteria of moral virtues. In propounding this
Aristotle says "because by reason of pleasures we do what is
bad and by reason of pain we decline from doing what is right".
This idea is however, expressed in Al Ghazali by Ms analogies
of the gambler who does what is wrong because of the pleasure
he finds in doing so and the person who performs the acts of
worship reluctantly owing to lack of pleasure in them.
Both Al Ghazali and Aristotle see difficulties in the
doctrine that "by doing acts of virtue we become virtuous".
This, says Aristotle, "implies that man must do just actions in
order to become jiist. A person may be perplexed as to the
meaning of this statement, for if men are doing the actions,
they have the respective virtues already, just as men are
Cl) The Btiiics pp. 40 - 41.
(2) Xhva Vol.Ill p. 50.
a)
grammarians or musicians when they do the acts of these arts."
In an attempt to remove this perplexity &1 Chasali says
this is one of the wonders of the relation between the soul
and the body. For the feeling that prevails in the heart
expresses itself in actions by the members to the extent that
these members act in accordance with those feelings. On the
other hand, every act that is performed by members may leave
an effect on the soul, and so on in a "vicious circle", 41
Ghazali gives an example to make this clear. 4 man who wishes
to make good liandwriting a habit of his soul so that he becomes
a good writer by disposition (tab*), must practise imitating what
a good writer does. He must do this repeatedly and for a long
time. The action is done at first with effort and trouble
the course of time, with repetition and with
the full development of that habit, goodness of writing comes
to be a quality of the soul. Good writing, which was at first
an action that came reluctantly and painfully, at last flows
easily and readily from his hand.
In this way A1 Ghasali explains how the activities that
proceed from a "formed habit" differ from those which have
gone to form it. He draws a distinction between two ways of
performing good actions. The good act through which we learn
(1) The Ethics p. 43.
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to be good is a reluctant act, an act which is performed only
by our members. There is no activity of the soul in it and
consequently we find no pleasure in it. But in the course of
tine, and after a continuous repetition of the "good act*, we
become good in the sense that we have developed the habit or
the disposition of goodness; such a habit becomes second
nature to us and we no longer perform the good act reluctantly
or painfully, but easily and pleasantly. Goodness lias come to
be a quality of the soul and not merely an act which proceeds
from the member. Hence we find pleasure in doing it. Sew
Aristotle^ explanation of the difficulty is different from
that given by A1 Ghasali. According to Aristotle it does
not necessarily follow that if men do virtuous actions they
already have the appropriate virtues. It is not so even in
the case of arts, for a can may produce something grammatical,
either by chance or through suggestion from another; he
becomes a grammarian when he not only produces something
grammatical , but does so as a grammarian, that is, in virtue
of the grammatical knowledge he himself possesses. Here
Aristotle distinguishes between the arts and the virtues.
There is no direct parallel, indeed the factors do not operate
in the same plane, because things which are produced by the
arts have theirexcellence in themselves, and it is sufficient
that they should be of a certain kind. But the products of
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virtue, say, justice or self-mastery, are not what they are
merely because they are acts of a certain kind, but in virtue
of the state of the person who performs them. It depends on
whether he performs the act knowingly and performs it
intentionally with a vie?;? to achieving the end of the action
for its own sake, and, finally, whether he is himself stable
and consistent. These conditions are not necessary for the
attainment of success in the arts. For these, the only
necessary condition is knowledge• For the attainment of virtue
knowledge avails little or not at all; but other conditions
are all important. Virtuous action is the result of continued
practice eightly performedjthat is, from habit after the
manner of the just man, or the man of perfect self-mastery.
Mere performance of these acts otherwise than according to
the example of just and self-controlled mer c.oes not result
in the possession of virtue. Finally, he wno does not perform
acts of virtue at all is not even on the way to becoming a
(1)
good man,
PogSib^ity of i pdifyhy- Character.
Throughout his moral teaching A1 Ghasali emphasises the
idea of modifying character through the regulation of passions
and desires. According to him, spiritual discipline depends
(1) The Ethics pp. 43 -
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solely on this regulation, or 'modification1. He points out
that some people tend to deny the possibility of such
modification,adding that the view of such people is based on
the assumption that human nature cannot be changed in any
respect. Their argument is twofold:
a) - Character (khula) is the internal form of man and
(khala) is Ms external form. Since the external form cannot
be changed, the tall man cannot be turned into a short one,
so
nor the ugly man into/ beautiful., so toe internal ugliness of
character cannot be turned into *beauty1•
b) - Goodness of character is alleged to result from the
repression (as they call It) of desires and passions; but
experience has shorn that goodness of character is the outcome
of human temperament (masii). Any attempt to control this will
yield no result; for the purpose of character modification is
to check the natural inclination of human nature, and this, the
argument continues, is quite impossible.
These two arguments seem to A1 Ghazall extremely weak. The
claim that character cannot be modified is the claim of him
who finds indulgence too 'pleasant and discipline too hard.
Instead of attributing tills to Ms own weakness, such a person
maintains that the modification of character is not possible.




(1) Had not character been susceptible to modification,
there would be no use in the instructions and the teaching of
the prophets.
(2) Character modification is possible even in animals.
We see^for example, that the character of the falcon can be
modified and changed from fierceness to tameness, the dog from
greed for food to abstemiousness, the horse from intractability
to obedience. This gives strong grounds for believing tiiat
modification of character is possible in human beings also.
The false argument that character cannot be changed for the
reason that passions and desires cannot by any means cease to
exist is based on the assumption that the aim of discipline is
the eradication of the natural inclinations in man. This is
an erroneous notion because desires are created in man to
serve an essential purpose. If the desire for food ceases, for
instance, man will vanish. If the desire for sex disappears
the preservation of the race will not be possible. And so with
passions: if anger did not exist man would not be able to
(1)
defend himself against destructive elements,
hov/ PffQPlq Differ An teacity for fctoral
Al Ghasali is greatly impressed by the Aristotelian notion
of moral virtues. According to Aristotle, none of the moral
virtues exists in us entirely by nature, for none of the
(1) Ihva' Vol.Ill p. 48 - 49. See also Part I p.40
- 156 -
things vMcli exist by nature can be changed by custom. Here
Aristotle uses the analogy of a stone. By nature it gravitates
downward, and can never by custom be brought to rise upwards.
Similarly, fire could never be trained to move downwards.
Virtues, then,occur in us neither by nat -re nor in despite of
nature. We are by nature provided with a capacity for
(1)
receiving them; they are perfected in us through custom.
A1 Ghazali has a similar conception, but employs different
analogies. He sees all tilings are divided into those vhich
are created perfect and those which are created imperfect. The
first, those which are created complete or perfect (kamil) by
nature, cannot be changed by the will of man. Such are the
sky and the stars, and also the bodies of men and animals.
This to my mind is an elaboration of Aristotle's notion that
we cannot modify ourselves in respect of what we are by nature.
The second category is of those which are created
incomplete (hauls), but provided with the capacity for
(2)
perfection and improvement under certain conditions. Here, too,
it is clear that A1 Ghazali is interpreting the Aristotelian
idea that we are furnished by nature not with virtues, but
with a capacity for receiving virtues. The "certain conditions"
(1) The Ethics pp. 36 - 37.
(2) Ihva Vol.Ill p. 48.X.
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v/hich A1 Ghasali has mentioned and goes on to explain here
more fully, are probably the development of what Aristotle
means by the term custom. According to A1 Ghazali, education
is capable of improving our character only within certain
limits, and he uses a metaphor to make this clear. "The date
kernel is in fact neither a date palm, nor an apple tree, but
under 'certain conditions' is capable of becoming a date palm,
but it cannot by any means become an apple tree". So, too,
our desires and passions can be changed by education, within
certain limits^,to produce virtue, but education can by no
means eradicate these natural inclinations. The responsiveness
of individuals to moral influences differs according to A1
Ghazali in two principal ways. In the first place, people
vary in the intensity of their instincts, and within an
individual the natural inclinations vary in intensity. For
example, appetite is always more intense and harder to fight
against than anger.
Secondly, responsiveness to moral influences depends
upon environmental conditions. A1 Ghasali divides people into
four classes, according to the effect of such conditions upon
them.
(i) First comes the naive person (al insan al ghufl) who
does not distinguish between right and wrong, nor between good
and evil. He remains without convictions; but the power of
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his appetites has not "been strengthened hy indulgence. Such
a person is the most amenable to education, Tor he only
requires a teacher to guide him towards discipline and a
stimulus to induce him to adopt it. He has the capacity to
become good in a comparatively short time.
(ii) Next comes the person who distinguishes between gooc
and evil, hut has not the habit of acting well. His bad
behaviour comes of indulging his desires and paying no
attention to his knowledge of their evils. Such a person is
less responsive to moral education than one of the first
class, since he needs to make a double effort, first, to
*/re
eliminate the bad habits that 4?a- in him and then to implant
virtuous habits within himself. Resolution is necessary hero
if the person is to be capable of improvement.
(iii) Thirdly, there is the person who performs vicious
acts not only because of the enticement of desires, but
because, owing to the wrong education he has received, he
does not hesitate to do things that he knows to be evil.
The possibility of such a persons responding to education is
remote and his reform can hardly be expected because of the
many errors that have gone to shape his bad character.
(iv) Fourthly, there is the person who not only adheres
to wrong beliefs in which he has been educated and believes
c
that vicious acts are virtuous, but actually prides himself on
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performing such acts and thinks that his prestige is thereby
enhanced; such a person is the most difficult and unresponsive
of all to moral teaching.
The person in the first group is described by A1 Ghazali
as ignorant (.iahil). in the second as "going astray" (dal),
» A
in the third as wicked (fasjq), and in the fourth as evil-
- (1)
na tared (ghiyrpj-r).
Methodg of iJodjfyi^ Charades.
A1 Ghazali regards balance (i*tidal) in character as the
"health of the soul"; any deviation from this "balance" is a
sign of indisposition, Just as a balance in the constitution
of the body is a sign of health. Any deviation from the
balance is a sign of ill-health. Thus, there is a
correspondence between the tending of the body and the tending
of the soul. The cure of the soul by eliminating vices and
implanting virtues to strengthen it is like the cure of the
body from disease by eliminating the malady and producing
health. In physical health the general rule is that the human
constitution is by nature balanced, but external conditions
can bring about ill-health in the body. So it is also with
the soul. For the most part every child is born with a
balanced nature, but through habituation and mis-education he
develops vices. The body is created at birth incomplete, but
(1) Ihva7 Vol.Ill pp. 48 - 49
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matures and grows stronger through being tended and
nourished. The soul, too, is created imperfect but with the
capacity for being perfected through education. The duty
of a doctor is both to devise rules to preserve the health
that a man's body already lias and to restore to health a body
which is suffering from disease. In the same way every being
possessed of a soul has the duty, first of preserving the
soul's original purity and increasing its strength, and
secondly of purifying it itien it becomes impure. The diseases
which affect the body are usually cured by their opposites.
For example, if the patient lias a fever, he v/ill be given a
cooling treatment. Similarly vices which are the maladies of
the soul are cured by their opposites. Thus the disease of
ignorance is cured by knowledge, the disease of illiberality
by exerting generosity, the disease of vanity by exerting
humility. The cure of physical disease requires the sufferer
to be patient and endure the unpleasantness of treatment.
Similarly, in order to overcome a moral indisposition a person
must be patient in bearing the hardship of discipline. It is
necessary for the cure of the body that the doctor should
know not only the right medicine and treatment and the correct
quantity of the medicine to be taken, but also the resistence
of the patient. Diseases may be made worse if these are not
correctly estimated; similarly In the cure of the soul, the
I6l -
measures by which its defects are to be cured must be thoroughly
examined. Before commencing treatment the doctor should know
not only the nature of the disease, its symptoms and its usual
course, but should know also the history of the patient
including his physical history, profession and age. In like
manner the spiritual physician (al shavhk) who guides his
followers and cures their souls, should not be hasty in
prescribing discipline for them, he should not Impose a hard
regime upon them, nor should he force them to practise a
particular study before he knows the nature of their diseases.
As it is likely that the doctor who prescribes the same
treatment for all patients may cause harm and even death to many
of them, so also the spiritual physician who advises all his
followers to pursue the same course of discipline may cause
spiritual deterioration in many of them. He must, therefore,
consider the moral disease of each individual separately, he
must study the various factors such as his age, his constitution^
his physical endurance and the severity of treatment he can bear.
He will then devise the appropriate treatment. If the pupil is
a beginner, with no knowledge of the fundamental religious
duties, the shaykh must give him first some instruction in these
duties, such as the rules of physical purification and prayer.
If he is already engaged in wrong practices, he must first be
ordered to abandon them. When the pupil already observes
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religious practices and physical purification, then the duty of
the shavkh is to consider his inward purity,
, to study his character, and diagnose the disease of his
heart#
There is an important method of modifying character, which
must be employed when the disease of a person is so obstinate
that he cannot practice its opposite. It is then advisable that
such a person should be deflected from his obdurate fault to
another one, which is less serious than the first. The case here
is like that of the person who is seeking"physical purification:
he rashes off a blood stain which is impure (nails). with urine,
which is also impure, and afterwards he rashes off the urine
with rater, which is the natural thing for removing impurities
(naiasah). This course is followed when it is not possible to
clean off the blood directly with water, An example of the
transformation of character through deflecting Interest from one
imperfection to something less imperfect, is found by A1 Ghazall
in the ray we can make use of a child1 s natural interests at
various stages of development. The child's interest in play can
be used in encouraging Mm to go to school, or can be transformed
into an interest in ornament, and from this to an interest in
leadership; the interest in leadership can be transformed into
interest in the world to come. Again, the person who is fond of
power and position can be deflected to fondness for a less
163 ~
harmful kind of power. Many characteristics can be modified in
ing
tliis way. In concluding Ms discussion on modify character Al
Ghasali states that the general principle for acMeving
modification of a particular characteristic is to practise the
opposite. The person must exert himself to do r/hat is contrary
to his desires until Ms character is improved. The most
important tiling in self-discipline is a strong will. Once this
will is attained, the way is paveil for the improvement of
character.
Qf Mo£al Dftsea^es.
The analogy of the body is also employed in explaining the
symptoms of the diseases of the human heart. Every organ or
member of the body has its own proper function and any failure
to perform this, is a sign of disease in it. The function of
the eye is to see and failure to do this is a symptom of disease
in the eye. So, too, the proper function of the soul is to
attain knowledge and wisdom. Attaining wisdom leads to knowing
God, knowing God leads to loving Him, loving Him leads to
worshipping Him, worshipping I-Iim leads to finding pleasure in
the thought of Him, finding pleasure in til© thought of Him leads
to preferring such pleasure to all other forms of pleasure. A1
Ghazali strengthens his argument by observing - as a matter
(1) Ihva' Vol,III pp. ?4.
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of common acceptance - that the distinctive characteristic of
the human heart is ability to know things as they are# Thus
knowledge of things as they are must imply, first, knowing God,
for He is the creator of these things. If man knows all tilings,
but does not know God, his knowledge is worth nothing, he would
be as if lie knew nothing# If it is established that knowing
God is the best of all forms of knowledge, then it follows that
loving Him is the best of all forms of love, for loving Him is
the result of knowing Him closely# Again if it is established
that loving Him is the test of all forms of love, it follows
that preferring Him to all worldly interests is the best of all
aims, for the sign of love is to prefer the beloved to all other
things# The conclusion is that the knowledge of things as they
are, which is the distinctive characteristic of man, entails
preferring God to all other things# This is the sign of health
in the human heart# Therefore, a man who prefers anything to
knowledge of Him, is sick in heart, just as the stomach, which
prefers anything other than its proper food, is sick# Hence the
inclination of the soul to momentary pleasures is deemed by A1
Ghazali to be the symptom of moral disease# According to him,
almost all souls are sick, except those which receive salvation
from God# Some physical disease can escape detection; a man
may be suffering from disease without being aware of it# Moral
diseases are of this kind, and hence man usually pays no attention
"
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to them. If it happens that a man becomes aware of his moral
diseases, he still finds it hard to endure the bitterness of
treatment, because the cure of moral diseases lies in the
opposition to desires, which are extremely hard to fight. If
a person can endure the unpleasantness of the treatment, there
is still the difficulty of finding a skilful physician who can
undertake the task of treatment. The learned Culama3) who are
supposed to be the spiritual physicians, are also affected by
the same diseases; and a sick doctor cannot cure the sick.
This, according to A1 Ghazali, is the reason why the diseases
of the heart are obstinate. This is the reason, he considers,
for the degeneration in understanding of moral questions that
has taken place. The "rulama" have come to deny that
modification of character is possible, because they are too
interested in this world to pay attention to it. They rather
occupy themselves in what are ostensibly acts of worship, but
are in truth hypocrisy. These are the symptoms of moral
(1)
diseases, as Al Ghazali expounds them.
The Mean as a Sjgft pf Ifealtfr.
The mean in Al Ghazali's theory is the sign of moral
health. This is obvious when we consider the treatment of a
malady of the soul. A person who sets out to cure the disease
of illiberal!ty by giving money must observe the mean, and if
(1) Ihya" Vol.Ill p. 24.
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he goes beyond It, he will contract another disease in place of
the first, namely, the disease of prodigality. The middle
position between the two diseases is the sign of moral health.
The criterion by which we know that the mean has been fully
attained, is that vie perform it more easily and readily, and
find more pleasure in it than in its opposites. To do with
pleasure the actions belonging to a certain quality is a sign
that this is a dominant characteristic. This is clear if we
consider the acts which cone as a result of a bad quality. An
example might be the person who finds more pleasure in saving
money and hoarding it than in spending it upon those who deserve
it. Such a person i3 dominated by the character of illiberality,
or avarice. His duty then is to increase his effort to be
generous and to practise giving. If he reaches a state in which
he finds more pleasure in giving, even to those who do not
deserve it, than in proper economy, then he is dominated by the
disease of prodigality. His duty then is to practise restraint.
The principle is that the individual must keep watch on himself
and scrutinise his own character, fudging it according to the
"pleasantness" and "unpleasantness" he finds in each kind of
action. In the matter of using money, a person attains the mean
when he reaches a state in which he pays 110 attention to money
so that giving and saving become alike to him. Money will come
to be like water, in that he keeps it to meet Ms needs and
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glvos It to those -.ho need it. the soil tot reaches such a
stage onjoys acre! health in respect of thta particular polity.
It oast this in six the mom! qmX&H&m vatil it oon»3
to have no infceroet to things that are connected sith this
world* So the soul will journey froo this world Imviag no ties
with it9 and return to Its QoS pleased* and ted*.
(See part I p.. 35 }
®«»t the exeet MB **i ^aat s^ ** h©M by l|
• •
tocell to he extseaaly difficult to ooftoo. according to his
It is floor than s hair and torpor ton to edge of a sword#
Snooe the person sho ymoosefls in Insping to It in this wli
win be Ohio to pons easily slang to alCTVlfl gito ifl (the
straight path) ia to world to eooe* Sat to fact to tot few
people succeed in tsseping to the exact ass& to too world sod
therefore few escape soae sort of suffering in the uae&ft to
ioao. 41 Oh©sell thSx&s* however* tot people vary in the
aoonnt of panSshasat toy receive ia to world to mm 2a
proportion to their deviation fron to Dean.
It is tree* 41 Ghacall admits* tot achieving istliaoali
Clamping to tins omot mm})* ia this world* is an extrsaely
difficult task* t'tevortolcss* nan should continue to strive
to.ords tot state* ovm if toy eesoofc attain it. the person
viio ciosiros salvation* concludes 41 Ghesali, -111 fiml no
salvation except through good actions; . toco ho oust witch his
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moral qualities, scrutinise them and seek the right method of
Cl)
treating them.




A1 Gxiazali's scheme of child education is most clearly
inspired and coloured throughout by his moral and spiritual
ideas. His whole policy for the education of children rests
on the assumption that a child is by nature neither good nor
bad, but is equally ready to be affected by the forces of good
or evil. From this it follows that the task of education must
be directed to safeguard/^fhe child against corrupt influences
in his environment and to implanting in him the seeds of good
character, A1 Ghazali repeatedly emphasises that safeguarding
children from bad companions is all-important as a negative
principle in their education. Protection from vices and the
purification of the heart are phrases constantly repeated which
reflect these guiding principles of his theory. At the same
time he emphasises no less strongly the importance of a
positive principle even in the education of very early child¬
hood; the positive principle which for him governs the whole
theory of production of good character. It must be remembered,
however, that the aim of all moral teaching, in Ms view, is
purely religious. The doctrine that this world is important
only as an avenue to the next world must be implanted in the
child and carefully nurtured so as to yield good fruit in the
world to come, for the supreme goal is the meeting with God in
which eternal happiness is found.
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A1 Ghazali sees Reason as playing only a small part in
early childhood. He holds, therefore, that a cliild who lias
not reached tamyiz (the development of reason during the
period following puberty), should not be taught moral and
religious rules through logical explanation, but by a process
of indirect persuasion and vise management. He does not define
by chronological limits the different stages of a child's
development, but speaks of the various characteristics of these
stages, and of the educational schemes suited to each of them.
He treats separately of home and school education and, though
he regards these as closely linked, he tends to stress
constantly the greater importance of the home and the rest of
the child's environment in comparison with the education he
receives in school.
Since it is these influences, not reason, which are
important during childhood, the upbringing of cliildren must aim
at making them familiar with moral and religious rules, so that
as soon as they are sufficiently mature they can be enabled to
understand the reasons for what they have been taught in child¬
hood. Tills introduction of reason into moral and religious
education is what, for A1 Ghazali, forms the line of
demarcation between child and adult education.
The child of whom A1 Ghazali writes and thinks is the male
child; for lie speaks sometimes of things and attributes belong-
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ing to boys in contrast to girls. H© has boys' clothing in
(1)
mind when referring to the child's dress, and he enjoins that
the child, when suffering corporal punishment, must not cry
(2)
out or make a fuss "like women". Yet most of what he lias to
say in the matter of child education can apply to either sex,
and Al Ghazali is here only follov/ing the general line of
Muslim tradition, where the male is always foremost in
educational policy.
Underlying the thole of Al Ghazali's educational theory
is the principle of reward and punishment. The incentives for
the adult are the hope of Heaven and the fear of Hellj
correspondingly awe of father, and dread of social censure
together with the promise of praise and commendation are to be
prominent features in forming the child's character. Al
Ghazali does indeed urge discreet handling of the fear element;
but this does not iraply any departure from his general
principle of reward and punishment.
After tliis brief outline of Al Ghazali's general views I
shall endeavour to present in greater detail his scheme of
child education.
The Nature of Child
In his insistence on tlie natural passivity of children he
(1) Ihva> Vol.Ill P.63.1V
(2) Ihya? Vol,III p.63
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likens their newborn hearts to blank sheets of paper ready
for good or evil writing. The writing is the work of
environment. He says that how children are brought up is a
matter of the greatest importance. The child is given as a
trust to liis parents; his pure heart is a precious jewel, not
engraved with any impression, but ready to retain all that may
be impressed upon it. If a child is accustomed to goodness lie
vdll grow good, and his life will be happy in this world and
the next. If he is accustomed to evil and left to grow wild
like an animal, he will grow up unhappy and come to ruin. A1
Ghazali maintains that, as parents are responsible for training
their child to good or evil, they will be rewarded if they
choose the good way, and punished if they neglect the child or
train him in evil ways. His emphasis on parental
responsibility rests on a quotation from the Quranic verses
"God says, *A11 you believers must protect yourselves and your
families C ahllkum) from the Fire.1" Alillkum here refers
particularly to the children. He writes further: "The child
is born susceptible to the influence of good or evil; it is
Ms parents who incline him to the one or the other. The
Prophet said: 1every cMld is born according to al fitrahf but
UJ
his parents make him Jevdsh, Christian, or Magi.1"
(1) jQiya' Vol. Ill p.62
In this saying of the Prophet the sense of the word fitrah
is uncertain and lias been disputed by Muslim scholars. From
the context in which A1 Ghazali uses the quotation I conclude
that by fitrah he understands "the natural disposition". This
0
meaning would support Ms use of the analogy of the uncarved
stone for the child's heart, and his view that, since anything
can be engraved on it, all religious beliefs are the product of
education.
Here the question arisesi are these vie?;s compatible with
A1 Ghasali*s doctrine of innate ideas, his doctrine that belief
in God is innate in human nature, and that every soul is
endowed with it? (See Part n p. 64 ) He quotes the Quranic
verse: "The fitrah of God which he planted in man at Ms
creation" and takes fitrah here to mean faith or belief in God.
Commenting on this passage he writes: "It means that every
human being has the disposition to believe in Godj has, thus, a
knowledge of things as they are. Such faith and knowledge are
implicit in him, in the sense that they are capable of being
realised. The belief in God, asserted by A1 Ghazali to be
established in the child at birth, is - in ray opinion - to
be thought of not as already in being, but as a capacity, a
potential belief, which it is the function of education to
bring into being. Hence there is no contradiction here because
Al Ghazali speaks of the nature of the cliild as being free from
any Impressions, he speaks of the actuality of moral and
religious beliefs and those undoubtedly do not exist in tlie
child's nature, but develop in him in course of tira© as tlie
result of the education that he receives from liis parents and
other influences of his environment.
file task of education, A1 {Jhsssall holds, is to help that
cliild to overcome vvordly difficulties as yell as to protect hi®
from the Fire of tlie world to cooe* This help or protection is
secured through disciplining hin and fostering good character
in hiiaj education also helps and protects hiia in a negative
xmy when it safeguards him against evil companions and refuses
to alios Mm to become accustomed to an easy life or develop
tli© love of ornament ami luxury* For if he grows U|> with these
inclinations lie will spend all Ms life seeking them and then
he vdll come to ruin* Education should take charge of the cliild
froa tii© very beginning of his life* It must provide Mb in
Ms nursing and lactation with a good and pious woman; Ms
nourishment oust caste from a lawful source?, for the milk which
comes from an unlawful source lias no blessing, and if the
nurture of the child is dram from such a source, his clay
(tlriLih)t 'Mil be kneaded^from filth, and Ms nature become
inclined to evil tilings*
(1) liiya' Vol.121 p*62
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P9Y9l9PK»nt gf aifl Moral CpftagjLQUaafiaa
From tliis warning in relation to tht very early nurture
of the child, A1 Ghazali proceeds to speak of the dawn of
social and moral consciousness. He desires the child's
guardian to be ready to recognise what is in truth the first
sign of the development of a 'sensus communis* (tamylz)t an
awareness of himself in a social environment• This sign,
which should be watched for and welcomed when it appears, is
shyness (hava' ) which is manifested in the child growing
bashful in manners and less spontaneous in behaviour. A1
Ghazali must refer to the sort of occasion when a child appears
to restrain himself from doing what he wants because he has
become aware of the disapproval of others. When this happens,
A1 Ghazali thinks, it is because the light of reason is
davaiing in him, developing his sense of right and wrong, and
leading him to choose one form of behaviour rather than
another.
This shyness, therefore, f.s a particularly precious gift
of God, a good omen which indicates the awakening of the sense
of morality. It is a stage which precedes the ripening of
reason at the time of puberty. It is important to note that
the shy child Is a promising child. His shyness must not be
ignored, but regarded as a sign of sensitive awareness of his
social environment ('sensus communis1 or tamvlz). of which his
176 -
education should take full advantage, A1 Ghazali, however,
says little of how this is to be done. On the other hand, there
are dangers of the child's social awareness also making him.
susceptible to corrupting influence. He must be guarded from
those who may tempt Mm to indulge Ms bad inclinations (such
as those discussed in the following sections), A cMld whose
early years are neglected is likely to develop such bad
qualities as lying, envy, calumny, importunity, meddling and
impudence. From all of these it is the function of a sound
(1)
education to protect him.
The Child and Ms Food
The first quality which appears in the child is greed for
food, and tMs impulse must be rightly disciplined, A cMld
should aat only with Ms right hand, say "In the name of
God" before he starts to eat and must take only the food which
is nearest to him. He must not hurry to the table before others
and must not gaze at the food nor at other people eating. He
must not hurry his own eating and must chew Ms food properly.
He must not stain Ms hands or clothing and must sometimes eat
Ms food without condiments so that he may not think that
condiments are always necessary; gluttony must be made repulsiw
to him by pointing out to him that a glutton is behaving like a
(1) E^ra' Vol.111 p.62
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beast and by disparaging in his presence the greedy child and
praising the child who is well-mannered and content with little
food. The virtue of unselfishness and of be* satisfied with
It is obvious from kl Ghazali's account that home
education must continue even after the child goes to school}
hence the parents must retain importance in Ms education in
the Later period of childhood after he goes to school. The
first task of school is to provide the cMld with some
academic instruction but its function must include responsibility
for Ms moral upbringing,
Nov; the aim of the cMld's first school (maktab). is to
teach him by heart the Quran and some of the Traditions and
instruct him in the biographies of pious people in order to
develop Ms admiration of good people. For similar moral
reasons A.1 Ghazali excludes from literature the teaching of
love poetry. The cMld should not only be kept away from love
poetry but from mixing with those who maintain that this kind
of poetry is a sort of gentleness and refinement. This, A1
Ghazali thinks, implants in cMldren the seeds of immorality.
rough food must be rendered admirable to Mm.
Schgplj.1^
(2)
(1) Ihys' Vol. Ill p.62
(2) Biva? Vol.Ill pp. 62 - 63.
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Conduct
In bringing the child up to have a good character, A1
Ghazali holds that instruction about what sort of conduct is
©
good is far less effective than m&re indirect ways of
influencing his conduct. If a child behaves well, he should
be commended, rewarded with sometliing that pleases him, and
praised in the presence of other people for his good behaviour.
If he goes astray from his good conduct, his misdemeanour
should be recognised and pointed out to him, but he should not
be made to think of it as a fault so grave that no other
person could ever commit it. This is particularly important
if lie himself tries to hide his misdemeanour and prevent other
people from knowing of it. If the child repeats a misdemeanour
he should be admonished in private arid it must thus be made
clear to him that his misbehaviour is not trivial; he must be
warned against doing it again; and told that if he does so,
other people will know of it and then he will be disgraced
among them.
Ai Ghazali warns parents and teachers "against making a
habit of reproaching the child; for this will make the
reproach tolerable to him; he will become used to it, and this
will encourage further misdeeds, when this point is reached
\
any advice that is given will have no effect upon his heart".
Al Ghazali emphasises the importance of the child's
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parents in securing his stability. The father must be
consistent in his treatment of his child, he must preserve his
dignity whan addressing him, and must reproach him only
occasionally. The mother must take advantage of the child 's
respect for his father and in A1 Ghazali* s words invoke Ms
fatherfs name "to awe Iiim and restrain him from wrongdoing."
When the cMld starts to develop a sense of right and
wrong he must be carefully watched. "He must be prevented




Furthermore,A1' gives a number of specific examples of
the social and moral teaching that should shape the future
character and personality of the child. In their small society,
children can absorb such etMeal principles as suit their
stage of maturity. The child must be prevented from being
boastful of his parents' possessions or Ms food, clotMng or
school materials. He must be encouraged to show modesty and
respect for all those who have to do with Mm, and he must be
courteous in addressing them. He must be taught that he
cannot take from Ms playmates anything that he may fancy; if
he comes from a well-to-do home this is to be impressed upon
him by teaching that to give and not to take is a mark of
(1) Ifrya3 Vol.Ill p.63
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good breeding, and that taking is mean and vile; but if he
eocies from a poor home, the lesson is to be impressed by
teaching that greed and taking are servile and disgraceful,
and that such behaviour befits a dog, which wags its tail
while awaiting a piece of food. In general, the love of money
and greed for it must be made repulsive to children and they
must be warned that these are worse than snakes and scorpions,
for the evil that results from love of money and greed for it
is more harmful to children, as well as to adults, than
poison.
The child must not be allowed much freedom of speech. He
must not chatter nor start speaking unless he is spoken to,
i
and then his answer must be relevant to the question. It must
be made clear to him that talkativeness "indicates impudence,
which is the mark of children who come from mean homes ..." He
must be a good listener whenever spoken to by his elders ...
he must be prevented from talking nonsense, from scurrility,
cursing and swearing and must therefore be kept away from the
company of those who indulge in these improprieties. It is
from evil company that such bad talk is learnt, and here, as
in general, the principle of good upbringing is to keep
(1)
children out of corrupting companionship.
(1) Ihya^ Vol.Ill p.63
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Early Forms q£ Physical 3fastrw?Ugn
A1 Ghazali introduces some recommendations upon physical
education. When the child readies school age, he must be
prevented from sleeping during the day because this conduces
to laziness. As for his sleep at night, this should not be
curtailed, but he should not be provided with soft bedding. He
must have bedding that villi make his members grow rough and
prevent his body becoming fat. He must be accustomed to
coarseness in bedding, clothing and food and he must be
accustomed to do some walking during the day as well as
exercises so that he may not form habits of laziness. He
should be habituated not to expose his limbs nor hurry in his
walking, he must not relax his hanek when ho walks, but should
rather keep them to his chest.
He must be trained not to spit or to blow Ms nose in
company5 he must not yawn in the presence of others nor turn
Ms back on them, he must not cross Ms legs while sitting nor
lean Ms chin on his hand, nor support Ms head with his arm,
for these are signs of laziness and the cMld must be taught
the correct posture.
By way of recreation and relaxation the child should be
allowed to play at games that are not thought improper, thus
gaiMng relief from the tedium of school work; provided that
he does not overtire himself. To deny the child play and
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compel him to be continuously at v/ork dulls Ms spirits,
stunts Ms intelligence and embitters Ms life so that
eventually he will do all he can to be rid of the sort of
(1)
study that lias been forced upon Mm.
Instruct!on
When the cMld is on the treahold of adolescence he lias
readied the preparatory period for full religious instruction.
TMs instruction, which will cover both doctrine and religious
observance, will be given when he reaches puberty. In the
preparatory stage he must become familiar with some of the
religious duties that he will have to perform as an adult. It
Is noticeable here that A1 Ghazali refers to this period as
the age of tamviz (See p.26 ) He says that when the child
readies the age of tamviz he should not be allowed to neglect
physical purification (taharah) and prayers; should be
commanded to fast some of the days of Ramadan; and should be
forbidden to wear silk and gold. He must be taught all that
he needs of religious rules, and the temptations to wrong
conduct that children are usually subject to. If the child is
brought up in such a manner, then when he reaches puberty it
will be possible for him to come to understand the reasons
( asrar) for these rules. It will then be explained to him
(1) Ilivi3 Vol.III p.63
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that all kinds of food are but 'medicines* and that their
purpose is to provide the individual with the necessary
strength to obey God; that this world is not worth while since
it has no permanence and Death will terminate its pleasure. It
is merely a dwelling to pass through; the Hereafter is the only
permanent habitation. Death may be expected at aiy moment and
the intelligent and wise is he who in this world makes
provision for the next so that his rank near God may be high
and Ms happiness in Paradise may be great.
If the ubpringlng of small children has been right, then
these instructions at the time of puberty will be profitable
and effectual, and endure in the heart as an engraving endures
on a stone; if, on the other hand, the upbringing lias been
wrong, so that the child lias become used to amusement, shame-
lessness, impudence, greed for food and clotiling, ornamentation
and vanity, then Ms nature will not be rightly formed for the
acceptance of tha^truth, just as dry earth is ill-prepared for
plastering a wall.




We use the term Adult Education here as A1 Ghazali uses
it in contrast to child education. It means the education of
young people after puberty. Adult education In its modern
sense, meaning formal education, other than "Higher Education",
for those who have passed school age, is too modern to exist
in A1 Ghazali's system of education. His adult education
commences with the child's puberty when reason is developed
and the individual becomes responsible for performing
religious duties.
2he Value of Education
fhe education of early childhood is not the responsibility
of the child, but of Ms elders, particularly his parents and
teachers; the emphasis, moreover, is on moral Influence and
training. A1 Ghazali considers that from the age of puberty
each individual begins to have a responsibility for his om
education. He is responsible for Ms own further moral
education, and A1 Ghazali's thought on this subject lias been
given i: Part iy* . But whereas academic studies played
little or no part in the education of the young cMld, such
studies play a major part in the education of the adult. Al
Ghazali accordingly introduces his exposition of this
education, which includes both obligatory studies and
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optional studies, with an examination of the reasons why
such education is both valuable and necessary. This
justification is appropriate in introducing Ms thought on
that part of education for which tlie individual himself is
responsible.
The value of knowledge, and hence the value of education,
is attested in A1 Ghazali's view both by authority of
religious opinion and by the conclusions of reason. We shall
now review, first his account of the importance accorded to
education by religion, there he quotes many Quranic verses
and extracts from the Traditions; and secondly his own
argument on logical grounds for the necessity of education
and its value,
(a) Religion authority*
To elucidate what is taught by religion as to the
excellence of education, A1 Ghazali quotes the following
Quranic verses and Traditions:
In encouraging people to seek knowledge God said
referring to teachers, "ask those who know if you do not
know." He also said "they must warn their people when they
return to them". A1 Ghazali comments that what is here meant
by tiiis warning is "education and guidance."
The Prophet in exhorting people to have education said:
"God would guide to a road that leads to heaven him who
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follows a road seeking education." "Verily the angels
spread their wings for Mm who seeks education, expressing
their gratification at what he desires." In addressing tlie
Muslims he said "to go and learn a chapter of knowledge is
better for you than to perform a hundred prayers"; "seek
education even if it is to be found in China"; "knowledge
is a treasure whose keys are questions, therefore ask for it,
for by questioning four persons are rewarded, the questioner,
(1)
the teacher, the listener and he who admires them."
(b) The conclusions of reason.
Reason also can prove the necessity and the excellence
of education; but to be convinced of its excellence one must
first bo convinced of the excellence of knowledge, which is
the subject-matter of education. A1 Ghazali therefore
proceeds to enquire into the nature of knowledge.
The things which are good belong to one or other of the
following classes: (1) that which is good for the sake of
itself; (2) that vhich is good for the sake of others; (3)
that vhich is good for the sake of itself and others.
Happiness in the world to come and the Vision of God is good
for the sake of itself. Money is good for the sake of
others. The health of the body is good for the sake of
CD Sm Vol.1 p.8*- 10.
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itself and others; for instance the soundness of the foot
is good in itself from the point of vie?? that the body is
free from pain and it is also good for the sake of others
from the point of view that when the foot is sound it is
used for achieving human purposes and needs# Nov? if v?e
examine knowledge by this criterion, we find it good in it¬
self, and v?e also find it a means to the v?orld to come and
eternal happiness. As eternal happiness is the most excellent
thing for man, it necessarily follows that that which leads
to it is excellent; that which leads to it1knowledge and
good acts; since jood acts cannot be ^ensured except through
the knowledge of what is good, the basis of happiness in both
this world and the world to come is knowledge. There is also
another criterion by which the excellence of a thing is
judged, and this is its fruit# It is obvious that the fruit
of knowledge is nearness to God in the world to come; in this
world its fruit is honour, reverence, power and respect.
A1 Ghazali here points out that he is considering the
excellence of knov?ledge in general; specific sciences of
course vary greatly in their nature and accordingly in their
excellence also. He concludes: The excellence of learning
and teaching, (education), is fully attested by what has now
been said; for if it is established that knowledge is the
most excellent tiling, it follows that learning must be the
~ 188 • ~




By obligatory education for adults A1 Ghazali means the
education which provides the minimum amount of religious
instruction necessary for every individual. The Prophet
said that seeking education (cilm) was the duty of every
Muslim, but we have to ask what kind of education is necessary.
&1 Ghazali declares that people disagree as to the kind of
education which is obligatory. He mentions that every group
of scholars interprets cllm according to the science in
which they are engaged. The theologians (Mutakallimln).
claim that education means scholastic theology, through
which monotheism and the deity of God and His attributes
come to be understood. The jurisprudents claim that what is
meant in the Tradition is jurisprudence, for tills teaches all
the acts of worship and also what is lawful and unlawful.
The Quran commentators and the Traditionists restrict
obligatory education to the study of the Quran and Traditions,
on tiie ground that through the study of these all other
sciences come to be understood. The Sufis say that what is
meant is Sufism and this in turn is interpreted by them in
(1) Ihya9 Vol.1 p.12
different ways. Some of them maintain that it is the know¬
ledge of the soul, its states and its position near God.
Others think it is the knowledge of Sincerity and the defects
(1)
of the Soul.
After surveying these different views Al Ghazali gives
his own definition of obligatory education. To him the
truth is that knowledge (clln) is divided into practical
knowledge (glliJ al-raugaoalah). and contemplative luiowledge
( cilra al-mukashafah). He thinks that vihat is meant by ^ilm
in the Tradition is Practica1 Knowledge. This "practical
knowledge", as has been seen in connection with his theory
of knowledge, includes a spiritual element. Having decided
that the knowledge which education must seek is "practical
knowledge", Al Ghazali goes on to define what this practical
knot ledge isj that is, what are the obligatory duties with
(2)
which every adult is charged by God. (Al Ghazali explicitly
excludes the Insane from such responsibility.) These duties
are of three kinds: duties of belief: duties of practice:
and duties of omission. We will now examine what Al Ghazali
has to say about each.
Instruction on Duties of Belief.
When the individual becomes mature, when, that is, he
(1) Ihyr Vol.1 p. 13 .oi
(2) Ihyi^ Vol.1 p.13
- 190 -
reaches puberty or at latest, then he reaches years of
discretion (thought to be at about eighteen years of age),
the first duty he has to perform - given a sound mind -
is to learn and to understand the meaning of the Vlbrus of
Faith (kaliaat al-shahadah). that is to say *There is no
good but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God*. His
duty now includes using reason to understand the meaning,
but this strict obligation does not include meditation upon
the rational proofs of these truths. It is- sufficient that
he understands and accepts them as true and believes without
doubt. Understanding of the cleaning may lie secured by
acceptance of authority, for the Prophet accepted from the
uneducated Arabs a simple belief and profession of faith.
Acceptance of this kind is sufficient for the fulfilment of
what is strictly obligatory. A1 Ghazali explains that since
understanding the lords of Faith is all that is obligatory
upon an individual at this stage, "if such a person dies
(i)
afterwards, he dies obedient to God."
Furthermore, A1 Ghazali maintains that It is also part
of obligatory education that the adult should be taught the
doctrines of Heaven, the Fire, the Day of Judgment, and the
Resurrection. This knowledge is a complementary duty to
(l) Eaai' voi.i p.13
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knowing the Words of Faith, fox- as a corollary to the belief
that Muhammad is the Messenger of God, the adult must know
also the nature of the message which l^uhamaiad communicates,
name viho obeys God and his Prophet deserves Heaven, and
he who disobeys them will have the Fire as his reward.
Instruction on iXitic; of Pyaptice
The next obligation, after the fundamental doctrines
are understood and accepted, is to have instruction in the
performance of religious px*actices, Tills obligation relates
only to the fundamental ordinances, such as physical
purification, (taharah), prayer, fasting, Ramadan, alms¬
giving, and Pilgrimage,
It is not obligatory for instruction to be received on
these ordinances before the time comes for their performance.
It is obligatory only to receive instruction as a preparation
for the performance of each ordinance. For example, before
the time arrives when he is required to perform the ordinance
of prayer, he must receive instruction on physical
purificationj as also instruction on the actual forms and
gestures of prayer.
Similarly when Ramadan is due, it is the duty of the
adult to obtain instruction on fasting. If he possesses
(1) Ibya' Vol.1 p.14 - 15.
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wealth at the time of puberty, it is obligatory also to receive
certain instruction on alias-giving. The due time for the
commencement of alms-giving in such a case is the lapse of one
year from reselling puberty, and it is at this time that
instruction is obligatory. Similarly instruction on the
Pilgrimage is not necessary until the adult has intimated his
intention of performing the pilgrimage, but it then becomes
(l)
obligatory.
It is to be noted here that A1 Ghazali's view that
instruction on religious practices should be given gradually
in relation to the practical need is in line with the view
generally accepted by Muslim educationists. He considers all
strictly obligatory practices and instruction to be required
solely on religious grounds; that is to say, they are not
obligatory for ethical reasons, nor are they to be justified by
Sufi doctrines. Orthodox Muslim teaching is that only that
instruction is obligatory which is necessary for the fulfilment
of relif-ious obligation. A1 Ghasali does hold, indeed, that
there is a sense in which the practices of the Sufis are also
obligatory. But in this context, he is only concerned to say
that there are no strict obligations except the obligations of
religious belief and practice.
(1) Ihvap Vol.1 p. 14
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Duties of Omission
Positive education on duties of belief and practice is
incomplete without negative education on forbidden practices,
or duties of omission. Instruction on these is therefore
considered by A1 Ghasali as complementary to the obligatory
education described above, but is obligatory only in relation
to circumstances. He writes: "as regards forbidden acts, it
is necessary to relate the instruction on them to changing
circumstances and conditions. It is not obligatory, for
instance, for the dumb to have instruction on forbidden words,
nor is it obligatory for the blind to have instruction on
unlawful looking (nazP.ar) but an adult who lives in a
country where forbidden things are customary, if, for example,
he lives in a country where wine is taken or pig is eaten, then
(1)
instruction on these forbidden things is obligatory."
A1 Gliazali treats in a similar manner the problem of
whether instruction should be given on controversial questions
of theology as a safeguard against heretical influences. He
takes the view that such instruction is necessary for the
safeguarding of true beliefs when a person has conceived doubts
about the "Words of Faith" (kalimat al shahadah).
To understand on what occasions instruction may precede
(1) Ihva3 Vol,I p.14
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the emergence of doubts it is necessary to note A1 Ghasali's
theory of the causes of disbelief. He holds that the causes
which impair belief are of two kinds; (1) those evil thoughts
which come naturally, (2) those which are the result of environ¬
ment, as when the person lives in a country where scepticism is
widespread and heretics are respected. Such a person should be
given the necessary instruction to protect his belief from
potential doubts; but if heretics have already affected his
(1)
belief then he must have instruction to eradicate these doubts.
Optional Education
Fard kifavah is the term for 'communal duty' in Muslim
canon law. 41 Ghazall thinks it the fard kifavah of all Muslim
a-n
communities to produce,,adequate number of students of such
subjects, and practitioners of such occupations, as are
essential to the general well-being, though not obligatory or
binding on all the faithful. This work of fulfilling the fard
kifavah is both religious and secular. The religious duty is
supplementary to obligatory religious learning and duties and
helps to further the understanding of these. An account of both
groups of study follows.
He^igipi.^ Studio $
These studies are derived from God through the Prophet*
Those sciences which may be acquired through reason, experience
(1) Vol.1, p. 14
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and "hearsay" (samec )« such as arithmetic, medicine and
languages, cannot alone lead to this knowledge. Subjects
which can do so, A1 Ghazali classifies as: -
I. Main Subjects
Cl) The Quran, the Holy Book; (2) The Traditions of the
Prophet (Sumiah): (3) The general agreement of the Muslim
Community; and (4) The teaching of the Companions ( athar al¬
gahabah).
lie treats the third as essential because it leads to the
Traditions, and the fourth because the Companions lived when
the Revelation came, and could understand it, therefore, to a
degree not possible for after-comers. It is because their
experience taught them far more tiian any spoken word, or
writings, that the learned ('ulama3 ) declare that their teaching
must be upheld and followed.
II. Siapp^mentary Subject
These are subjects which according to A1 Ghazali are
derived from the previous main subjects, and go beyond the
spoken words that are recorded to examine the meanings which
minds working upon these words have arrived at. These inter¬
pretations have developed to such an extent that through and
beyond explicit teaching other truths are apprehended. One
instance of such interpretation is the saying of the Prophet:
"The judge must not judge while he is furious (ghadban)."
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Tills saying has been interpreted in several senses, for the
■word fhiadban* of which the usual meaning is "furious", is also
interpreted as "starving" and "sick". Thus the Judge is
starving or affected by sickness.
Interpretation of the main sources is of two kinds: (a)
that v/hich is connected with secular affairs, is contained in
the books of Jurisprudence, and is in charge of the Juris¬
prudents j and (b) that which is connected with the world to
the
come and is the science of the "states ofjfheart" (ahvaal al
a a lb) and their value, praiseworthy and blameworthy.
III. Introductory Subjects
These are means to the study of the Quran and the
Traditions. Because every religion emerges through a language,
h
ifence the philology, grammar and writing of that language must
be studied, so that the sacred books may be rightly understood
and expounded.
IV. CompXemqnfrary Subjects
The study of these is connected with the Quran, and it is
divided into: (a) That which deals with the different versions
of the Quran, its words and vocables; (b) That which is
connected with its content, and this is a study of the
explanation (tafsir) of the Quran which depends not only on the
Text but also on the Traditions, for the meaning of the text is
not always certain from the mere study of the words of the
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Quran, (c) Tliat which is connected with the injunctions
( ahkim) such as the question of the abrogation of injunctions
(al-nasikh Wi Mansukh), the General and Specific (alc5um wal
kliassJ and all that is contained in the study of the origin of
• «*
jurisprudence. This complementary subject deals also with the
Traditions, and includes the science of knowing the Traditionlsts,
their names and their family relationships, the names of the
Companions and their qualities, and an acquaintance with the
integrity of the narrators and their biographies in order to
distinguish between the weak and strong Traditions, and so
forth. It is complementary to the Traditions and to the
teaching of the Companions#
Sector Studjeg,
The "subjects and occupations" referred to on p.194 as
"essential to the well-being", though not "obligatory or
binding on the faithful" are, according to A1 Ghazali:
medicine as essential to physical health; arithmetic for the
handling of wills and inheritances and business maters; also
farming, weaving, building. All those who are thus employed
need not study the profounder or more scientific aspects of
their skills, but sane should do so#
Another kind of secular education, which includes the
(1) Ihyip Vol.1 p.15 - 6.
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study of good poetry arid history, is optional but not In the
sense of communal duty.
There is a blameworthy part of secular education vihich
includes the study of bewitchment (al-sihr), talismans~
XI)
(talasim) and jugglery (shacbashah). etc. A1 Ghazali asserts
that tliis must be excluded from the curriculum.
After reviewing A1 Ghazali's scheme of religious and
secular education it remains to consider the underlying ideas
which direct his policy in designing these. In these ideas
the following are the governing principles in summary form:
1. A1 Ghazali's religious purpose here inspires and dictates
his whole system of education. He refers to the twofold dogma
- that God is the Supreme Power and that the Prophet
Muhammad is His messenger, as kalimat al sbaliadah. Belief in
the Hereafter arises from this faith, therefore consciousness
of the awards of Heaven and the punishments of Hell must be
firmly established in the adult being. The first stage of
education is concerned with these beliefs.
2. Advanced or specialised theological teaching is not
obligatory. But unless it is studied by some sufficiently for
the protection of the Faith, there is danger of heresy.
3. The duty to learn about worship and ritual is obligatory.
(1) Ihya* Vol.1 p. I5.i°i.
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To neglect it would be disobedience to God, unless it were the
result of ignorance,
4. Instruction about forbidden thoughts and activities,
especially those most likely to occur in a pupil*s daily life,
is obligatory. Such instruction must be explicit and detailed
about both wrong thinking and wrong doing, so that both may be
recognised and avoided. This can be called negative education.
5. The obligatory studies should not be imposed on the
student all at once at the time of puberty but rather by
degrees. The sort of instruction necessary at each stage is
determined by the duties which have to be undertaken at that
stage. The course is progressively related to the changing
life of the individual as it is developed in accordance v;ith
the ordinances of religion.
6« The obligatory education which is suggested in the
Tradition of the Prophet, namely, "that seeking education is
the duty of every Muslim" appears to mean education for all,
male and female. With respect to women The Tradition does not
explicitly Indicate the necessity for education, but on the
above evidence it is fair to assume that this obligation in
respect of religious duties implies that they were also to be
given the necessary educational preparation for these duties.
hi Ghasali is orthodox in his general view here and we may
therefore conclude that he intended his educational scheme to
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apply to women also. Though the word Muslim In Its
grammatical usage applies to the male,, yet there is room for
the assumption that- according to the Arabic traditions the
term "man" sometimes includes both sexes, especially when its
usage is connected with fundamental religious duties where
man and woman are on equal footing.
6. Studies included in "optional" education are divided into
religious and non-religious. Religious knowledge originates
from the supernatural, hence neither reason alone nor human
experience alone is a sufficient guide to it. The deepest
insights of religions consciousness are a matter of revelation.
Education in such knowledge can only come from authority, hence
the Quran as a text-book and also the Traditions of the Prophet
are the main sources of such education.
7, Secular education is that which is connected with human
experience, and depends mainly upon reason and human skill.
All sciences, arts and crafts which serve to advance human
welfare in this world belong to this category, and include
medicine, arithmetic, geometry; the principal trades and
professions such as farming, weaving, building; the
supplementary trades which provide the principal trades with
the necessary services, such as iron-working for farming and
some other industries, and gleaning and spinning for weaving;
/the connected trades such as bleaching and tailoring for
weaving.
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8. The foregoing sciences and crafts on which the life of
the individual and the structure of society completely
depend^ are purely secular. On tlie other hand there are some
other secular studies which are intimately connected with
religion in the sense that they help in the understanding of
it. These are jurisprudence, languages, grammar, phonetics,
the interpretation of the Quran and the sources of religious
law, history, and poetry.
9# All sciences which are praiseworthy have a religious
significance, for they serve as a means to the fulfilment of
religious aims. For example, A1 Ghazali considers juris¬
prudence as a secular science for the reason that its function
is to deal with human relations in order to establish
security among the members of society. The jurisprudent is
the person who is specialized in law, who can advise the ruler
(Sultan) as to the right methods of governing people so that
their well-being in this world is secured. From this point
of view jurisprudence is a secular science. On the other hand
it is closely connected with religion because secular life or
the life of this world is like a seed-bed for the next and the
ultimate aim of religion can be secured only through living in
tills world in preparation for the world to come. Thus
(1)
jurisprudence can also be considered as a religious science.
(1) Ihyi' Vol.1 p. 16.10
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10. A1 Ghazali includes in his second group of Religious
Studies (the supplementary studies) both jurisprudence and
the "science of the world to come", and both are optional
studies. Tliis is a popular view that is held by the Muslim
scholars, but A1 Ghazali goes further and maintains in accord
with the view ox^the Sufis, that spiritual knowledge is an
obligatory duty.
11. A1 Ghazali has excluded scholastic theology (*ilu al-
kalam) and philosophy (falsafah) from his curriculum for the
following readoris:
a) Scholastic theology is not regarded by Iiim as an
independent science, on the ground that all that is contained
in it is either in the nature of useful proofs which are also
contained in the Quran and the Traditions or blameworthy
disputations and sectarian controversies, most of which are
trivial. Some of these studies have no connection at all with
i
religion and were not recognised in the time of the early
Muslim, who rather considered such study as heretical. But Ai
Ghazali does not agree with this total condemnation. He
believes that the justification for the condemnation has
disappeared as a result of the recurring heresies which are
liable to distract people from the simple doctrines of the
(1) Ihya3 Vol.1 p. 19^1.
t
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Quran and the Traditions and so create a need for proofs and
theological demonstrations. Therefore what was forbidden in
the early times lias become permissible under the pressure of
necessity; indeed the study of such a minimum amount of
theology as may be necessary for refuting heretics has
finally became one of the communal duties#
Philosophy
b) yFalsafah is also held by ill Ghazali not to be an
independent science but rather a group of four brandies: -
Ci) laafrhcanatftgg
The study of mathematical sciences is permissible to all
adults except those who are weak and liable to be led by
these sciences to other blameworthy sciences, for many people
who have been engaged in them Ixave eventually become heretics#
On tliis account the weak should be prevented from plunging into
them,
(ii) Formal Logic.
Formal logic, which consists In the devising of proofs
and definitions according to special rules in order to prove
theological principles^is a branch of philosophy which hi
Ghazali believes should be considered as a part of theology.
(iii) Metaphysics, ( Ualflyyat).
Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy which is concerned
with the investigation into supernatural questions such as
the Deity of God and His attributes, A1 Ghazali maintains
-
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that it is contained in scholastic theology and that the
(1)
philosophers have not introduced into it any method which is
substantially different from that of tlie theologians. All
they have Introduced is theories most of which are irreligious
and some of which are heretical , for example "iStizal". the
doctrine of the nuctazilah.a th .ological Muslim sect^is not an
independent science, but is a theological doctrine professed
by a group of theologians who are extreme thinkers and v)ho have
introduced false doctrines. The Falasifah in this sense are
no more than a theological group.
(iv) i'latuyal Philosophy or Phyw?
Al Giiazali maintains that natural philosophy is partly in
disagreement with orthodox religion and is therefore not to be
recognised as praiseworthy knowledge. Part of it however is
concerned with investigation into the qualities and
characteristics of matter and the nature of physical and
chemical change. The fmiction of this science is similar to
the function of medicine, but with the difference that medicine
is concerned with the human body, its health and disease,
while natural science is concerned with bodies generally, in
(2}
respect of their changes and motion.
(1) The word here refers to a special branch of Theological
Schools.
(2) Ihva* Vol.1 p. 2o.vl>.
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The Dufjeff of S-gudentfl
Adult students have ethical duties and
regulations to observe, which are necessary if the right aims
of education are to be achieved. In this chapter we shall
giva a brief account of these duties.
1. Purity of the Heart.
True knowledge requires spiritual purification, which
frees the soul from evil and makes possible the "worship of
the heart". To attempt this worship of the heart (inward
worship) without spiritual purification would be in vain, just
as the outward actions of 'worship would be vain without
physical purification. The light of knowledge is shed into
the heart by God through the agency of His angels. His angels
do not enter any dwelling unless it is cleansed and purified.
If the heart is to be the right place for knowledge, it must
be prepared for the entry of the angels who bring knowledge
into it. To the objection that there are many students who
are of bad character but still attain knowledge, A1 Ghazali
replies that knowledge of such a sort is far removed from that
genuine knowledge which is effectual and leads to eternal
happiness. He quotes Ibn Masild's saying "knowledge is not
virtuosity but is a light which is shed into the heart".
2. Devotion and concentration.
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Since one cannot pay attention to two things at the same
time and personal ties are disturbing, the student must
reduce his wordly interests and leave Ms home and relatives#
A1 Ghasali likens unconcentratod thought to the water of
a canal which is carried off in branch channels; the earth
moreover absorbs some of it and the air evaporates some of it
and at the end nothing is left to reach the farm#
3» nihility aftd Obedlyftqe.
The student must be neither supercilious nor imperious
but must completely submit to his teacher and listen to his
direction just as the ignorant patient listens to the
direction of a kind and expert doctor# He must be humble
towards his teacher and ask for no honour or reward except in
serving him. It is a sign of superciliousness to be too haughty
to learn except from those who are renowned; moreover it is
also a sign of great stupidity, for knowledge is the -way to
salvation and happiness, and a man viio was seeking to be
saved from a wild beast would hardly make it an issue whether
Ms rescuer were a famous person or unknown. The student must
be to Ms teacher like fertile soil which lias received rain,
absorbs the rain equally in every particle and is fully
responsive to it. Whenever the teacher suggests to him a
method of learning which he thinks wrong he must obey and
leave aside Ms own. opinion, realising that what seems to him
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an error on the part of his teacher will benefit him, while what
seems to himself to be correct will not; for experience shows
that many things which appear strange at first, turn out to be
of great value. A1 Ghazali raises the possible objection that
this is inconsistent with the freedom of questioning which is
mentioned in the Quran verse "ask those who know if you do not
know". He agrees with the principle suggested in this verse, and
he says: "Yes, it is so, but the questioning must be restricted
to the limit which the teacher allows; for questioning about
what is beyond one's standard of understanding is blameworthy and
the teacher is a better judge of v/hat knowledge is suitable for
his student and the appropriate time for revealing it. Before
this moment, any questioning would be untimely."
4. The Beginner gaaji bvoifl agaflsmifi Atoa&ga aM ^ibjgujues*
JlcL
The beginner must be safeguard- against disputed and diversity
ia
of views, whatever the studies he is engaged^may be, secular or
religious, for such disputes will confuse his mind and discourage
him from pursuing learning. Therefore he must first master the
doctrines held and expounded by his teacher and afterwards he may
pay attention to other views and problems. This duty of
acceptance only applies when the teacher's views are personal
convictions; if on the other hand he lias no such views and his
method is to quote the views of others and the accepted
eoramentaries upon them, then the student must be on his guard, for
— 2 -
such a teacher would be more liable to mislead than to guide,
for the blind cannot be well guided by the blind.
5• General education before specialization.
The student must first have a general education, for he
must not be without knowledge of the aims and purpose of any
of the praiseworthy sciences. After he has secured this,
and if he has the opoortunity for further study, he may take
up any science he likes; but if he is unable to study it
profoundly he must confine himself to the most important
of its problems.
6. Learning must be systematic.
The student must consider the logical order of
sciences, and must not engage in any one before he has
studied that which is logically prior to it. There is a
hierarchical system of sciences and the successful student
is he who understands this hierarchy and in the study of
each science directs himself to an understanding of how it
leads to that which is immediately above it.
7. Academic Toleration.
The student must not be prejudiced against any
science because of a dispute that has occurred among
its exponents nor because of an error committed by one
or more of them, moreover he must not be prejudiced
because of inconsistency between their
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practice and their theory. For this reason some people have
abandoned philosophical and juristic studies; others are
sceptical about medical studies because of errors committed by
the learned, for example, a doctor's mistake in practice. Others
believe in the validity of astrology because of a successful
prediction by an astrologer. Both these attitudes are wrong^
for a thing should be investigated and measured for itself; as
Ali said "do not know the truth through men but know the truth,
and then you know men",
8. The Criterion of Superiority of Sciences.
The student should know what it is that distinguishes a
superior science. There are two separate criteria of this
superiority: A science is superior because of either (1) the
superiority of its aim (fruit); or (2) the precision and
conclusiveness of its proofs. An example of one science being
superior to another in respect of the first criterion is to be
found in a comparison of religion and medicine. The aim of the
science of religion is concerned with eternal life and the aim of
medicine is concerned with temporal life, therefore the science
of religion is superior. An example of one science being superior
to another in respect of the second criterion, is to be found in
comparing mathematics and astronomy. Mathematics is superior
because of the precision and conclusiveness of its proofs. If,
however, mathematics is contrasted with medicine, then medicine
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Is superior in respect of its aim, mathematics is superior to
medicine in respect of its proofs, but since the criterion of the
"aim" is the more ultimate criterion, in A1 Ghazali's vieus,
medicine is superior to mathematics. Thus it becomes clear that
the uost excellent of all sciences is the knowledge of God, and
the knowledge of the means that leads to it#
9* teedif'te and u.ittetb Ajas ?f the student.
The Immediate aim of the student should be the adornment and
embellishment of his inner life by virtue. His ultimate aim raust
be to come to God and ascend to the neighbourhood of the heavenly
community of the angels and the saints; his aim must not be
leadership, wealth, power, or rivalry. If this nearness to God
is the ultimate aim of the student, he must inevitably seek tliat
which comes closest to his aim, that is to say, the "science of
the world to come." Nevertheless, the student must not despise
the other sciences which are praiseworthy.
10. Isisasaa aM tftsta Alas*
The student should consider the relationship of sciences to
their aim. He should both give preference to the immediate over
the remote and to the important over the unimportant. The
important is that which concerns us and what concerns us is our
interest in this world and the world to come. Since it is not
possible to gain the pleasures of both this world and the world
to eorae, as Is mentioned in the Quran, then the choice must be
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that which is the more important; and the pleasure of the world
to come is eternal and therefore, concerns us more. This world
should therefore be regarded as a temporary dwelling and the
body as a riding animal (markab) serving the purposes of the
soul. All action should become means to the one end
^ the meeting
with God in which all the eternal pleasure is found.
The Dulles of the Tpacker
A1 Gliazali points out that man in relation to knowledge has
four states Just as in his relation to wealth. The seeker of
wealth lias:
1) - A state of collecting, or acquisition.
... j£-'
2) - A state of saving that which he gains and so becoming
self-sufficient.
3) - A state of spending on himself, benefiting from what
he lias acquired.
4) - A state of spending on others, or benefiting ethers
through generosity; this is the noblest state.
So, too, with knowledge, there is a state of acquiring, a state
of storing, a state of reflecting or benefiting oneself, and a
state of imparting to others; this last is also the noblest, for
he who knows, practises his knowledge, and teaches, is described
as great in the realm of heaven, and is like the sun which shines
(1) For the whole of this section see Ihya* Vol.1 pp.43,fe- 47.
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and illuminates. He who teaches and does not practise his know-
ledge, is like the book which benefits others, while it is of no
benefit to itself, or the candle which gives light to others while
it is burning itself away. A1 Ghazali declares that the person
who is engaged in teaching is performing an honourable task and
in order to fulfil it he should observe the following duties
and regulations:
1. lie should be kind to his pupils and treat them as if they
were his children; the Prophet said: " I am to you like a father
to liis children". His kindness must be directed to saving them
from the Fire in the world to come. Thus the teacher's
responsibility towards the pupil is greater than that of his
parents, for the parent is responsible for the existence and
temporal life of the child, whereas the teacher is responsible
for his happiness in eternal life.
That A1 Ghazali means by "the teacher", is, as he explains,
the teacher of spiritual know/ledge, or of that secular knowledge
which is connected with our aim for the future life; as to
teaching for the sake of this world only, this is considered by
A1 Ghazall as dangerous and eventually destructive.
2. A1 Ghazali urges the teacher to follow the example of the
Prophet in teaching without payment. He should not charge any
fee for his tuition, nor must he expect any reward for it. He
must teach for the sake of God. He must not feel that he is
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doing any favour to his students, though they are in fact under
an obligation to him. On the contrary he must consider that
they are doing him a favour in surrendering their hearts to him
to be planted with knowledge, so that he (through planting know¬
ledge in them) draws near to God. A1 Ghazall draws the analogy
of a man lending you his land In order to plant/It for yourself
something which is beneficial to you; the profit which you gain
is more than that which the owner of the land gains. So also
your reward from God, for teaching, is greater than that of the
lit
student. This is the sense of the C^ranic Verse: "Oh, my people
I would not ask you any money for It; verily my reward is only
from God", A1 Ghazali states that all the \«altli there is in
this world should be "a servant of the body" and the body is the
bearer or "riding animal" of the soul. Knowledge, however,
should be that which is served, so that the excellence of the
soul may be secured. Therefore, he who seeks wealth tlirough
knowledge, inverts the functions of the servant and the served.
3. In advising and guiding his students the teacher must
prevent them from proceeding to any stage of knowledge before
they are prepared for it, or engaging in any difficult science
before they have completed the study of the easy. He must make
clear to his students that the aim of seeking knowledge Is
nearness to God and not leadership, self-assertion, or rivalry.
He must make these things appear to thera as unlovely as possible.
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If the teacher discovers that a student is seeking knowledge for
secular purposes only, then he must examine whether the student
is interesting himself in blameworthy studies, or in praiseworthy
studies. , If the student is interested
in a purely secular aspect of jurisprudence, that is to say, the
differences between jurisprudential schools, or in the blame¬
worthy dialectics of theology, then his teacher must prevent him
from engaging in such studies. The Religious studies are the
study of the Quran and the Traditions and also the sciences in
which the early Muslims were engaged, namely, the "science" of
the qualities of the soul and the method of combating its
defects. On the other hand, the student may be interested in
sciences which belong to the religious sciences, but be
interested in them for secular reasons. The teacher should not
turn him away from these sciences, for there is hope that he may
eventually discover from them the wickedness of his purely
secular aim. For there is embodied in these pralsev/orthy
sciences the seeds of knowledge, which may lead him to the fear
of God and the disdain of tills world, and thus turn him from Ms
secular aim.
4# A1 Ghazali advises the teacher to use an indirect approach
in Ms moral instruction. lie declares that this is one of the
most delicate problems in the art of education. The teacher
must restrain the student from misdemeanour through suggestion
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and not by direct correction, through kindness rather than
reproach. Undisguised correction will damage the relationship
between the teacher and his student and will cause the student
to be obstinate and aggressive. On the other hand, the method
of suggestion stimulates the virtuous and intelligent students
and provokes them to think out the meanings of his hints.
5* A1 Ghazali does not want the teacher to be one-sided
tovjards his subject, or to be prejudiced against other subjects*
He points out that the teacher who is in charge of a particular
science should not depreciate others. He gives the example of
the teacher of grammar who underrates the science of juris¬
prudence, or the teacher of jurisprudence who underrates the
sciences vtiich are concerned with the Traditions and the Quran,
or the teacher of theology who distracts students from the study
of jurisprudence. These qualities of one-sidedness and contempt
for others' studies M Ghazali maintains to be blameworthy ones
which teachers must avoid. The teacher who is in charge of a
single science must widen the outlook of his students and pave
for them the road to other sciences. If he is in charge of more
than one science he must consider orderly progress in promoting
the student from one study to the next.
6. The teacher must take into consideration the mental attain¬
ment of his student. He must not give him work which lies beyond
Ms understanding, for tliis would discourage him and cause him
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confusion. A1 Ghasali quotes the statement of Ali (the cousin
of the Prophet) when he said, pointing to Ms chest, "here is
an abundance of knowledge had I found for it bearers". A1
Ghasali comments that Ali spoke the truth for the hearts of the
pious are the "graves" of hidden knowledge Caspar) , and the
learned should not disclose all he knows to anyone, especially
to him who does not understand it*
7* A1 Ghasali emphasizes that special care must be given by
the teacher to the backward student* He must teach him only
the simple tMngs that suit his intelligence, without
discouraging him by suggesting to Mm that there is beyond the
simple work something more difficult which he cannot understand.
Tills has been referred to in connection with the discussion of
individual differences.
8* A1 Ghazali urges the teacher to set a good example to Ms
students. The teacher must practise his knowledge so that Ms
conduct does not contradict his teacMng. He points out that
knowledge is apprehended by insight, while action is perceived
by sight. Since the number of those capable of perception
greatly exceed the number of those capable of insight, any
contradiction between a teacher's practice and his preaching
would be a great obstacle to acceptance of his teaching. To
illustrate this, he says that the teacher who is to be a guide
must be to Ms student lilt© the stamp that is impressed upon
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the clay. There would be no effect on the clay had there been
no engraving on the stamp, Another example is the stick and
its shadow; How could the shadow be straight if the stick viere
(1)
crooked!?
(1) For the whole of this section see Ihya' Vol,I pp.49?- 52.
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CONCLUSION
Generally speaking the most valuable features of A1 Ghazali's
theory of education are those that come to him through the stem
lessons of his own experience. It Is therefore helpful,to
review his doctrine as a whole, the clear system of pedagogic
procedure which it shapes, and the convictions and controversies
out of which these emerged against the background of his
spiritual biography, of which a brief sketch was attempted in
the first pages of this study*
A1 Ghazall lias tasted the bitterness and .frustrations of
scepticism passing into unbelief, and had restored Ms faith by
a long course of hard thinking assisted by Sufi discipline.
Accordingly he applies himself to the task of protecting youth
against the dangers to which he had himself succumbed by a
system of instruction that was to place the truth that he had
found upon a firm foundation of rationality stabilised by a
traditional and religious discipline.
The sense of a spiritual unity underlying multiplicity of
religious doctrines and practices vMch is apparent throughout
Al Ihva' led A1 Ghazali to go beyond the accepted requirements
of physical asceticism, and to seek and enjoin a discipline of
thought and study. In Ms practical plan for spiritual
education he takes what is relevant from his Sufi training
excluding vhat derives from contemplative knowledge.
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In the searching examination of the different trends of
Islamic theology which he undertook in the course of his search
for truth he had observed how easily controversy on a vital
theological issue could develop round single words, to which
different scholars or sects were unconsciously assigning
different meanings with the result that their argument proceeded
at cross purposes.
It was with an acute recognition of the dangers from such
misunderstandings that he elaborated his definition of key
words - one of the most significant and original features of
his work* His purpose was to assign to words a clear
limitation and to eliminate any mysterious connection with the
tilings they symbolize and to remove confusing changes and
developments in meaning*
That M Gbazali was complete master of his own terminology
cannot be assertedj indeed he sometimes sets his translators
and editors hard tasks in deciding between the different
possible senses of the word he uses and in resolving the
apparent inconsistencies of a theory. Such occasional lapses
are indeed inevitable! for A1 Ghazali was not merely breaking
new ground in several fields, but thinking and building many
centuries ahead of his age. Often he provides a key to his own
ambiguities in the vivid analogies with which he illustrates
his thought. That Ms parables from daily life such as when
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water wells up when a well is dug, it follows that innate
ideas will emerge when the childb mind is probed, have retained
their freshness through eight and a half centuries is perhaps
because they meant something more to A1 Ghazali than mere
illustrations of perplexing points; they were evidence to him
of the pervading spiritual unity that he discerned under the
apparent complexity of phenomena,
Al Ghazali*s theory of how we attain knowledge appears at
first sight eclectic, a medley of unrelated and sometimes
conflicting elements; only in the light of his whole
intellectual and spiritual development is it revealed as
peculiarly his own - a logical corollary to his fruitless
quest among contemporary schools of thought for a theory of
knowledge that he could accept as true. In the course of his
search he load conceived a deep mistrust of knowledge gained by
acceptance of authority; hence the one element common to the
four sources of knowledge that he conceived as true is that the
ideas are received into the mind at first hand. This fourfold
division of the sources of knowledge, of which an account was
given in Part II is Al Gliazali* s contribution to episteraology.
The theory aims at being logical rather than mystical; but it
is mainly the logic of his own native sanity; and when he
ventures into a formal Aristotelian system, the results are not
impressive.
- 221 -
The division is through and through originalj for, when
elements of other systems have been dram upon, Al Ghazali lias
restricted and manipulated then into conformity with the rest
of Ms theory. Thus Ms confining of innate knowledge to
theological facts and axiomatic universals introduces a major
limitation into the theory of innate ideas as held by Plato,
and admits "reminiscence" into Ms educational theory only so
far as relates to these kinds of knowledge. Then the delayed
emergence (until puberty) of innate ideas gives full play to
of
his doctrine that the larger pa r^knowledge comes through the
channels of sense perception ani through the activity of the
mind working upon itself. These two tenets - elaborated six
centuries later by Locke as "Sensation" and "Reflection"
undoubtedly place Al Ghazali 'well ahead of his age as a bold
and progressive thinker. Unfortunately, in elaborating
"Reflection" and "the reasoMng process" he confuses the issue.
He is here on the border-line between theories of knowledge and
education, and, in Ms zeal to score a victory for the
operations of reason over the acceptance of authority, he
speaks of the syllogistic process as an instrument for the
production of nei knowledge• Now the syllogism deduces the
consequences of premisses that are taken for granted, and the
conclusion is implicit in these premisses, Al Ghasali
prescribes, for the advancement of knowledge, a progressive
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chain of syllogisms, each one containing elements from its
immediate forerunner. One may possibly infer that what he lias
in mind in speaking of "reasoning" is something like the
process of induction, though he purports to be speaking of
syllogism in its simplest form. A more probable explanation
is that A1 Ghazall, in Ms concern to prescribe a mode of
thought that takes nothing for granted, failed to recognise
the limitation of the syllogism and used the word in a much
more inclusive sense.
To complete Ms theory of knowledge A1 Ghasali breaks his
self-imposed ban on contemplative thought, and reveals a
loftier vision than Ms Muslim teachers could rise to. The
conception is a splendid ones a knowledge beyond the scope of
sense perception and the reasoning faculty, accessible only to
the fully purified heart (therefore acquired, not innate), and
entering the heart through its inner door, from the divine
realm. The analogy employed to make it "clear even to simple
minds" is worthy of the conception: a pool which, if deepened,
can reach a spring of water purer and more constant than the
surface streams. The power and poetry of the Thole exposition
carry the reader with them. But not so A1 Ghasali himself;
and it is unfortunate that, detecting a flaw in the logic of
#
Ms conception, he sought to rectify it by an appeal to the
tlieory of "forms" or "ideas". Mo such rectification seems
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called for; and A1 Ghazali's argument is not happy, ov.ing,
perhaps, to his insufficient grasp of the theory of "forms"•
In his epistemology A1 Ghazali is essentially idealistic;
the relation between mind and reality occupies the forefront
of his theory; his belief in the antecedence of reality, and
in the mini as a mirror to reflect its images, brings him into
line with the scholastic theory of knowledge# But 41 Ghazali's
idealism is not an innovation# He is rather an example of the
contemporary tendency of religious thought. Even the Quran
embodies the element of this idealism as we see in the principle
of the "Preserved Tablet", on which the original knowledge was
written long before the creation of the Universe. The
conception of the mind as a mirror of reality is clearly shorn
in Al Ghazali's use of the similes, in particular his
conception of the "knowing Conditions" as comparable to the
conditions under which the mirror reflects the images of
visible objects shows well the clear relation between his
employment of simile and his epistemological theory; indeed
the wealth of pictorial images with which he enrichdd the
scholarship of his day is equalled by none of his Muslim
contemporaries# His division of knowledge or belief into (1)
that based on authority (2) that based on logical grounds (3)
that based on vision, is in line with Plato's conception of
the categories of knowledge, vhieh is discussed in the sixth
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book of tiie "Republic".
A1 Ghazali did not recognise as "knowledge" that which is
based on acceptance of authority. The knowledge that is
based on tiie tliinkers own logical proofs is mora reliable, but
is not the true lmow'leda9t which is based on "certainty". This
is the knowledge achieved by the saints, and corresponds to
the vision of the eye. It is only a step to the highest know¬
ledge which is to be fully gained only in the world to come,
fiere the doctrine of the Vision of God occupies and directs
the whole of Ms thinking. In this doctrine he is not original,
but a true representative and an able exponent of Sufi thought.
The way to the true knowledge that is attainable in this
world is outlined in a mystical scheme, which does not in
substance differ from the scheme of his Sufi teachers. But A1
Ghazali's characteristic division of knowledge into
"practical" and"contemplative" in the strict Sufi sense of the
words stands as one of his peculiarities. A further
distinction is between religious and secular knowledge - the
supernatural knowledge which comes tlirough the Revelation of
tlie prophets and the natural knowledge viiich comes through the
exercise of human reasonj he considers these two as operating
as an indivisible unit, such that its parts can only work if
they work together. Here Ms analogy of food corresponding to
rational knowledge and medicine to religious knowledge shows
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clearly his attitude towards both orders of knowledge and
the relation
consequently/between religious end secular education.
In the field of moral education £L Ghazali stands out as
pioneer and master, the first Muslim educationalist to '
investigate the building of character on a grand scale. He was,
I believe, convinced that moral education could most effectually
further the purposes of the practical part of his spiritual
teaching. 'To him "practical'" and moral education were distinct
but it is no exaggeration to say that they virtually constitute
one body of ethical teaching. The scientific part of his moral
scheme is platonic and ari stotelian; the rest is substantially
of Sufi character. Regulation of passions and desires dominate
both his Sufi and morel, schemes and bring the two Into close
relationship. This accounts for the great Importance he attached
to the training of character.
Despite the severity of religious discipline to which he had
himself been subject the austerity he proscribed in bringing up
children was tempered by a great moderation and sanity. His
moral and*sufi scheme overshadowed his whole aim, which was to
equip the young with right moral standards and Instil qualities
that would regulate their spiritual future. Hence training must
start right from birth, when the nature is neither good nor bad,
but destined to be made one or other by its environment. Hence
A1 Ghazali1s fear of corruption from outside influences; hence.
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too, the paramount importance, in his scheme, of parents,
teachers, and the child1s own little world*
The reader is struck by Ai Ghazali*s silence concerning
elementary academic instruction* Since, however, this silence
extends to reading and writing, it may be supposed that the first
steps in general education are to be achieved during the period
when he insists that the children should be learning the Quran
by heart 4,
In the later period of childhood, the preparatory stage
preceding manhood, religious instruction plays only a small part,
and is to be directed exclusively towards moral aims*
Freedom in the sense of modern "experimental ism" finds no
place in Al Ghazali»s scheme since his child is conceived as clay
in the hands of his parents end teachers* He is to have no
choice but to be fashioned in the educational mould that Al
Ghazali himself designs* Underlying all these restrictions to
be imposed upon the child is the "fear" factor, which pervades
the whole of his educational theory*
In the matter of adult education Al Ghazali keeps strictly
to the line of Quranic precept in accordance with general
orthodox practice. Concerning secular education, however, his
systematisation Qf subjects necessary to the vellbeing of the
community such as the principal arts and crafts is of interest
as proving that his mystical leanings did not affect his
- 227 ~
recognition of man's need of secular education. His notion of
such education is, of course, r< mote from that of our own day;
but is of special interest in its coming from a man of other¬
worldly outlook and pursuits. It constitutes the practical side
of his theory that rational knowledge has a function similar to
that of food in relation to the body.
Al G-hazali is, in my judgment, the outstanding educational
figure, not merely of his own age, but of the whole history of
Islam. Bearing the stamp of his powerful personality his system
should be designated "ghazalian". It is built upon his firm
belief in the testimony of his own experience; its merits rest
partly on his intellectual gifts of observation, lucidity, and
a happy balancing of theory and practice, partly and perhaps
mainly, on his independence of mind and judgment. In defence of
his principles he was a great fighter: he did battle with the
theologian, the jurist, and the philosopher, in each of whose
vocations he was himself pre-eminent; he was a devoted sufl, who
looked Jealously into the credentials of professing sufis; he
was an orthodox Muslim, yet a fearless innovator; he condemned
philosophy, yet it was part of his legacy to make it popular;
his own philosophy embraced many elements of human thought and
was the outcome of a thorough examination of current schools,
yet its final message was startlingly original.
Nearly nine centuries divide Al G-hazali fbo m the present
generation; but once or twice in this study his mind has been
shown working far ahead of his time. Let us see whether, and at
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what points, it has made contact with the educational thought of
our own. His language is not scientific; his theories are
presented through the ancient medium of parable and personiflcatioi
They have the freshness of pioneer work, the keenness that distin¬
guishes a single mind's productions, but is blunted in controversy
and the apparatus of administration. We must look below these
surface differences. Al G-hazali's fear of authority as a guide to
knowledge is exaggerated and leads him into error; but it contains
scientific
the germ of th< / method. His defining of keywords shows
strange overlapplngs of usage; but its motive, the purging of
scientific terminology, has led, in our time, to a science of
meaning. He has thus planned some of the instruments of modern
education, though his designs are archaic. Concerning the mater¬
ial to be fashioned, Al Ghazali's penetrating insight has given an
extraordinarily true account of the human mind, its dangers and
defences; but modern implements will probe further. So we come
to the purpose of education - its near and distant objectives.
As for the latter, there is divergence between the modern educatior
alist's outlook and Al Ghazali's: the sole purpose of the latter
is to e uip the soul for its Journey to God; the primary aim of
education today is to e uip the individual for his walk in life.
Yet it is exactly in the problem of how and what to teachjthat
Al Ghazall's system comes into a certain identity with our own.
His message to the present-day educationalist is to confirm that
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the building of character must keep pace with Intellectual
growth, that the development of the moral outlook is an
integral part of the training of the mind.
This 18 Al Grhazali as I have understood him; a man I venture
to enrol 1 among the great men of educational inspiration in
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